Violence and Democracy in Colombia
The Conviviality of Citizenship Defects in Colombia’s Nation-State
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Abstract
This essay aims to utilize the concept of conviviality for connecting the coexistence of seemingly contradictory phenomena in Colombia. It argues that while conviviality implies a normative content – a society in which members do not slaughter each other is better than one in which members resort to violence – the meekness of that normative claim suggests that it is better used as an analytical tool that seeks to connect the contradictions that coexist in the real lifeworld. Colombia’s history of violence and democracy is such a contradictory case. Comparativists have situated Colombia’s deficits on the “extra-institutional playing field”, lamenting that it is a “besieged” or “threatened democracy”. Conviviality helps us to specify these “extra-institutional” defects by suggesting impediments exogenous and endogenous to the state-building logic of the Colombian nation-state.

Keywords: Colombia | state-building | violence | democracy | conviviality

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1. Introduction

The late Colombian sociologist Eduardo Santa once wrote that Colombians were born with a party identity attached to their umbilical cord (Santa 1964), so intensely and entrenched was the partisan animosity that repeatedly plunged the country on South America’s northern shore into destructive bloodshed. Long before the revolutionary violence associated with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), or the drug-infused violence associated with Pablo Escobar, Colombian politics have been consistently violent for the entirety of the two centuries since independence in the early 1800s. Since 1948, Colombians have experienced an uninterrupted large-scale escalation of organized violence that has killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions.

There is another side to that story, though. While Colombia has been a violent country for the better part of its post-colonial history, it has also been a democratic country. Universal male suffrage was already the law of the land in the mid-19th century. The country’s numerous constitutions in that same period went much further in the guarantees of rights than their European counterparts. During the 20th century, when much of South America went down the perils of autocratic military dictatorships, Colombia did not. The contradictions do not stop there. While parts of the country have seen the absence of the state and the presence of armed non-state actors (ANSA), these conflict zones in Colombia’s civil war need not be mired in destructive violence. In fact, sometimes they appear orderly at times.

A kaleidoscopic view of Colombia’s history shows that destructive traits coexist with constructive characteristics – and often over long periods. It is that reason that makes the Colombian case so valuable for conviviality studies. First, while conviviality does contain a normative element that values a non-violent society over a violent one, this element is relatively timid. Nevertheless, the analytical component is of higher importance for this study, especially since it asks scholars to explore the coexisting contradictions in Colombia’s everyday life and politics, both historically and contemporarily. I want to argue that conviviality helps us explore and disaggregate the “Colombian puzzle” – a democratic polity that coexists with high levels of violence – and suggest several specifications. It is known that democracy is compatible with reasonable degrees of inequality (Huntington 1991), yet, Colombia shows that democracy, coupled with clientelist patterns in the periphery, is compatible even with extreme inequality and insurmountable barriers to access to political power and material prosperity. Such clientelist patterns were intrinsic to the state-building process in Colombia. The violence that emanates from those patterns – in the last three decades, mostly in the form of paramilitary violence – is not a form of plural statehood, as it is endogenous to state-building and indirect rule. The second phenomenon, orderly areas in conflict-affected
zones of the country, however, is a form of plural statehood, as it is often a function of rebel governance that specifically and directly challenges the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.

I first discuss the normative origin of conviviality, and the analytical importance couched within that concept. The paper then introduces the context of the Colombian case, specifically the high degree of socio-economic inequality and contours of what comparativists term “the Colombian Puzzle”. I will provide explanations for that phenomenon by explaining the history of clientelism in Colombia that has historically structured the production of political power and, despite improvements in democratic governance, has survived. I will then explore how armed non-state actors develop caveats of citizenship in areas under their control. This section is based on studies compiled with the CONPEACE (CONPEACE n.d.) project at the University of Oxford.

2. The Analytics of Conviviality

Recent work, including in the Mecila Working Paper Series, have crystallized a contentious line in conviviality studies that is situated between a normative component implied in a society capable of containing violence, and the analytical aims to identify the contradictions evident in the empirical lifeworld that implicitly pose a threat to conviviality. While contentious, I argue that conviviality does indeed espouse a normative concern in claims that argue for a “healthy society” that can manage conflict. The normative element is that a less conflict-ridden society is better than a conflict-ridden one. The difficulty arises because the very notion of a healthy society that can manage conflict includes an analytical component as well: what are those components that make a society less conflict-ridden despite societal tensions (material, political, and ideational)? The danger for the researcher is to lose sight of the different dimensions of the concept, conflate the analytical with the normative implication, and create not much more than an ideological assertion for social life. Moreover, since the normative claim in conviviality is rather timid – less violence says nothing about how such violence ought to be contained and could very well imply power relations that are stable, and thereby less violent, but nevertheless repressive – the analytics of the relations that structure conviviality has to be the more attentive to how power structures are, and have been, constructed. This is particularly pertinent in the Colombian case that this paper seeks to elucidate. It has multiple dimensions characterized by contradictory socio-political phenomena: a long history of liberal democracy with an equally long history of organized and destructive violence. It thereby intriguingly connects the political claim for legitimacy with the technical foundation of the monopoly on the legitimate use of

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1 I thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing out the need to clarify the lines between normative and analytical arguments as well as concepts to be used in conviviality studies.
violence – Max Weber’s famous definition of the nation-state (Weber 1958 [1919]). What we will see is that within that case, violence can be the function of different armed non-state actors that act endogenously to state-building structures – or exogenously and against them.

A key passage in the Convivialist Manifesto: A Declaration of Interdependence conveys a theoretical exposition that explores how humankind can co-operate and compete at the same time “without resorting to mutual slaughter” (Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre For Global Cooperation Research 2014: 23). The normative implication is in the absence of violence and even the accommodation of conflict. The authors state:

A healthy society is one that manages on the one hand to satisfy each individual’s desire for recognition, and accommodate the element of rivalry – of wanting permanently to reach beyond oneself, and of opening up to the risks this entails – and on the other hand to prevent that desire from degenerating into excess and hubris and instead foster an attitude of cooperative openness to the other. It succeeds in accommodating diversity – among individuals, groups, peoples, states, and nations – whilst ensuring this plurality does not turn into a war of all against all. In short, we have to make conflict a force for life rather than a force for death (Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre For Global Cooperation Research 2014: 25).

Thus, the Conviviality endeavour is two-fold, situated between theory and praxis, as “the term convivialism is used to show that it is essential to develop a new philosophy and practical forms of peaceful coexistence” (Adloff 2019: 35). Conviviality exposes a tension between a normative ideal, based in theory, and empirical contradictions, based in analysis. While it does not prescribe how conflict specifically ought to drive some form of progress or “force for life”, it nevertheless conveys that situations with intractable forms of violence are to be avoided. It is this call for averting violence that is the nucleus of a normative content – however weak it may be.

