

Bi-regional Relations



EU-LAC Foundation

# Mobility | Diversity | Inequality | Sustainability: cross-cutting issues of cultural, scientific and social relations between the European Union and Latin America / the Caribbean

Peter Birle / Barbara Göbel / Miriam Boyer / Jakob Krusche



This study deals with bi-regional relations between the European Union (EU) and Latin America/ the Caribbean (LAC) in three dimensions which, unlike economic and trade relations, are not normally the focus of attention: exchange on cultural, scientific and social issues. At the heart of the study is the question, how the cross-cutting issues of mobility, diversity, inequality and sustainability have been addressed in the political dialogue and concrete programmes between the EU and LAC since the institutionalization of bi-regional relations in 1999.

The study was carried out as part of the EULAC Focus Project (Giving focus to the Cultural, Scientific and Social Dimension of EU - CELAC relations), in which Berlin-based Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut worked with 19 partner institutions from Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe between 2016 and 2019, funded by European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme. In this study, we refrain from giving a general description of the development of bi-regional relations since the 1990s and from describing the serious differences that exist between the partners EU and CELAC. Detailed reflections on these issues can be found in three final documents of the EULAC Focus project (EULAC-Focus 2019 a, b, c). In Chapter 2, however, we mention a number of points that seem to us to be central as framework conditions for the cultural, scientific and social relations between the two regions.



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# INDEX

	<b>PRESENTATION</b>	<b>VII</b>
	<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b>	<b>VIII</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>01</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>BI-REGIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND CELAC IN A CHANGING WORLD</b>	<b>04</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>THE CULTURAL DIMENSION</b>	<b>06</b>
	<b>3.1 THE REGIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF THE CULTURAL DIMENSION</b>	<b>07</b>
	3.1.1 European Union	07
	3.1.2 Latin America and the Caribbean	12
	<b>3.2 THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF EU-(CE)LAC-RELATIONS</b>	<b>16</b>
	3.2.1 The cross-cutting topic Mobility	16
	3.2.2 The cross-cutting topic inequality	19
	3.2.3 The cross-cutting topic diversity	20
	3.2.4 The cross-cutting topic sustainability	23
	3.2.5 Impacts, Achievements and Challenges	24
<b>4</b>	<b>THE SCIENTIFIC DIMENSION</b>	<b>28</b>
	<b>4.1 THE REGIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF THE SCIENTIFIC DIMENSION IN EUROPE AND LAC</b>	<b>28</b>
	4.1.1 European Union	28
	4.1.2 Latin America and the Caribbean	31
	<b>4.2 THE SCIENTIFIC DIMENSION OF EU (CE)LAC-RELATIONS</b>	<b>32</b>
	4.2.1 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC MOBILITY	34
	4.2.2 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC INEQUALITY	40
	4.2.3 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC DIVERSITY	44
	4.2.4 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC SUSTAINABILITY	47

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<b>5</b>	<b>THE SOCIAL DIMENSION</b>	<b>51</b>
	<b>5.1 THE REGIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN EUROPE AND LAC</b>	<b>51</b>
	5.1.1 European Union	51
	<b>5.2 THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF EU-(CE)LAC-RELATIONS</b>	<b>58</b>
	5.2.1 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC MOBILITY	62
	<b>5.3 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC INEQUALITY</b>	<b>68</b>
	<b>5.4 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC DIVERSITY</b>	<b>71</b>
	<b>5.5 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC SUSTAINABILITY</b>	<b>73</b>
<hr/>		
<b>6</b>	<b>CONCLUSIONS</b>	<b>78</b>
	<b>6.1 THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF BI-REGIONAL RELATIONS</b>	<b>78</b>
	<b>6.2 THE SCIENTIFIC DIMENSION OF BI-REGIONAL RELATIONS</b>	<b>79</b>
	<b>6.3 THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF BI-REGIONAL RELATIONS</b>	<b>81</b>
<hr/>		
<b>7</b>	<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>84</b>
	<b>7.1 PRIMARY SOURCES</b>	<b>84</b>
	<b>7.2 SECONDARY BIBLIOGRAPHIC SOURCES</b>	<b>105</b>
	<b>7.3 DOCUMENTS OF THE EULAC-FOCUS CONSORTIUM</b>	<b>113</b>

## PRESENTATION

Adrian Bonilla - Executive Director

The EU-LAC Foundation is pleased to present the publication “Mobility-Diversity-Inequality-Sustainability: Cross-cutting issues of Cultural, Scientific and Social Relations between the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean”.

This document is the result of an in-depth analysis of the issues considered here as cross-cutting themes, based on the experience gained during the implementation of the European Union Programme EULAC Focus: Giving focus to the Cultural, Scientific and Social Dimension of EU - CELAC relations.

The programme was implemented by a group of nineteen relevant entities committed to the development of bi-regional relations from the EU and LAC. But the effort to produce this synthesis of the most relevant lessons learned in the areas of Mobility, Diversity, Inclusion and Sustainability was made by Dr. Peter Birle and Dr. Barbara Göbel (Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut Berlin) as well Miriam Boyer and Jakob Krusche.

The Foundation’s interest in publishing this document is directly related to its mission and objectives, particularly “to contribute to the strengthening of the EU-LAC bi-regional partnership process with the participation and contributions of civil society and other social agents”.

The European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean are facing a world that has changed dramatically. The global health emergency resulting from the terrible consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic has definitely changed the architecture of relations within each region, and in their relations with other regions. In this sense, this analysis can serve as an input for future bi-regional dialogues in a global context marked by uncertainty and changing times.

At a time of change, the opportunity is emerging for both regions to resume the path of political dialogue towards building a solid and sustainable bi-regional partnership.

Therefore, in line with its mandate to foster the debate on common strategies and actions to strengthen the bi-regional partnership, the EU-LAC Foundation has considered the publication of this document useful and timely.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank the EU-LAC Foundation for the interest in this publication and for the opportunity to make our work known to a wider audience. Our special thanks go to Paola Amadei. As Executive Director of the Foundation, she has been a continuous contributor to the advancement of relations between Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union. We look forward to working with Adrian Bonilla as the new Executive Director of the EU-LAC Foundation. Over the past years, he too has repeatedly given important impulses at EU-LAC Focus project meetings, which have been incorporated into this paper.