The timidness of that normative claim is a conceptual advantage of conviviality. It avoids a naïve optimism à la “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1989), and opens the analytical lens for perpetuating contradictions and conflict. Nobre and Costa (2019) observe that, even though it is true that the manifesto contains “a positive vision of living together after the end of [systemic] Cold War divisions,” they also stress that “such an explicit normative starting point is combined in the text with the analytical concern about the logic of action that would go along with convivialism” (Nobre and Costa 2019: 3). In other words, peaceful coexistence is far from the natural outcome of humankind, but contingent on choices – political, social, economic, and cultural – that are amenable
to social action. However, a prerequisite is the clear analytical focus to isolate the contradictions that undermine conviviality in the first place.

The logic of action in conviviality is not the only key to defying naïve optimism that is blind to persistent contradictions and injustices. It is also the entry point for the analytical perspective of practices that coexist in the empirical world of human relations. Adloff insists that “Convivialism denotes a theoretical position that is based on a basic tendency toward human cooperation… Conviviality, by contrast, is the lived praxis of this idea” (Adloff 2019: 36). What is more, establishing a lived praxis of conviviality must be precipitated by an analytical understanding of the nature of injustices that undermine conviviality in the first place. After all, “conviviality is the name of constellations structured by inequality and difference”. It is, therefore, by definition, a space filled with conflict, violence, and domination, where the “structuring features of conviviality, [are] less a given starting point than the name of the results that may emerge from looking at reality from this perspective” (Nobre and Costa 2019: 10).

Analytically, conviviality represents a state of affairs and is the result of processes.

The use of conviviality in this paper is analytical, as “a platform for new interdisciplinary approaches in cultural studies, humanities and social sciences rather than as a given canon linked to an already established tradition” (Nobre and Costa 2019: 9). In that light, the Colombian contention, different modes of internal conflict within a liberal democratic order, problematizes the nature of the state and the practices and dynamics that underlie its coercive structuration. If we retain Max Weber’s ideal type conceptualization of the state as the human organization that exercises the legitimate means of violence in a given territory (Weber et al. 1958), a weak state is an organization that has not succeeded in ascertaining its monopoly over the legitimate means of violence and competes with other armed actors for dominance (Tilly et al. 1985). As we will see below, Colombia is such a state that has been continuously competing for hegemony over the use of violence. To be sure, the degree of organization of those armed non-state actors that have challenged the central government’s claim to the legitimate use of violence has varied significantly, ranging from well-organized guerrilla groups and paramilitary death squads to street gangs that in effect assume localized governance functions. I afford myself the simplification to focus only on the most structured competitors to Colombia’s monopoly of violence, the country’s paramilitaries (the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) and the recently demobilized FARC guerilla forces, because these demonstrate the imperative to view the monopoly of violence in combination with how political practices, and social action more generally, generates specific political relations.

The contentious part of Weber’s definition lies in the conjunction of the means of violence with legitimacy. Hannah Arendt has illuminatingly disaggregated that conjunction
between violence and power into spheres differentiated by the ontological connotations of solitary (brute) force in violence and relational politics in power, respectively. “The extreme form of power is All against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All. And this latter is never possible without instruments” (Arendt 1972: 141). Arendt’s political philosophy bestows normative significance to that distinction.² Yet, it is important to stress that Arendt’s conceptualizations of keywords such as power, strength, force, authority, and, finally, violence contained differentiating ontological connotations. She insisted that all of those terms “refer to distinct, different phenomena” (Arendt 1972: 142). The critical distinction is that “power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert” and “violence is distinguished by its instrumental character” (Arendt 1972: 143-45).

Borrowing Arendt’s ontological distinction between violence and power does not say anything of how, and if, communicative power can affect violence and how authority is contingent on either of those. This is the normative question implicit in the distinction. Rather, it agrees, foremost, with the assertion that such ontological distinction does exist and should therefore factor into our analysis of functional phenomena such as the monopoly of violence. If you reduce that distinction to its analytical benefits, it is not that distant from conceptualizations of power articulated in the Conviviality Manifesto. The authors argue that conviviality, in its idealized form, protects notions of individual and collective agency, human dignity, and the possibility for collective action and conflict de-escalation, even if the reality is mired in various form of inequality – including the inequitable access to public power and private wealth. The Manifesto posits two communitarian and two disassociating principles (Adloff 2019: 37) as the foundation of legitimate politics, proclaiming “principles of common humanity, common sociality, individuation, and managed conflict” (Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre For Global Cooperation Research 2014: 30). Costa, too, argues power consists in distances, of collective and individual wills, to influence political will formation, but remains “always relational and contingent” (Costa 2019: 28). In effect, power is not instrumental in the teleological Weberian sense of social action, but rather a relational term: in the sense of Norbert Elias, a “‘Beziehungsbefriff’, … that is exercised or acquired in concrete interactions whose results always involve some unpredictability” (Costa 2019: 28).

This theoretical excursion served to illustrate the imperative, in case studies such as the Colombian, to combine our analysis of dysfunctional phenomena (e.g., weak state structures) with examinations of political practices that structure social relations and action. It enriches our understanding of seemingly contradictory phenomena (liberal democracy with extremely high levels of violence) by not solely asserting

² I again thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting me to specify the different realms of applicability of Arendt’s distinction.
their coexistence but appreciating different dynamics that play out at varying levels of abstraction. In Colombia, it helps us to trace the local and national production of political power, as well as variation therein that is reflective of local contingencies (such as the nature of the dominant actor in a given part of the territory). The argument thus far is that conviviality implies such a holistic approach. The next sections will illustrate its application in the Colombian case.

3. The Colombian Case: A Weak State, High Inequality, and Liberal Democracy

The Colombian case displays three generic traits of high relevance for conviviality: high levels of violence, an economy that produces sharp inequalities, and a political system that has been relatively democratic. These generic traits are connected, and conviviality helps us better situate them in a holistic context that brings these elements together. The first task then is to display the evidence that allows us to make such a simplification before we can turn to the evidence from recent research projects on the (shadow) citizenship in territories formerly controlled by the FARC and the survival of defective democracies in the Andes that support the core argument: violence towards civil society can be endogenous or exogenous to the state-building logic in Colombia; politically, constitutional democracy can function, even spectacularly well in the core, while showing systematic deficiencies in the periphery of that same country.

Since 1948, when the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán plunged the country in the eponymously named period of La Violencia, Colombia has experienced some form of protracted internal conflict that oscillates between different intensities as different actors transform their capacities and influence. The so-called Bogotazo (a multi-day riot in Bogotá), following Gaitán’s assassination, metastasized into bipartisan warfare throughout the country. After pacification through the National Front pact (1957; a bipartisan power-sharing deal between the Conservative and Liberal Party of Colombia), the FARC and other guerrilla groups formed in 1964 and following years. In response, landowners started to wield private armies that were legalized through Law 64 in 1968 – the beginning of the modern paramilitaries. The infusion of immense profits from the international narcotics trade by the 1970s created another round of potent armed actors: drug cartels based in the two urban hubs Cali and Medellín, whose terror wars waged during the 1980s, escalated the violence in Colombia to unprecedented heights. After their demise in the mid-1990s, paramilitaries inherited...
the lucrative profits from the drug trade and orchestrated their violent expansion that left an accordingly devastating number of civilian victims in their path. The guerrillas, despite the end of the Cold War, could also expand and profit from taxation of the drug trade. The state’s armed forces confronted the guerrilla but often co-operated with the paramilitaries and were complicit in some of the worst human rights violations of the time.

The graph below illustrates the endemic violence throughout the 1990s and the persistence of high homicide rates in the 2000s and 2010s (Graph 1).4 The high values throughout the 1990s reflect the conflict with the large drug cartels in the first half of the decade (especially with the Medellín cartel), and the expansion of ANSAs in the second half (especially the AUC paramilitaries and the FARC guerrilla). The downward slope of homicide rates began with President Álvaro Uribe’s Democratic Security policy in 2002 that focused on a military approach vis-à-vis the FARC. The lowest homicide rate of the last four decades (23 murders per 100,000 citizens in 2017) was reached when peace negotiation with the FARC concluded. It has slightly ticked up again in the two years since. The other lines on the chart, however, suggest that 1) the trajectory of the reduction of violence is far from linear, and 2) specific regions of the country (in this case Departamientos located in critical corridors of the illicit economy, Nariño and La Guajira) are affected by violence trends that are disjointed from national trends.

4 There are critiques concerning the use of homicide rates to measure violence – not least by the anonymous reviewers of this essay. To be sure, it is always preferable to utilize refined data to measure violence. There are some issues, though, that are particularly pertinent for the Colombian case. For example, the Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses provides data for battle-related deaths and homicides that it counts as occurring from the conflict. The issue, however, is that the counting could very well be affected by the politics of the conflict. For example, the paramilitaries were not directly targeted by the armed forces until peace process from 2002-2006. Their military expansion at the end of the 1990s, particularly the massacres committed against civilian populations, contributed to a substantial part to the violent deaths during that time. Thus, I chose to trace generic trends of violence through the intentional homicide rate that certainly includes deaths as a consequence of what is referred to as ordinary crime. To be sure, the battle-related deaths does not show a fundamentally different trajectory than the intentional homicide rate. Also, I employ a disaggregation of the violence indicators by including homicide rates for regions directly in the path of the illicit economy. As explained in the text, this shows that specific regions in Colombia can evolve very differently from national trends when it comes to violence and its effects.
A more telescopic view of Colombia’s history reveals that the disintegration of order is not an atypical phenomenon: from post-independence Nueva Granada through to the Republic of Colombia by the end of the 19th century, politics regularly degenerated into factionalist warfare with turmoil mushrooming from regional to national level. Malcom Deas (Deas 1997) counts nine civil wars that “could claim to be national” (1830-1, 1839-42, 1851, 1854, 1860-2, 1876-7, 1885, 1895, 1899-1902) and another fifty local conflicts spread around the country (Deas 1997: 352, 391). Bushnell combines civil conflict and coups as examples of acts of violence aimed at changing power at the national level and comes to a number of fourteen of such acts and events during the 19th century (Bushnell 1992). Osterling counts twenty-eight wars and sixty-three mini or regional civil wars. While the numbers may vary, the resulting analyses agree that the abundance of internal conflict is a testament to a weak institutionalization of the nation-state (Osterling 1989: 46-47). It is for these reasons that Colombia is considered a state with historically weak state structures (Centeno 2002) that has experienced a period of contraction in the course of the expansion of the illicit narcotics trade in the 1990s and 2000s (Bejarano and Segura 1996). The question of conviviality in Colombia must therefore be viewed in the context of a weak monopolization of the legitimate use of violence – the technical definition of a weak state.
As with endemic violence, socio-economic inequality is constitutive of the particularly Colombian democratic shortcomings. As Gustavo Duncan writes, “Colombia is the champion of inequality” (Duncan 2018: 52). A glance at standard inequality measures confirms his consternation. Colombia combines a sizeable informal sector with a high inequality score on the Gini Index. What is more, Colombia is the second-highest score on the Gini index for land distribution (still rising). This inequality is primarily concentrated in rural areas (but not exclusively so). Accordingly, the contrast between rural and urban poverty is much more extreme in Colombia than in other Latin American countries. Rural poverty is almost twenty times as severe as urban poverty in Colombia, while that ratio is ten and four in Bolivia and Guatemala, respectively (Table 1).

Table 1: Inequality measurements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Informal Sector</th>
<th>Gini</th>
<th>Gini Index for Land Distribution and Tendency</th>
<th>Multidimensional Poverty Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>.433</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>.473</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>.524</td>
<td>↑ 0.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>.576</td>
<td>↑ 0.86</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>.519</td>
<td>↑ 0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>.469</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>.515</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>.578</td>
<td>↑ 0.88</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>↓ 0.8</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>.585</td>
<td>→ 0.84</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>.565</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.095</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, 2019; Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 2019 (compiled by the author).

An important caveat is the aggravation of socio-economic inequality in Colombia’s rural areas. Also, note that violence in rural areas oscillates in much larger amplitudes than, on average, at the national level (see Graph 1). Both phenomena, aggravated violence and a higher degree of socio-economic inequality indicate the core-periphery divide between urban hubs and rural margins in the country (Alba Niño et al. 2018). This divide is critical because it will help to explain Colombia’s sui generis combination of these phenomena with relatively democratic institutions in its core.