For the EU-LAC Focus project (Giving focus to the Cultural, Scientific and Social Dimension of EU-CELAC relations), in the context of which this paper was produced, it was a stroke of luck that Paola Amadei was involved as a member of the Trans-Sectorial Board. In addition to her, four other external experts belonged to this advisory board: Rigas Arvanitis (Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement, France), Alan Cobley (The University of the West Indies, Jamaica), Enrique Saravia (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) and Hebe Vessuri (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México). Through their commitment and constructive criticism, all of them not only made an important contribution to the success of the project, but also significantly enriched this working paper.

In addition to the authors of this paper, the team of our Transectorial Pathways work package consisted of Moacyr Martucci and Cecilia Matsumura (Universidade de São Paulo). They also deserve our thanks.

Without Ramón Torrent (Universitat de Barcelona), the coordinator of EU-LAC Focus, the project would never have come about. It owes a good part of its success to him. His feedback and comments were also a great enrichment for this paper.



# 1. INTRODUCTION

This study deals with bi-regional relations between the European Union (EU) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in three dimensions which, unlike economic and trade relations, are not normally the focus of attention: exchange on cultural, scientific and social issues. At the heart of the study is the question, how the cross-cutting issues of mobility, diversity, inequality and sustainability have been addressed in the political dialogue and concrete programmes between the EU and LAC since the institutionalization of bi-regional relations in 1999.

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These general considerations are followed by three chapters, in which we deal with the three dimensions that were at the heart of the EU-LAC-Focus project. In each of the chapters dedicated to the cultural, the scientific and the social dimension of the bi-regional relationship, we will first explain how the respective dimension is embedded into the context of regional cooperation and integration in both regions. We then show how the bi-regional relationship has developed in each dimension. Against this background, we study the significance of the four cross-cutting topics. The analysis of each dimension ends with the consideration of impacts, achievements and challenges. The study concludes with a chapter that presents general conclusions of our analysis.

The selection of the cross-cutting topics was guided by four criteria. First, they are paradigmatic key concepts encapsulating a broader spectrum of themes and problems. Second, they address significant aspects of the social, the scientific and the cultural dimensions of EU-LAC relations. Third, they are of strategic relevance for the EU-LAC bi-regional agenda and play also an important role within the UN framework.

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1. EULAC FOCUS has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 693781. For detailed information on the project please visit the website <http://eulac-focus.net/>.

Fourth, they are adequate to analyse the multidimensionality of the “new paradigm” on development that has been developing during the last years.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the analysis of the selected cross-cutting issues makes a contribution to overcome blind spots in our understanding of EU-LAC relations.

We understand mobility as the spatial movement of people and knowledge between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. The mobilization of people may be temporary or long-term (e.g. labour migration). When analysing the mobility of people in all three dimensions we will find that, depending on the context, key groups of actors change (e.g. in the scientific dimension, students, post-docs, senior researchers; or in the social dimension workers carrying out health or home/child-care services). It is important to note, that not only people but also knowledge, encompassing also values, worldviews and experiences, are mobilized and circulate across the Atlantic. In addition, we will also see that digital transformation produces new patterns of mobility beyond institutional and national borders.

We define inequality on two analytic levels. On the one hand, we address inequalities between countries and among regions. On the other, there are inequalities between individuals and social groups that can be defined as a disparity among individuals, social groups and institutions, in time and space, that create a hierarchy of access to socially-relevant and economically important goods (income, wealth, etc.) and power resources (rights, political participation, political power, etc.). Beyond the traditional emphasis on class differences and unequal distribution of income, we also consider inequalities of gender, class, ethnicity and the interrelations among these social categories.

We address diversity in two ways. On the one hand, we focus on cultural diversity. It encompasses diversity in terms of cultural norms, values, forms and practices of knowledge. Cultural diversity also includes differences between individuals and within social groups regarding gender, age, or ethnicity, as well as the intersections between these social categories. On the other, we take biological diversity into account. It refers to the variability among living organism from all sources, including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part. In the context of wellbeing, livelihood and sustainability, cultural and biological diversity are mutually interdependent.

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2. In a joint document published in 2018, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) emphasized the need for a new development paradigm with five key dimensions: “(i) It needs to offer additional measures beyond per capita income; in particular metrics that measure people’s objective and subjective needs as well as other areas, including productivity and economic transformation. (ii) It needs to redefine cooperation strategies to focus at the national level and take into account specific national institutions and development traps in order to define policy priorities under a multidimensional framework. (iii) It needs to focus on the global challenges of an increasingly interconnected and multipolar world, reflected mainly in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. (iv) It needs to include a refounding of multilateralism in a complex international landscape, which is more and more multipolar given increasing concentration of economic and political power and new emerging actors. This integrated perspective should also include horizontal cooperation across different levels of government. (v) It calls for advancing international cooperation for development beyond traditional financial assistance to include a new set of modalities, such as innovative instruments of knowledge-sharing, multilateral policy dialogue, capacity-building, technology transfers, blended finance and resource mobilization” (ECLAC/OECD 2018: 30).

The core of the sustainability concept is formed by the interconnections between economic growth, environmental health and social wellbeing. Since the late 1980s, sustainable development has been a key concept of international social and environmental frames. It has been taken into account to a lesser extent within economic international frames. In the realm of the current study, sustainability addresses societal transformations aiming at more equal, inclusive and ecologically friendly modes of living, highlighting the interdependencies between spatial scales (local, national, regional and global scales) and temporal scales (past, present and future). In more concrete ways it refers to specific knowledge, institutional developments and technologies able to cope with global environmental changes (e.g. climate change, biodiversity loss, land-use changes, rapid urbanizations) and mitigate their effects.

These definitions of the four cross-cutting topics serve as a first orientation. In the context of the analysis they are outlined with more details. The spatial frame of our analysis focuses on the bi-regional level, i.e., to relationships institutionalised and implemented in a specific political and legal setting between the EU and CELAC (and their precursors in LAC). Since the bi-regional level of relations is only one component of a broader network of relationships between the two regions, relations between the EU and sub-regional actors in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as individual partner countries, in particular the strategic partners Brazil and Mexico, are also taken into account.