Comparativists have traced Colombia’s relatively stable democracy for some time.\(^5\) They often begin with Dahl’s (Dahl 1971) components of polyarchy (universal suffrage,  

\(^5\) These considerations on the nature of democracy, and its deficits, follow my contribution to a research project by Maxwell A. Cameron on the “Survival of Defective Democracies in the Andes”, funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
competitive elections, civil rights and liberties, governance without veto-power of un-elected actors) to test the democratic quality of any given political regime. Intriguingly, testing for such indicators showed that the liberal and decentralizing constitution of 1853 (universal male suffrage, liberal rights, federalism; see Posada-Carbo 2000), already institutionalized what comparativists today term a democracy with adjective: an oligarchic democracy. This basic quality of polyarchy remains true until today, and it is for this consistency in, at least, holding relatively free elections that Colombia never qualified for an authoritarian subtype (Cameron 2018; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Bejarano et al. 2010; Bejarano and Pizarro 2005). It is an assessment that I share, but we need to venture beyond measures of political democracy.

To fully grasp the contradiction in Colombia’s polity, it is best to let Bejarano and Pizarro speak for themselves: they stated the nature of the Colombian puzzle most poignantly – and dramatically. They contend that it is “true, [that] elections are held on a regular basis – but candidates and elected politicians are also regularly assassinated. The press is free from state censorship, but journalists and academics are systematically murdered” (Bejarano and Pizarro 2005: 236). It is for that reason that “Colombia’s democracy has always been a democracy with adjectives” (Bejarano and Pizarro 2005: 235).

I combined in the table below (Table 2) the conclusions on the nature of democracy in Bejarano and Pizarro 2005 and Bejarano et al. 2010. The last column detailing the nature of democracy in Colombia today is my evaluation for a research project on defective democracies in the Andes: I hold that Colombia is a very liberal democracy with oligarchic enclaves that has systemic deficiencies for facilitating citizenship capacities. What is more, conviviality helps us to specify the citizenship defects arising at the local level as endogenous or exogenous to the state-building logic. Paramilitaries and guerrillas have different relations with the structures of the state, above all the coercive apparatus and the socio-economic elite, and the citizenship defects differ accordingly.

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6 Note that these measurements are on political democracy. They say nothing about other aspects treated with care in democratic theory, such as socio-economic equality or the quality of deliberation (Warren 2017). The point here, however, is precisely to insulate political democracy from other variables of development that affect conviviality. In order to disaggregate and specify our assessment it is, therefore, helpful to use measures of political democracy, even if only to venture beyond such measures.

7 Only two times in the 20th century did a general assume the presidency (General Reyes in 1905 and General Rojas Pinilla in 1953), and both times after prolonged periods of inter-party violence. However, in neither instance was his ascendance to power the result of a coup but occurred at the quasi-behest of civilian party leaders to calm violent tensions between both parties (the Liberal Party and Conservative Party of Colombia; Hartlyn 1988). They were thus dictators in the sense of classical Roman law, albeit not entirely emulating the ideal of Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, as both had a preference to overstay their welcome (Livy 1960: 12; Hartlyn 1988).
Table 2: Colombia’s regime trajectory from 1910–today.8

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deficiency</td>
<td>Full suffrage</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>Full Contestation</td>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>Citizenship capacities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtype</td>
<td>&quot;Oligarchic&quot; Democracy</td>
<td>Transitory authoritarian</td>
<td>&quot;Restricted&quot; democracy</td>
<td>&quot;Besieged&quot; democracy</td>
<td>Threatened democracy</td>
<td>Democracy w/ oligarchic enclaves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Gutierrez-Sanin stresses Colombia’s liberal tradition, unmatched “by any of its Latin American peers, [but at the same time] has suffered counter-intuitively high levels of brutality that in many senses outperform the worst Latin American dictatorships” (Gutierrez Sanin 2019): 65). The 1991 Constitution is, above all, and by all accounts, a testament to the democratic quality of the country’s core institutions (Boesten 2016; Negretto 2013).9 The Colombian constitutional regime has aspects that are profoundly democratic – among them its creation, form, and substance of jurisprudence concerning the control of constitutional reform, the enforcement of social rights, and the protection of cultural rights. These liberal constitutional guarantees of private, civic, social, and cultural rights in Colombia’s constitutional regimes are not chimeras but effective controls. Thus, in Colombia, not only are Dahlian denominators of democracy (such as free and competitive elections, a free press, and civic rights; Dahl 1971) generally respected, the constitutional regime encompasses an expansive rights system that is enforced by the courts.

8 “Transitory authoritarian”: This period spans the epoch that is known in Colombia as La Violencia, when interparty and rural violence were endemic and the breakdown of order almost complete (1948–1953), as well as General Rojas Pinilla interregnum (1953–1957), when the regime was certainly fully authoritarian to overcome the preceding violence and hammer out a power-sharing deal to appease the country. Arguably, for the first period, there should not be a regime classification at all, as the regime broke down entirely, while, for the second period, the ‘authoritarian’ attribute is certainly correct, it nevertheless remains distinct from other authoritarian regimes in the region, as it was an evidently transitory institutional framework (Hartlyn 1988). I therefore modified the term used by Bejerano and Pizarro to “transitory authoritarian” (Boesten 2016). "Besieged democracy”: Archer had included the attribute “illiberal” in addition to “besieged”, which Bejarano and Pizarro (2005) also included in their categorization. Since this period includes the creation and implementation of the 1991 Constitution – a liberal document with very liberal consequences such as the expansion of rights through strategic litigation – I do not share this attribution (Boesten 2016). The puzzle as I see it is precisely that Colombia has a very liberal regime, but still a besieged democracy.

9 The new constitution was a product of communicative, collective action, and it produced norms and mechanism that not only reflected the diversity of the original constitutive moment, there is also a causal link between discursive genesis and effectiveness of constitutional guarantees: the Constitutional Court’s rejection of a third presidential term was based on implicit principles of the constitution that receive their normative authority from the pluralistic origin of the constitution itself. Other examples of the progressive nature of the new constitution are abound and go beyond the confines of liberal constitutional doctrines, also espousing socio-economic and cultural rights of minorities (Boesten 2016).
Three general patterns of the Colombian case generate contentions amenable to conviviality studies: high degrees of socio-economic inequality that are particularly exacerbated in rural areas (with even more dramatically inequitable patterns of land ownership), exceptionally high levels of violence that are tied to well-entrenched non-state armed actors (that differ in terms of ideology, internal organization and social composition, remuneration, and political support network), yet, relatively stable and competitive electoral institutions with profoundly democratic judicial institutions. For our interest in conviviality, it is important to connect the ability to hold relatively free and competitive elections embedded in a sound system of rights, with the inability to protect the inalienable right to physical integrity.