## 2. BI-REGIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND CELAC IN A CHANGING WORLD

The traditional hierarchies within the post-1945 liberal world order have been increasingly called into question by emerging powers over the past two decades. In these global developments, EU countries and members of CELAC are often on opposing sides. The EU does not question global power structures and is more concerned with conserving and, where possible, raising its own profile as an actor in existing global fora. The EU is already a rule maker and wants to preserve this status. On the contrary, Latin America to this day remains mainly a rule taker (follower of rules) in the international system. The EU today considers that Latin America is a key partner when it comes to facing the current global challenges. However, this is often conceived as a request to support the EU's own ideas to address and solve global problems. The EU willingness to learn seriously from Latin America and to support proposals developed in the region is rather limited.<sup>3</sup>

From the beginning of the 2010s, the crisis in the euro zone has not only had major political and social impacts within the EU but has also massively changed the external perception of the European integration process. Especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, where the EU has long been promoting its own integration model as a possible model for regional integration, the European model has lost much of its appeal. In addition to the euro crisis, the perception of Europe in Latin America has also undergone a significant change due to the refugee crisis. The way in which the EU and many of its member countries treated refugees, the lack of solidarity responses from many European countries and the xenophobic outbursts fuelled by speeches by the extreme right-wing have seriously damaged the prestige of the EU as a “normative power”.

A central element of bi-regional relations between the EU and CELAC is that both regions have developed different levels of agency. The EU has an undisputable (and recognized) agency. It is the “only actor” in some areas where it has an exclusive external competence, mainly in commercial policy – and high seas fisheries, an area also relevant for some LAC countries. The EU also can become an international actor in areas in which it has only non-exclusive competencies and in which, as a consequence, both it and the member states can act towards external partners (as in the three areas studied by EULAC Focus and the present Report). There is no comparable partner for bi-regional relations in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Although the 33 independent countries of LAC are represented in CELAC, it is not an organization with its own competences. This lack of agency on the part of LAC has encouraged the European Union to develop the bi-regional agenda with the region at three different levels, first with LAC as a region, second with the sub-regions and third with individual countries.

In contrast to the dynamic development of regional integration and cooperation processes in the first decade of the 21st century, the current situation in LAC is characterized more by stagnation and leadership vacuum. CELAC is currently unable to agree on common positions with regard to important issues of hemispheric and international politics, and thus strengthen the region's role as an actor in international affairs.

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3. For this and the following, see in more detail EULAC Focus 2019d, 15-23.

A major institutional asymmetry in the EU-LAC relationship is related to the fact that beyond the political dialogue, a large part of bi-regional relations is implemented through instruments to fund common programmes and activities which stem almost exclusively from the EU. Various EU funding instruments such as the Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Development Fund, the Partnership Instrument, and the various Framework Programmes in the area of science and technology have provided the necessary funds for bi-regional programmes and activities in the scientific, social and cultural dimensions. However, who makes the money available, often determines the formats and topics of cooperation and drives the agenda. As cooperation budgets are provided almost exclusively by the EU, the European side also exerts a strong influence on the format of joint projects. Although there is a discursive commitment to equal partnership, the problems and challenges of the Latin American and Caribbean countries are usually the focus of cooperation. Europe appears as an idea generator or as a model, but rarely as a “problem case”. These asymmetries due to different levels of funding have been partially addressed in the 2016 CELAC-EU Assessment of Programmes and Actions which notes that innovative financing is needed in order to continue to provide funding to LAC countries that have been categorized as middle income countries that may no longer qualify for Official Development Assistance (ODA). Even more importantly, the recommendations made in the 2016 Assessment also note that “both CELAC and EU should take responsibility for and participate actively in every stage of drafting, programming, design and implementation processes as relevant, taking into account intra-regional balance and inter-regional representation” (Assessment of Programmes and Actions 2016: 4).

Bi-regional relations between the EU and LAC can be characterized as “multilevel interregionalism” or “hybrid interregionalism”. Bearing in mind the fact that there are also bilateral relations between most European and Latin American countries at various levels and, furthermore, that Spain and Portugal with the Ibero-American Community of Nations have a separate strategy towards the region, it becomes clear that bi-regional relations between EU and CELAC are part of an extremely complex geometry. The diversity of this complex network of relationships is a positive aspect, especially because relations not only take place at an intergovernmental level, but also involve numerous civil society actors on both sides of the Atlantic. However, a major challenge is the articulation of this diversity in creative and productive ways in order to exploit its potential and transform it into joint positions in global settings. In view of the internal heterogeneity of both regions and the asymmetries between them, it is difficult to imagine building a general “common vision”. On the contrary, it would be necessary to explore common interests in specific areas and formulate realistic positions on this basis. Most likely, this might not be possible within the EU-CELAC framework, but only between groups of related countries in both regions. Of course, such variable geometries could be explicitly welcomed and supported within the framework of the EU-CELAC political dialogue, which would provide additional support.

A particular challenge for bi-regional relations between the EU and CELAC, which has been recurrent in the context of the EULAC Focus project, is to strengthen the participation of the Caribbean countries in bi-regional structures and processes. In a study published in 2017, the EU-LAC Foundation analysed the historical relations between Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as between Europe and the Caribbean, and on this basis examined the integration of the Caribbean countries into the EU-CELAC framework, focusing on economic aspects and only marginally addressing the social, scientific and cultural dimensions of relationships (Montoute et al. 2017). The study explicitly recommends further strengthening the position and commitment of the Caribbean countries in CELAC. This could also benefit relations between the EU and the Caribbean. However, a prerequisite for such a development would be a fundamental institutional strengthening of CELAC.

### 3. THE CULTURAL DIMENSION

Since the 1980s, culture has increasingly become a topic of international cooperation. The 1982 UNESCO World Conference on Cultural Policies defined culture as “the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs” (UNESCO 1982: 1). The 1995 UNESCO Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development identified cultural diversity as a source of creativity. The 2002 UN World Summit of Sustainable Development added the cultural dimension to the classical dimensions of sustainable development (economic, social and environmental dimensions). The 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions emphasized “the need to incorporate culture as a strategic element in national and international development policies, as well as in international development cooperation” (UNESCO 2005: 1) and recognized “the importance of traditional knowledge as a source of intangible and material wealth” (UNESCO 2005: 1) as well as “the need to take measures to protect the diversity of cultural expressions” (UNESCO 2005: 1).