I argue that politics and notions of citizenship help us better explain this Colombian conundrum and, above all, specify the nature of those defects that Bejarano and Pizarro (2005) have identified as emanating from the extra-institutional playing field. Conviviality is a most suitable framework because it forces us to connect the aforementioned apparent contradictions to a more holistic picture and go beyond the indicators of political democracy. Specifically, conviviality forces one to properly appreciate the relational dimensions in the localized and national power foundations in Colombia.

As we will see, these are constitutive of configurations that enable political practices at the other level. There is thus a degree of mutual interdependence between the structural parameters of political power at the local and national levels. These structures of political power themselves are highly inequitable, yet they additionally exist in a context of extreme socio-economic inequality, which in turn is more pronounced in peripheral areas of the country, adding a geographical factor to social, political, and cultural inequality. The armed non-state actor central for the exercise of political power in such a context (the paramilitaries of the AUC) differs fundamentally from an armed non-state actor aiming to overthrow the entire edifice of the Colombian state, the FARC guerrilla forces. In the case of the former, the armed actor operates endogenously to state structures, while in the latter, it is an exogenous armed challenger. Systemic citizenship defects arise in both cases but differ in ontology and therefore deserve different titles: paramilitary violence reflects oligarchic citizenship defects at the subnational level, while preponderance of the FARC could at best enforce shadow citizenship. Either defect makes collective action a risky endeavour.

The final sections aim to bring the specifically Colombian inhibitions to citizenship together with the analytical notion of conviviality that, as I hold, urges us to inquire into the coexistence of apparently contradictory phenomena. I will argue that indeed there are defects to citizenship on the extra-institutional playing field, but we can specify the nature as endogenous and exogenous to the state making logic of the Colombian state. Each has their own specific defects that are contingent on the structuration of power at the local level. First, and endogenous to the state building process in Colombia, is the perpetuation of clientelistic relations with their corresponding (parainstitutional) coercive instruments, above all the AUC paramilitaries. Second, and exogenous to the state building process, is the regime challenge levelled by insurgent groups, above all the FARC. Citizenship under the preponderance of these actors remains in the shadows with insurmountable barriers to the entire possibility of social action. Both types of citizenship defects, evident in a conviviality framework, describe defects that go beyond definitional traits of political democracy.

To begin, clientelistic relations that cement inequitable access to power, weak distribution of public goods, and accumulation of private wealth in few hands (Boesten 2016) are constitutive of the exercise of the political practices at the local level and tie together an edifice of indirect rule between core and periphery (Gutierrez Sanin 2019)).

10 Crucial for understanding the Colombian political system’s contradictory nature is that clientelistic relations and warfare were intrinsic to Colombia’s nation-building process. The indirect exercise of the monopoly of violence is a systemic feature of the Colombian state. It is entrenched in its longevity and persistent in its continuity, creating a pernicious concoction of legal with illegal actors and sub-optimal outcomes (Gutierrez-Sanín 2019; Boesten 2014; Acemoglu et al. 2013). It is the historical and contemporary importance of patronage networks to produce political and economic power that leads Colombian sociologists and historians to differentiate three epochs of clientelism: traditional (independence until the 1930s), broker (1950s until the 1980s), market clientelism/armed clientelism (since the late 1980s). In the context of armed clientelism lie the contemporary conviviality contentions that involve issues of citizenship under non-state armed order. To assert that clientelism, and inequitable patterns of conviviality in Colombia, it is prudent to briefly explain the historical trajectory of clientelism in Colombia in connection with political practices and institutions that further cemented those inequitable patterns.

10 Patron-client relations consist in 1) two parties, unequal in status, wealth, and influence who 2) form and maintain reciprocal relationships for the exchange of [non-comparable] goods and services and 3) rest heavily on face-to face (affectionate) interactions (Powell 1970).
The traditional form of patronage, rooted in the absence of a strong centralizing institution after independence at the beginning of the 19th century, evolved around regional strongmen turned natural leaders, *caciques*, who tied the local population through affectionate relations to their *domus* (Boesten 2016). A complete range of ecological zones allowed each population cluster to live close to a complete range of crops and basic foodstuffs, providing incentives for autarchy and autonomy from other clusters (including the central government in Bogotá). The weak penetration of the formal economy into the hinterlands left them largely to themselves, enabling them to deal with collective action problems themselves, often violently. These traditional powerholders became the nucleus of the two-party system that effectively structured politics until 2002. Historians contend that the resulting political system was “dysfunctional in its capacity to contain civil violence [while] supremely functional in shielding the elite from the full political consequences of social conflict” (Bergquist 1992: 5). This arrangement “continually obscured, distorted, and channelled the discontent” of social struggles into fluid political relations between patrons and clients, resulting in a disencounter with liberalism: a very weak notion of citizenship that produced an incomplete differentiation between the private and public utilization of political power (Bergquist 1992: 5; Palacios 1998). Its trademark were two traditional parties that were cross-sectional in their support base and mostly oligarchic in their leadership (Collier and Collier 2015), and a propensity for violent conflicts between factions (Deas 1997; Bushnell 1992) that simply exhausted them without producing a definite winner. These trajectories, on the one hand, undermined the understanding from sociology of war-making as state-making (Centeno 2002) and, on the other hand, laid the seed for the reproduction of inequitable social relations inimical to full democratization. Both traits extended into the 20th and 21st century.

Therefore, it is not a coincidence that, in the last three decades, the Colombian conundrum must be viewed in the context of armed clientelism (Peñate 1999): a conflict between various guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups, and the state’s armed forces. It produced practices that entailed the privatization of (local) security combined with the entrepreneurial transactionalism in the production of political power (García Villegas 11 Bushnell, too, notes, “the relative immunity of Colombian presidents to violent overthrow, despite a political culture marked by a fairly high levels of violence, is often overlooked amid the emphasis placed on the violence itself” (Bushnell 1992: 18).

12 Conosciational deals struck under military guidance transformed traditional relations of dependence into broker clientelism. These functioned around the same original patronage networks, but enabled each cluster to negotiate political support, and thereby also generate economic development, with each other. The two-party system again functioned as a coordination framework between caciques and their corresponding factions without undermining the territorial hegemony of localized power networks. 20th century consociationalism modernized the interaction between the different clusters, assuaged the conflictual fallout of partisan tribalism (Hartlyn 1988), but essentially left patronage networks untouched and even empowered regional powerbrokers at the expense of central authorities – precisely the locus where patronage was most deeply entrenched.
and Rebolledo 2010). Incidentally, the term “armed clientelism” was coined in a study on the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) guerrilla (Peñate 1999), but paramilitaries refined the practices of controlling local politics to extend nets into legal politics. Drug cartel enforcers had gained social status by merging with existing traditional landowning classes and becoming vigilante groups for the rural landowning elites (Duncan 2006). These vigilante groups, operating independently throughout the regions, created the AUC in 1997, which boosted a national expansion plan, constructed organisational statutes consisting of different military fronts, and designed a national public relations strategy that included appearances of leaders justifying the violence as a necessary response to the absence of the state and the presence of the guerrilla.

Nominally, paramilitaries compete with the state’s monopoly on violence, akin to guerrillas. Still, by the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the paramilitary project had “united a good sector of Colombian society: ganaderos (agro-industrialists), industrialists, narco-traffickers, militaries, some national politicians, and the entire regional elite” (Ávila Martínez 2010: 120). The relations with the socio-economic elite in rural areas, and connection to the national elite via armed campaigning created opportunity structures to construct inroads into legal politics. As a result, the line between legality and illegality that places the counterinsurgent groups outside the realm of legality had become intrinsically blurred, producing systemic citizenship defects for communities living where the AUC had a preponderance of control. In addition, these informal relations at the local level reached far into the legal political system. Responding to electoral changes in the 1991 Constitution, regional power brokers began to concentrate votes locally through alliances with armed actors, forfeiting the need for the party label. They formed small political movements, essentially becoming electoral entrepreneurs, that contracted out political support in exchange for facilitating their elections (López Hernández 2010). Paramilitaries, in turn, received legislative support and reduced criminal exposure to ensure the victory of their preferred candidates through coercion or vote-buying (Gutierrez Sanin 2019). This control over citizens’ voting behaviour, manifested in the Santa Fe de Ralito Pacts in 2001 (Semana 2007), completed the parainstitutionalization of Colombia’s representative institutions (Boesten 2016).

Such trajectories make it difficult to view the paramilitary empowerment that tied in parts of the state’s coercive apparatus as well as its economic and political elite as outside of the state’s claim to the monopoly of violence: it was not exogenous to the logic of state building in Colombia, but a continuation of a process of fragmentation of the national territory. This fractioning was bound together by webs of patronage and political practices that connected clusters of localized power with each other. The decentralization and effective privatization of security in the 1990s through the
CONVIVIR Program (a program for Special Vigilance and Private Security Services), which culminated in the formation of the AUC, was therefore not an outlier in the Colombian historical context, but a reflection of how counterinsurgent policy peculiarly connected local with national political practices (Gutierrez Sanin 2019). The resulting inhibitions to the full range of possibilities of (democratic) citizenship are therefore the realities of conviviality under such conditions that are endogenous to state building processes directed against insurgent competitors to the state’s claim to the monopoly of violence.

4.1 Institutions in the Context of Non-State Order

The historical construction of the Colombian nation-state not only entrenched patterns of indirect rule and opportunity structures for nefarious relations that trespass the margins of legality, but it also planted the seed for armed regime challenge from the left. The FARC, and other guerrilla groups such as the ELN, formed in response to the bipartisan consociationalism in the 1960s. Their trajectories are complex, reflecting socio-political and economic transformations situated at both the national and subnational levels. Here, I want to focus on studies we concluded at CONPEACE. The demobilization process with the FARC offered the unique opportunity to explore civilian-armed actor relations through the prism of trust/confidence relations. Our research focused on the community perspective in security landscapes affected by armed non-state actors and specifically probed differential effects of non-state order, including its transformation, community perceptions, and collective agency. These studies are our contribution to understand better why civil war zones need not essentially be characterized by the complete absence of order but display their own dynamics of violence, order, and control. Notions of citizenship under rebel rule remain in the shadows, because of the nature of armed conflict that only allows for confidence but not generalized forms of trust. The preponderance of an insurgent armed non-state actor, therefore, constitutes a citizenship defect exogenous to the state-building process.

13 For the last six decades, the internal conflict with the FARC-EP was the primary source of discontent in Colombia’s political discourse. It is one of the reasons why the peace process with the guerrilla forces not only carries the hope of reducing generic measures of violence, but also of correcting historically defective political processes. The peace process began in 2011, shortly after Uribe left office, with the commencement of secret talks facilitated by Hugo Chavez. Negotiations entered the open phase in 2012, focusing on a five-point agenda ranging from land issues, participation in politics, drug trafficking, disarmament, to reparations of conflict victims. By 2016, negotiations were reaching an end, FARC-EP combatants assembled in re-insertion zones, and a peace accord was officially signed in Havana in September 2016; only to fail to reach a 50%-threshold in a plebiscite held on October 2, 2016. Congress modified and passed the accord in the subsequent month, which the FARC-EP leadership and Juan Manuel Santos signed on November 30, 2016. A year later, the FARC-EP completed demobilization, handing in all weaponry, and formally entered legal politics with the founding of the Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (also FARC, but without the suffix, “EP”).
The identification of unbounded violence with civil wars, to a large degree, derives from the phenomenon of New Wars (Kaldor 2012) that were associated with failed states and the ensuing complete breakdown of order. Analogous to the discovery of new regime types in the post-Cold War world that were neither autocratic nor fully democratic (but rather some hyphenated form of the latter, such as illiberal or delegated democracies; see O’Donnell 1994; Collier and Levitsky 1997), the conclusion of the East/West standoff and disappearance of proxy wars did not relieve parts of the world from the perils of internal conflict (Holsti 1996). On the contrary, intra-state violence increased, while inter-state conflict decreased. To trace the entirety of the relevant literature on civil war, from the discovery of New Wars to the local turn, may well prove excessively exhaustive for this essay. Nevertheless, the New Wars approach and the turn to the political economy of internal conflicts that followed in its footsteps (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) specialised and demystified the field of conflict studies from the Cold War political clout. It urged scholars to identify factors that facilitate armed rebellion and set incentives for the persistence of violent entrepreneurs – even if the maximization logics at times proved too general for explaining the logic of local violence in civil wars (Kalyvas 2006; Gutierrez Sanin 2019).

The epistemological response to the political economy approach, especially the turn to the local, reveals questions of conviviality amid internal protracted conflict. The logic of violent events and its variation within civil wars disclosed the strategic constraints rebels face (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007) and the incentives to create something akin to institutional structures (Arjona 2014), civil administration, as well as programmes for economic development (Zahar 2000). Since the turn to local dynamics of conflicts also disclosed varying ruling strategies, the agency of communities living amid armed conflict had to be reassessed. Rather than being mere victims of often abhorrent violence, scholars have shown that civilian resistance is not a rare phenomenon (Mampilly 2011), comes in many different forms that range from obliqueness to resistance and or exit (Hallward et al. 2017), and through social networks impose constraints that non-state armed groups cannot ignore (Kaplan 2013).