Despite the increasing visibility of the field of culture at multilateral levels, the cultural dimension of EU-CELAC bi-regional relations is less pronounced than the scientific and social dimensions. This does not mean that the cultural dimension would be less important for the relations between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. Rather, it is a consequence of the fact that cultural policy is still primarily a domain of national foreign policies (and that, in federal States, sub-central levels of government are very jealous of their competences in the cultural field). In addition to national governments, state cultural actors, civil society organizations and the cultural industry are important players in cultural cooperation. In addition, there are the activities of organizations embracing groups of EU – LAC countries that refer to specific historical or cultural similarities, in particular the Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura (OEI), the Commonwealth Foundation and the Organisation Internationale pour la Francophonie (KEA European Affairs 2016: 33-44) that address a variety of cultural topics like language, literature, theatre and music (Schneider 2015: 364). It is only by looking at the totality of these relationships that it becomes clear why politicians can repeatedly emphasize the “common cultural heritage” and the “diversity of European-Latin American and Caribbean cultural relations”.

While our analysis focuses on bi-regional relations between EU and CELAC, it is important not to completely ignore other actors, frames, and levels in cultural relations. A major challenge for the EU’s external cultural policy is precisely to better coordinate the multiple activities of different actors and bodies (the “articulation” objective just mentioned above). An interesting inventory of the external cooperation policies of the European Union and its member states with third countries in the field of culture is offered by the book *A Cultural Component as an Integral Part of the EU’s Foreign Policy?* (Dodd/Lyklema et al. 2006). It shows that there is a fundamental openness of EU member states to cooperate in external cultural policy. This is especially true when the EU is ready to support and complement initiatives of the member states.

It is also important to look at institutions that are already strengthening the coordination of external cultural activities between EU member states. The most important one is the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC). Founded in 2006, it now has 36 members from all over the EU. It aims

to create effective partnerships and networks between European Union National Institutes for Culture in order to improve and promote cultural diversity and understanding between European societies and to strengthen international dialogue and cultural cooperation with countries outside the European Union; to act as a partner of the European Commission and other European institutions, in defining and implementing European cultural policy (EUNIC 2006: Art. 2 Purpose of the Association).<sup>4</sup>

Within the bi-regional framework of EU-CELAC relations, the cultural dimension remains exclusively at the level of political dialogue. So far, no bi-regional cultural programmes or policies exist. However, cultural exchange programmes exist between the EU on the one hand and sub-regional and strategic partners in Latin America and the Caribbean on the other. In addition, for the cultural cooperation between the two regions, the framework of UNESCO plays an important role. In both regions, culture is seen as a factor that is important for the success of regional cooperation and integration processes. Cultural aspects are therefore included in many programmes and policies at different levels.

### 3.1 THE REGIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF THE CULTURAL DIMENSION

#### 3.1.1 European Union

Following the aim to build a united Europe, the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity stressed the diversity of culture as an important factor within the framework of common European civilization. Thus, it introduced the relevance of culture for the European integration process (EC 1973: § 3; Smith 2015: 16). In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht introduced into the EEC Treaty (changed to EC Treaty) additional articles on different fields like health, education and, in particular, culture. Before 1992, the European Community, under the initiative of the European Commission, had made an increasing use of what some call the “residual powers clause” of article 235 EC Treaty (currently article 352 of the TFEU) in order to set up programmes in areas in which no other specific legal basis existed (Kandyła 2015: 51). This process generated worries on whether it could end up in a breach of the fundamental principle of “attribution/conferral of competences” that defines the nature of the European Community. The worry was particularly intense in federal countries whose competences in those areas could be “invaded”; this was the case in particular in Germany both at Länder and Bundesrat levels. The result was that, in the very delicate balance underlying the Maastricht Treaty, some limitation of the use of article 235 had to be introduced. The instrument was the introduction of additional articles that certainly conferred to the European Community new non-exclusive competences but with an extremely narrow scope, and in particular with the explicit exclusion of any production of secondary legislation: only “common actions” are possible (EU 2012c: Art. 6; Smith 2015: 17). Later on, it was made explicit an aspect that was implicit before: the authorisation “to take action at the international level in the cultural field, cooperating with third countries and international organisations” (EU 2012c: Art. 107 3.d; 167; Smith 2015: 17).

4. Further information on European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) can be found on the website of the organization: <<https://www.eunicglobal.eu/>>. The yearbooks published by EUNIC are available on the website of ifa in open access: <<https://www.ifa.de/en/library.html>> Accessed September 7, 2018.

Knowing this, it is not surprising that, in its proposals, the European Commission has never brought the audiovisual sector to the umbrella of “culture” but has carefully kept it under other legal basis that allow for a much greater scope of action. At first, there were clearly separated decisions and regulations for culture and for the audiovisual sector; then there have been decisions and regulations covering both fields but under a double legal basis (the one for culture and the other in order to cover the audiovisual). The section of culture was addressed by the EU programmes Ariane (1997-1999), Raphael (1997-1999) and Kaleidoscope (1996-1999), which mainly focused on performing and applied arts, literature and translations, and cultural heritage. They were followed by the Culture 2000 programme (2000-2006) (Smith 2015: 17, 18) which combined elements of the previous programmes mentioned above. In addition, it included “the promotion of intercultural dialogue and the recognition of culture as an economic factor and as a source of socio-economic development” (Kandyla 2015: 50).

In the audiovisual sector, the residual powers clause<sup>5</sup> provided the basis for MEDIA I (1991-1995) (enacted before the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty). MEDIA II (1996-2000), MEDIA Plus and MEDIA Training (2000-2007) were already based on the new article on culture. The programmes mentioned above focused on the cultural and linguistic diversity of cinema works. They emphasised the economic importance of the audiovisual industry guided by the objective to prevent the European film market from being dominated by imported products (Kandyla 2015: 52). Underpinned by its competencies in the audiovisual sector and the sector’s protectionist logic, the EC’s approach on international trade regulations was shaped by a discourse in which, alternatively, and sometimes simultaneously, the principles of “cultural exception” and “cultural specificity” were taken as foundation, including in order to justify the results, on audiovisual, of the negotiations leading to the setting up of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 and its General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in which none of these two principles is recognized (Burri 2015: 197).