Our approach (Boesten and Idler: Forthcoming) begins with examining the intuitive view that peace with the FARC leads to a more peaceful situation for local communities. The assumption is straightforward: if the non-state armed actor is a source of disorder, its transformation into a legal actor should reduce that the violence and disorder associated with the presence of the non-state actor in the first place. Our research, however, showed that this intuition is false, as the FARC was not only a predatory non-state armed actor but also a source of stability in the local lifeworld. Our research data stemmed from longitudinally differentiated fieldwork in conflict-affected zones of Colombia from before the peace process (2011-12) commenced, during the peace
negotiations in Havana (2016), and after FARC demobilization was officially finalized in 2018.

The approach to extrapolating the data, as well as the conceptualization of the transformations in local non-state order, is decisively community focused. Specifically, we utilize sociological theories of modernity that have explored complexity-coping mechanisms to theorize how individuals deal with uncertainty. Per Luhmann, Giddens and Gambetta (Giddens 1990: 36; Gambetta 1988; Luhmann 1988) and others, uncertainty arises from the basic fact that the future contains many possibilities and the productivity of social relations is contingent on our processing of information about future possibilities: fear of the multitude of future possibilities makes us anxious, constraining our lifeworld; recognising the variety of future possibilities as potential (but not existential) threats enables confidence based on observable patterns; and viewing these potentials as calculable risks allows for risky wagers and placing trust in.

When the monopoly of violence is at stake, violent death itself becomes an imminent future possibility, and anxiety motivates locals to remain in a familiar lifeworld, reducing the interaction with the unknown – a rational course of action. Conversely, if an armed non-state actor disappears, seemingly clarifying the monopoly on the the legitimate use of violence, we could expect the reverse development: people should grow more confident. However, our data suggested the precisely inverse trajectory: people became more uncertain about the future as the peace process progressed, and therefore more anxious (Idler and Boesten 2018). The transformation of perceptions of local communities showed that non-state armed actors can facilitate confidence in the procedures they enforce and induce more productive social interactions. It also showed that transitions are liminal spaces between the disappearance of certain patterns until the evolution of new ones.

A second investigation we conducted (Boesten and Idler: Forthcoming) explored differences in the attitudes towards the preponderance of different types of armed non-state actors, analysing differential conviviality contentions in the context of non-state order. The longevity of the Colombian conflict has produced several different non-state armed actors. Our data confirmed that these actors display systematic differences in their behaviour. Interviews suggested that the FARC had incorporated communal participatory mechanisms – in an instrumental effort of establishing territorial control, to be sure – while paramilitary rule was viewed as much more predatory and unclear on their ramifications for local communities. We argue that this difference arises from institutional caveats that each actor has brought to those communities. Firstly, the hierarchical coherence of the armed actor allows local communities to address those actors (they know who to talk to). Secondly, ideological, and political predispositions of the armed actor may incentivise that actor to incorporate participatory space for
communities to voice grievances. Both together enable locals to better structure their own lives and provide space for voice (Boesten and Idler: forthcoming).

The two studies we have compiled demonstrate that non-state armed order does not preclude conviviality, and, in fact, further amplifies the analytical utility of the concept. Local communities in Colombia’s conflict have not only experienced non-state order for considerable amounts of time, rather, contingent on the armed actor, have experienced the conviviality with non-state order differently. Crucial in our explorations, and to better understand conviviality contentions, is taking the community perspective to understand transformations of violence systems and security landscapes. To be sure, this approach is not normative and makes no statement on the legitimacy of the actor nor the desirability of peace processes. The approach is epistemological and shows that transitions are not linear processes but processes that harbour opportunities for other armed actors to exploit. The findings shed new light on what transformations of armed non-state actors entail, help us to better differentiate the type of non-state armed actor and the ramification of different systems of order on community perspectives. For our evaluation of specific citizenship defects that prevail on the extra-institutional playing field, those arising from insurgent armed non-state actors can amount to shadow citizenship. Both oligarchic citizenship defects and shadow citizenship describe the failings of democracy at the subnational level that coexist in convivial patterns with a robust constitutional regime at the national level.

4.2 The Consequences for Democracy

Democracy in Colombia during the 1990s and 2000s and now, after the implementation of the peace process with the FARC commenced, faces specific citizenship defects that are not detected with measures of political democracy. Bejarano and Pizarro already in 2005 rightly concluded that Colombia’s democracy had evolved, and deficiencies endogenous to the formal institutional set-up were transformed into deficiencies exogenous to formal institutions. With Archer (1995) they argued that it was a democracy besieged by actors situated on the extra-institutional playing field. Equally true, despite the evident advances of concluding demobilization processes with the largest paramilitary (umbrella) organization, the AUC (in 2006), and the largest guerrilla, the FARC (in 2017), Colombia remains a “threatened” democracy (democracia amenazada; Bejarano et al. 2010). Yet, the constitutional regime itself was formidable in asserting a progressive rights agenda. Conviviality helps us to bring both together.

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14 Importantly, non-state armed order contains inherent barriers to full (democratic) citizenship. Independent of any institutional caveats, armed actors do not subject themselves to specific institutional constraints (Idler and Boesten 2018).
Part of the concoction of structures facilitating conviviality remains the fact that Colombia is, and has been at least since the implementation of the 1991 Constitution, a very liberal regime with effective deontological constraints on the exercise of power and mechanisms to enforce a right to contestations when fundamental rights are violated. This is undoubtedly a heritage of the democratic origin of the new constitution in a more diverse and transparent Constitutional Assembly. It left an evident mark on political practices. For example, the Constitutional Court affirmed indigenous rights vis-à-vis evangelical sects in a writ of protection decision in 1997, ventured into substantive social rights jurisprudence by declaring a “state of unconstitutional affairs” in 2004, and eventually would become a powerful arbitrator of inter-branch constitutional conflict by strengthening the separation of powers principle through outlawing a third consecutive presidential term (Boesten 2016).

While indicators of political democracy may suggest a healthy state of democratic governance, in the same period the Colombian state resembled an almost failing state rather than democratically rejuvenated polity gaining strength over its internal adversaries: non-state armed actors became deeply entrenched in parts of the country and violence became endemic.