Subsequent to the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, in 2007, the European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World (EC 2007a) was adopted. It was the EU’s first explicit framework towards a cultural policy, replacing the logic of “cultural exception” or “cultural specificity” by that of the recognition of “cultural diversity”. The Agenda emphasized three objectives: the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue; the deployment of culture as a catalyst for creativity, enhancing growth and jobs; and the promotion of culture in the context of the Union’s international relations (Smith 2015: 17). Regarding the role of the EU in promoting an “agenda under the slogan of cultural diversity” (Burri 2015: 195), Mira Burri points out: “that the EU has played a particularly prominent role in both the shaping of the concept of cultural diversity and in the developments leading towards the adoption of this international legally binding instrument, which seeks to protect national sovereignty in matters of culture” (Burri 2015: 203).

Between 2007 and 2013 the sectorial division into cultural and audiovisual programmes continued. Within the cultural pillar, the Culture 2007-2013 programme focused on “promoting the transnational mobility of individuals and organisations working in the cultur-  
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5. As established in Art. 352 TFEU, the residual powers clause allows “the adoption of measures necessary for attaining treaty objectives when no specific legal basis was available” (Kandyla 2015: 51). In the 1990s, this was governed by the EC Treaty, Art. 235: “If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures”.



al field, promoting the transborder flow of cultural and artistic works; and encouraging intercultural dialogue” (Kandyla 2015: 51). The programme addressed not only cultural organisations; it also included non-profit cultural industries. The Media 2007 (2007-2010) and Media Mundus (2011-2013) programmes implemented within the audiovisual section concentrated on the economic development of the audiovisual sector. It should take more advantage of the potentials of cultural expressions, by amplifying its content and making reference to European cultural and linguistic diversity and broad audiovisual cultural heritage. Furthermore, the programmes encouraged audiovisual cooperation and cinematographic coproductions with third countries (Kandyla 2015: 52).

The notion of creativity in the 2007 European Agenda’s objectives provided “a discursive link between culture, innovation and broader EU economic concerns such as growth, competitiveness and social cohesion” (Kandyla 2015: 49). Thus, a direct nexus between economic challenges and the role of culture as a potential contribution to enhance economic performance and foster economic growth was established. According to Annabelle Littoz-Monnet (2015: 28): “Culture was presented as a direct source of creativity, and creativity was defined in terms of its potential for social and technological innovation, and thus as an ‘important driver of growth, competitiveness and jobs’”. The leading EU agency behind this discourse was the Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC). It promoted the incorporation of a creativity frame into EU cultural policy; an approach which provided the basis for the Creative Europe programme (Littoz-Monnet 2015: 25).

The Creative Europe programme was launched by a joint regulation of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 December 2013 and is valid for the period 2014 to 2020. Its legal basis is formed by the articles on culture (Art. 167) and industry (Art. 173) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. The general objectives of the programme are:

- a)** to safeguard, develop and promote European cultural and linguistic diversity and to promote Europe’s cultural heritage;
- b)** to strengthen the competitiveness of the European cultural and creative sectors, in particular of the audiovisual sector, with a view to promoting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (EU 2013: Art. 3).

The regulation that launched the programme described the new challenges facing the European creative industry as a result of globalization and the digital transformation. The central thrust of the whole programme is therefore clearly the promotion of the European cultural industry in international competition and the protection of European cultural sectors. Accordingly, the specific objectives are:

- a)** to support the capacity of the European cultural and creative sectors to operate transnationally and internationally;
- b)** to promote the transnational circulation of cultural and creative works and transnational mobility of cultural and creative players, in particular artists, as well as to reach new and enlarged audiences and improve access to cultural and creative works in the Union (EU 2013, Art. 4).

The EU's external cultural relations are mentioned in the Creative Europe Programme only in Art. 17 (Consistency and Complementarity), where it says

The Commission, in cooperation with the member states, shall ensure the overall consistency and complementarity of the Programme with:

**a)** relevant Union policies, such as those in the fields of education, employment, health, the internal market, the digital agenda, youth, citizenship, external relations, trade, research and innovation, enterprise, tourism, justice, enlargement and development;

**b)** other relevant Union funding sources in the field of culture and media policies, in particular the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund and the research and innovation programmes, as well as the financial instruments relating to justice and citizenship, external cooperation programmes and the preaccession instruments (EU 2013: Art. 17).

The relevance of culture to the EU's external relations has been reinforced by various declarations and activities over the past decade. In May 2011, the European Parliament (EP) called for the development of a common EU strategy on culture in EU external relations (EP 2011b). In 2012, the EP "launched a large-scale Preparatory Action (PA) – to be set in motion by the European Commission and executed by a bid-winning expert consortium. The purpose of the PA would be to analyse the existing situation as regards culture in the EU's external relations and to carry out a comprehensive inquiry" (Isar 2014: 17). As a result, in 2013 and 2014, the European Commission commissioned an inventory of the EU's External Cultural Relations with 54 partner countries. The final report Preparatory Action. Culture in EU External Relations. Engaging the World: Towards Global Cultural Citizenship, with recommendations on the future structure of foreign cultural relations, was presented in 2014 (Isar 2014). In 2016, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy adopted a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council entitled Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations (EC 2016h). This was a basic document for the strategy of cultural relations with EU partner countries fully in line with the UNESCO 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. The EU's new Global Strategy (EU 2017) and the 2017 New European Consensus on Development (European Council 2017) also mention the importance of culture as part of European foreign and development policy. In May 2018, the European Commission presented another key document, A New European Agenda for Culture (EC 2018e). The three strategic dimensions of the New Agenda include not only the social and the economic, but also the external dimension of European cultural relations. The document mentions as central objectives of the EU's foreign cultural relations:

- Support culture as an engine for sustainable social and economic development
- Promote culture and intercultural dialogue for peaceful intercommunity relations
- Reinforce cooperation on cultural heritage (EC 2018e: 6).