From this history, we know of the coexistence – conviviality, as it were – of these democratic national institutions with highly repressive subnational institutions, facilitated by the mutual dependence between electoral entrepreneur and armed actors. It is these structures of mutual dependence that created an equilibrium that not only undermined the provision of public goods – not least security, since this was contracted out to an armed non-state actor – it also made the rule of law a mere chimera (Boesten 2014). Paramilitaries imposed draconian codes of conduct with unmitigated impunity, while their contractual partners in Congress benefitted electorally and in return provided mitigated legal exposure (including their own). At the subnational level, the corollary was the blurred distinction between legality and illegality, while its national connotation reinforced the ambiguity of that line. In aggregate, it reduced the state’s incentives to eliminate a rival to the monopoly on the use of violence, locking-in the deficient monopoly on violence in “peripheral areas as an equilibrium outcome” (Acemoglu et al. 2013: 2). The resulting political practices – very repressive and highly abusive of the right to live – are part of the convivial patterns that besiege democratic rule in Colombia (Bejarano and Pizarro 2005; Bejarano et al. 2010; Acemoglu et al. 2013). Specifically, the conviviality of democracy with armed campaigning that is orchestrated by armed non-state actors with tight relations to the economic and political elites in Colombia’s periphery allows us to detect oligarchic enclaves with severe citizenship defects on civil rights; above all, the right to free assembly and opinion, making collective action all but impossible.
Insurgent armed non-state actors also produced citizenship defects that befall subnational regions situated in the periphery of the country. I illustrated with the example of the FARC that long-lasting guerrilla groups that challenge the state’s monopoly of violence directly, and at times establish patterns that build confidence amongst civilian and communities. They may even construct patterns that resemble some institutions and act responsively to some community demands. However, there are also insurmountable barriers to the full range of possibilities under generalized forms of trust that essential for democratic citizenship (Warren 1999, 2017). It is precisely for those systemic inhibitions that citizenship, at best, remains in the shadows and constitutes a citizenship defect.

In sum, conviviality urges us to appreciate both the profound quality of Colombia’s constitutional regime, as well as the high propensity for violence. During the 1990s and 2000s, the Colombian state resembled an almost failing state rather than a democratically rejuvenated polity gaining strength over its internal adversaries, as non-state armed actors became deeply entrenched in parts of the country, and violence was endemic. The conviviality explanation for these phenomena agrees with Bejarano and Pizarro (2005) that defects are situated on the extra-institutional playing field. It specifies their nature as either endogenous or exogenous to the state-building logic of the Colombian nation-state: in the case of structures that tie-in paramilitary groups in the construction of monopoly of violence, we can speak of oligarchic citizenship defects; in the case of insurgent actors exercising preponderance, we can speak of shadow citizenship. The aggravated socio-economic inequality that we find in Colombia’s periphery is foundational to both phenomena: violent regime contestation from the left and armed protection of socio-economic and political privilege from the right.

5. Conclusion

This essay set out to explore the analytical component of conviviality in application to the Colombian case. First, it argued for the conceptual utility of conviviality for connecting the coexistence of seemingly contradictory phenomena that we can identify in Colombia. To do so, it laid out the tensions situated between theory and praxis identified by the scholars from the conviviality school. I argued that there was indeed a normative element to conviviality, but that it remains rather weak. The concept is, therefore, better used as an analytical tool that seeks to explore the contradictions that coexist in the real lifeworld.

Colombia is such case; its socio-political history is riddled with contradictory phenomena, and conviviality precisely problematizes those contradictions that populate the real lifeworld experience. It should be noted that the essay makes no claim as to the
completeness of those contradictions in Colombia. Rather, it took three very prominent traits: order under non-state order, and the coexistence of violence with democracy, both embedded in high levels of socio-economic inequality. Incidentally, Colombia has gained its own, self-titled, puzzle in comparative politics, the Colombian puzzle, that consists in a long history of democracy coupled with an equally long history of violence.

Comparativists such as Bejarano and Pizarro, who identified the extra-institutional actors as key to Colombia’s woes with democratic rule, have found terms to describe this puzzle, even going beyond the confines of measuring merely political democracy. By embracing a conviviality approach, I hoped to specify that verdict by identifying extra-institutional impediments to democratic rule that are either endogenous or exogenous to state-building in Colombia. First, I traced various forms of clientelism that accommodated socio-economic changes, as well as institutional shifts. Clientelism gave rise to the peculiar relation between political practices that produce power at the subnational level and the connective structure to political structure at the national level. It is constitutive of an exercise of indirect rule. Notably, both loci produce different political practices: in the centre, very much in the spirit of constitutional democracy; and in the periphery, very repressive in the service of an oligarchic elite. Therefore, citizenship at the national level can be characterized as inclusive, facilitating the competitive exercise of electoral rights, freedom of speech, press, and association and supplanting these civic rights with the ground-breaking use of strategic litigation. However, citizenship at the local level faces severe oligarchic restrictions that (coercively) affect civic rights and collective action. These are the endogenous citizenship defects in Colombia.

The second set of citizenship defects, shadow citizenship, also occurs in the periphery of the country, where insurgent groups exercise preponderance. It is a form of plural statehood, often a function of rebel governance that specifically and directly challenges the state’s monopoly of violence. In short, impediments to democratic rule resulting from guerrilla preponderance are exogenous to the state-building logic of the Colombian nation-state. What I showed was that civil conflict need not mean the absence of an order but the presence of a particular order. Rebels do govern. However, viewed through the prism of sociological concepts such as trust, confidence, and familiarity, citizenship under rebel governance remains in the shadows because non-state armed actors retain their autonomy from the rules given to those living in the territory under their control. This caveat, implicit in the reality of armed conflict, prevents the construction of generalized forms of trust that opens the entire range of possibility implicit in democratic citizenship. Non-state actors that challenge the regime can only build confidence in established patterns of behaviour. Shadow citizenship, therefore, describes the rule under rebel governance and the specific citizenship defect
in Colombia that is produced by regime-challenging armed actors populating the extra-institutional playing field in Colombia.

From these findings follow two pertinent caveats. First, the importance and negative effects of clientelism in Colombia’s history entails that the peace process with the FARC was not only an opportunity for the state to expand its authority over its national territory without having to shoot its way in. It also means that the peace process must also be understood as also an opportunity to properly democratize those subnational enclaves in which citizenship rights are compounded by oligarchic clientelistic relations. Alas, the high levels of violence continuously directed against social leaders that aim to democratize precisely those subnational enclaves suggests that the opportunity is being wasted at present. Epistemologically, the findings from our studies on armed non-state governance suggest that citizen security is a crucial component of human security. It pays attention to those features in the security landscape that expand the horizon of possibilities for local communities through political/participatory mechanisms in designing localized security strategies.

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