As always, this document also refers to the subsidiarity principle: “Respecting the principle of subsidiarity, the EU’s role is to provide incentives and guidance to test new ideas and support Member States in advancing a shared agenda” (EC 2018e: 9). Nonetheless, the document is a clear political signal to member states and institutions of the Union to further develop the role of culture in the EU’s external relations in the coming years.

At EU level, the European Commission proposals to the European Parliament and the EU Council affecting external cultural issues (and the implementation of programmes approved by Parliament and Council) are at the charge of different DGs: the Directorate General on Education and Culture (DG EAC); the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO); the Directorate-General for Trade (DG TRADE). But in so far as these actions are included within foreign policy instruments, also the European External Action Service must be considered as an actor.

The activities of DG EAC are mainly conceived from an intra-EU perspective. They include the design of funding programmes in the fields of culture, media and education as well as the development of operational programmes to support cultural and audiovisual cooperation and an advisory function in matters of cultural policy. DG EAC also provides selectively funds for cultural cooperation with third countries (e.g. India, China, and Brazil), so called Special Actions Programmes.

The scope of action of DG DEVCO and its cooperation office EuropeAid is exclusively outward-oriented and cultural issues play a subordinated role. Nonetheless, related programmes are implemented under the umbrella of three financial instruments: the DCI (Development Cooperation Instrument, 2014-2020) includes thematic and geographic assistance programmes with regard to low income countries, e.g. in Latin America or South-East Asia; the ENI (European Neighbourhood Instrument, 2014-2020, formerly European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument ENPI) aims to foster stabilisation, security and prosperity in the EU’s Mediterranean and East European neighbour countries; and the EDF (European Development Fund) – funded by the EU member states and thus not influenced by EU legislative procedure – is directed to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to overseas countries and territories (OCTs) (Lisack 2014: 16, 21, 25; Mestrum 2015: 6, 14; EEAS 2016; EC 2018a; 2018b). In so far as commercial policy affects culture, the main actor remains DG TRADE (Eichhorst/Kendzia et al. 2010: 21; Kerremans/Orbie 2009: 630; EC 2018c).

The foreign policy instrument of Strategic Partnerships (SP) has been a “conceptual framework for the EU’s relations with the leading powers of the twenty-first century [India, China, and Brazil]” (Kundnani 2012). The SP was considered as ground giving instrument in order to advance trade relations, sectoral cooperation and political dialogue or to conclude new, legally binding (framework) agreements (Cirlig 2012: 2). Within the SP, cultural issues were addressed through specific declarations on further cooperation and dialogue. In the past, especially the EU’s strategic partners were chosen for DG EAC’s Special Action programmes for cultural cooperation with third countries (EC 2018d; EPRS 2012).

### 3.1.2 Latin America and the Caribbean

All Latin American and Caribbean cooperation and integration mechanisms recognize culture as an important field of activity. In its founding document, the 2011 Caracas Declaration, CELAC described its integration mandate as political, social, economic and also cultural:

based on a wise equilibrium between the unity and diversity of our peoples, so that the regional integration mechanism can become the ideal space to express our rich cultural diversity and also the forum to reaffirm the Latin American and the Caribbean identity, our common history and our ongoing struggles for justice and liberty (CELAC 2011: § 21).

Cultural cooperation and integration are considered as a tool to boost sustainable development in the region and to consolidate “a multi-polar and democratic world which is fair, balanced and at peace” (CELAC 2011: § 25). The political declarations and action plans of the five CELAC Summits held between 2013 and 2017 emphasize the importance of culture as a foundation of every country’s and the region’s overall identity, as a catalyst for regional integration, and as a motor contributing to sustainable development, to eradicate poverty and to decrease social gaps in the region. The relevance of cultural industries for national economies is highlighted as a generating tool for job opportunities (CELAC 2014a: § 54; 2015a: § 20; 2016: § 49). Furthermore, accentuated in a special declaration, the field of culture is addressed as a promoter of human development (CELAC 2014c).

The combat and prevention of illicit traffic of cultural goods is stressed as a key issue of regional integration, which requires multilevel policy action. In this context, the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property is highlighted as a reference document, which is to be strengthened (CELAC 2014a: § 15; 2014b: § 8, 9; 2016: § 49; 2017b: § 2).

With reference to cultural diversity as a key feature for peace and security on different levels, commitment is expressed in order to adopt measures guided by the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (CELAC 2017a). As a normative international frame, it is perceived of major relevance for developing countries (CELAC 2015b: § 14).

In 2013, CELAC established an annual Meeting of Ministers of Culture (LACULT 2017). It replaced the Forum of Ministers of Culture and Officials in Charge of Cultural Policies of Latin America and the Caribbean created in 1989, which had been coordinated and funded by UNESCO until 2014. In its first declaration, the Ministerial Meeting explicitly recognized the achievements of the entities in charge of culture in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). The declaration mentioned UNESCO’s historic support given to the work of the Forum of Ministers of Culture, through its Regional Office of Culture for Latin America and the Caribbean, and in particular the accompaniment provided by the Technical Secretariat. Once again, the ministers stressed “the role of culture in the eradication of poverty and the reduction of social inequalities in Latin America and the Caribbean, as part of a process towards the achievement of more equitable and better prepared societies to face current challenges, incorporating sustainable development strategies” (CELAC 2013b: § 12).

The Final Declaration published on the occasion of the III Meeting of Ministers of Culture of CELAC in September 2015 welcomed the initiative of UNESCO in the preparation of a Culture Work Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean (2016-2021). It encouraged its enrichment through participatory and joint work with the countries that make up CELAC (CELAC 2015b: § 15). With the aim to “preserve cultural heritage and promote culture in favour of productive economic growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development” (2015a: § 21), the Ministerial Meeting launched the Cultural Action Plan 2015-2020, defining 45 concrete activities in four thematic areas: Social Development and Culture; Cultural Industries, Creative Economy and Innovation; Protection and Conservation of Cultural Heritage; Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Arts and Creativity (LACULT 2015).

However, contrary to the EU, CELAC, founded in 2011, merely plays the role of a network for the concertation of common positions of Latin American and Caribbean countries in international politics. Sub-regional integration bodies such as CAN, SICA, CARICOM or MERCOSUR, on the other hand, are much more institutionalized. The main objectives of these organizations relate to economic and trade issues, but they also play an important role in the cultural cooperation of their respective members, as do the new regional projects UNASUR, ALBA and Pacific Alliance. As these organizations and networks are also important partners for the EU’s external cultural relations, in the following we explain the main approaches to cultural cooperation in the above-mentioned institutions.

The Andean Community of Nations (CAN) institutionalized a regular meeting of Culture Ministers in 2010 as Andean Council of Ministers and Authorities of Culture. Main objectives of the Council’s meetings have been the creation of an Andean System on Cultural Information, the development of legislation to promote cultural industries, the promotion of the circulation of cultural goods, cultural services and cultural manifestations or expressions which originated in the region, the training of Andean cultural actors and managers, and the creation of an online network to foster exchange of cultural entrepreneurs within the region (CAN 2010). Member states proposed the development of an Andean Cultural Stamp to enhance the international visibility of the region’s cultural diversity. Some of the proposals of the Council that have already been implemented include the celebration of an Annual Week of Andean Culture, the Andean Plan for the Development of Cultural Industries (2012-2015) and the nomination of the Inca Road System Qhapaq Ñan for the UNESCO List on World Heritage Sites (CAN 2012, 2013). In 2014, the World Heritage Committee decided to include the road system in the World Heritage List. For the first time, a World Heritage site of several countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) has been selected.

The Central American integration process has had a cultural dimension since the 1980s. In 1982, the Organisation of Central American States (ODECA) – the predecessor of the Central American Integration System (SICA) – extended its focus on the field of culture, establishing the Cultural and Educational Coordination of Central America (CECC). Nowadays is one of the sector technical institutions integrated by the Governments that are part of the SICA. CECC passed conventions on protection of cultural heritage and on exposition, restitution and return of archaeological, historical and artistic objects. Since 1994, CECC has pursued education and culture as guidelines to foster Central American regional integration in terms of sustainable human development and with regards to socio-cultural and natural diversity (SICA 2017b). Most of the programmes and projects promoted by CECC

address the improvement of quality of education. The programmes executed in the field of culture concentrate on the region's popular culture, cultural heritage and cultural diversity and literature as well as the audiovisual sector. This includes journals on Central American literature and culture and a Central American Culture Channel. Almost half of the programmes are funded by SICA's own means or by SICA member states. Other funders are Spain, the Netherlands, the Chinese Republic of Taiwan, the Inter-American Development Bank, and UNESCO (SICA 2017a).

MERCOSUR has had a Meeting of Ministers of Culture since 1995. In 1996, the organization adopted a Protocol on Cultural Integration. In 2003, specialized meetings of Cinematographic and Audiovisual Authorities of MERCOSUR were initiated (Europe Aid 2008; RECAM 2007). Based on the 2008 Declaration on Cultural Integration, the cultural dimension was institutionalized as MERCOSUR Cultural. Its entities are subordinated to the Meeting of Ministers of Culture and include the MERCOSUR Cultural Information System (2009), the MERCOSUR Cultural Secretary (2010), as well as four specialized commissions on Arts, Cultural Heritage, Cultural Diversity, Creative Economy and Cultural Industries (MERCOSUR 2017; LACULT 2014). MERCOSUR has realized a number of cultural programs and projects in the cultural field in recent years: the MERCOSUR Audiovisual Programme 2009-2011; the publication of its own Cultural Heritage list in 2012; the Beyond War Project to commemorate and reflect on the Great War 1838-51; the MERCOSUR Award on Visual Arts in force since 2016; the 2015 launch of the MERCOSUR Cultural Festival; and the Mapping of Artistic Residencies inside MERCOSUR 2016-2017 to encourage the mobility of artists in the region (MERCOSUR 2017; MEC 2011). The MERCOSUR Audiovisual Programme was partially funded by the European Union, whereas other activities realized under MERCOSUR's cultural umbrella have been financed by its own means or external funders like UNESCO, as it is the case of the Mapping of Artistic Residencies Programme (MERCOSUR 2017; Europe Aid 2008).

The inclusion of the cultural dimension into the institutional framework of CARICOM dates back to 1985 when the Regional Cultural Committee (RCC) was established. RCC meets at least once a year and serves as an advisory board to the Ministers of Culture to develop a regional cultural policy (CARICOM 1997: 1). In 1994, CARICOM member states agreed on a Regional Cultural Policy designed to profile the importance of culture within the Caribbean Community and to foster its development. The approach was thought as a model for national cultural policies by including guidelines on policy issues like cultural and artistic promotion, cultural heritage or funding. It has also established the concept of an "Ideal Caribbean Person", which takes into account the region's ethnic, religious and other diversities as a source of potential strength and richness (CARICOM 1997: 2-3, 18-19). One of CARICOM's main pillars in the field of culture is the Caribbean Festival of Creative Arts CARIFESTA. Since 1972, it has been held thirteen times in order to celebrate "the ethnic and racial diversity which separately and collectively created cultural expressions that are wonderfully unique to the Caribbean" (CARICOM 2017a). Cultural and creative industries are of great importance to the region's economies and especially to the CARICOM Single Market Economy (CSME) launched in 2006. To facilitate the development of a comprehensive Regional Development Strategy and Action Plan for the Region's Cultural Industries, in 2008 the Ministers of Trade and Culture of the member states established a Regional Task Force on Cultural Industries (CARICOM 2017b). The Task Force was also called upon to play a vital role in guiding the Commu-

nity in exploiting the provisions of the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)<sup>6</sup>, especially as it related to the cultural sector.

In its foundational principles, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples’ Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP) highlights “the contribution of trade and investments to strengthening of the cultural and historical identity of our peoples” and seeks to distinguish itself from consumption focused free trade agreements by taking into account “the diversity of cultural expressions in the trade” (ALBA 2010). The Summit Declarations of the Alliance address the right to defend historical and cultural values, especially regarding the consumption of coca leaves as “an age-old ancestral and intrinsic tradition” of Bolivian people (ALBA 2009a; 2009b). By agreeing on a common economic space of the ALBA-TCP member states on its XI Summit in February 2012, the Alliance reaffirms the commitment of its TCP to cultural diversity (ALBA 2012a). Identifying the international “great transnational media power” as its antagonist, the Alliance put the media sector in focus. In order to connect the media sectors of its member states, it proposed the creation of a regional Radio, the launch of a regional Television Platform Project, the creation of a regional Multimedia Network and the creation of the Alba Journalism Awards (AL-BA 2012b).

The constitutive treaty of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) established the promotion of cultural diversity as a specific objective to be achieved through the encouragement of the expression of memory and knowledge of the people of the region within its member states in order to strengthen their identities (UNASUR 2011: Art. 3). In 2012, the South American Council of Culture (CSC) was established. Its main objectives are the promotion and strengthening of cultural cooperation in the region, the recognition and promotion of the core value of culture as a prerequisite for development and to overcome poverty and inequality as well as the promotion of the reduction of regional and sub-regional asymmetries in order to increase universal access to culture (UNASUR 2012a; 2012b).

The Pacific Alliance (AP) established a Technical Group on Culture in 2015 to promote the development of the cultural and creative industries of its member states (AP 2016a). The activities of the group are focused on the development of statistical information on culture, the creation of regional and international webs linked to the cultural sector, the realisation of common cultural events, and the production of a mini-series on history, arts and commerce in the Pacific covering the centuries between XVI and XXI (AP 2015; 2016b). In 2016, activities included a regional seminar for strategy exchange concerning the development and innovation of cultural industries. Another project is CONECTA Pacífico, a digital training and exchange platform for cultural entrepreneurs in the region (AP 2016b).

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6. The Caribbean Forum of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (CARIFORUM) are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. CARIFORUM was established in the early 1990s and refers to the Body comprising Caribbean ACP States which are signatories of the Georgetown Agreement of 1975, that created the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). ACP comprehends 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific states. All Participating States in CARIFORUM, with the exception of Cuba, are signatories to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement or Cotonou Agreement and the EPA, respectively.

## 3.2 THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF EU-(CE)LAC-RELATIONS

For a long time, the EU sought a bloc to bloc relationship in its relations with LAC. Since this was not consistent with the realities of Latin American and Caribbean regionalism, the European Commission in 2005/2006 changed its foreign policy guidelines for relations with Latin America and the Caribbean and paved the way for broad cooperation on various levels: bilateral, sub-regional and bi-regional (EC 2005a; 2006: 18).

The ratification of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and the setting of the EU European Agenda for Culture in a Globalising World in 2007 established a direct link between the cultural dimension and the Commission's multilevel approach in the field of cooperation. This development was underpinned by the 2007 Agenda's definition of the EU as one of the main drivers behind the successful implementation of 2005 UNESCO Convention (Loisen 2015: 215).

Since then, the EU deploys a multilevel cultural cooperation strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean (Crusafon 2015: 229). This strategy is implemented in diverse frameworks of collaboration with sub-regional entities (CARIFORUM, MERCOSUR), sub-regions (Central America, Colombia / Peru / Ecuador), and individual countries (Brazil, Mexico). The set of agreements discussed earlier cover the cultural field differently. However, this is quite irrelevant in practice as the legal basis for any action involving the use of funds is not provided by the agreements but by the EU internal regulations and decisions that have already been analysed. In this context, it must be underlined that the cultural cooperation programmes implemented by DG EAC and within the strategic partnerships (EU-Brazil/Mexico) have not been continued in subsequent funding periods.

### 3.2.1 The cross-cutting topic mobility

Mobility within the cultural dimension of bi-regional relations is mainly addressed in a reciprocal way as "exchange", "interaction" or "circulation" between both regions. It is conceptualized in a broad sense, including mobility of people (e.g. artists, brokers), of items (e.g. goods, services), of knowledge (e.g. expertise, techniques) or of cultural practices. To foster mobility requires certain instruments and formats (e.g. cooperation schemes, programmes, funding lines). In addition, specificities exist with regard to mobility, depending on the sector in focus (e.g. performing arts, audiovisual sector).

#### a) Political Dialogue

In the period considered (1999-2017), cultural mobility gathers constant attention in the realm of political dialogue between EU and LAC. Thus, bi-regional exchanges among cultural actors are highlighted as "one of the most efficient and effective means to promote mutual understanding, learning and cultural production" (EU-LAC Summit 1999: § 61). The exchange of experts and techniques in the respective cultural sectors are seen as appropriate strategy to foster respect for cultural identities as well as cultural and linguistic diversity. The respect for cultural identities and linguistic diversity is described as an important factor for guaranteeing human dignity and sustainable development (EU-LAC Summits 1999: § 46 priorities for action; 2002: § 74; 2004: § 92). Both sides identify cultural industries and the audiovisual sector as major pillars of cultural and economic coopera-



tion. Efforts to deepen exchange should be enhanced in order to promote respect for cultural identities, cultural and linguistic diversity as well as to foster intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding (EU-LAC Summits 1999: § 62; 2002: § 75; 2004: § 92; 2006: § 54; 2010a: 19). The Summit Declarations adopted since 2013 also speak of mobility, but not in terms of the cultural dimension. Mobility is addressed only in terms of academic and scientific relationships (EU-CELAC Summits 2013a: 30; 2015a: 28, 69).

The EU's cooperation agreements with individual LAC countries, sub-regions or sub-regional entities mention cultural mobility in different ways, as the place of culture in these agreements varies, ranging from annexed or not annexed protocols on cultural cooperation; bilateral declarations; action and executive plans; up to regional strategy papers (Crusafon 2015: 228). Agreements signed before 2008 (EU-Mexico, EU-Chile, and EU-MERCOSUR) address culture exclusively in two realms: cultural cooperation and the audiovisual sector. Later agreements emphasize sectorial particularities within a single pillar of culture: cultural exchange and dialogue, technical assistance, audiovisual and cinematographic sector, performing arts, publishing, and protection of cultural heritage.

Almost all bilateral cooperation frameworks share the conviction that cultural mobility is essential to promote intercultural dialogue and foster mutual understanding. In addition, they also share the common goal to boost the respective cultural industries (EU 2000: Art. 31.1; EEAS 2008: 17; European Council 2010: 30). One of their key objectives is to promote the exchange of cultural goods, activities and services. In addition, the documents define specific objectives, taking into account each cultural sector's particularities (EU 2008: Art. 1.1; EC 2012a: Art. 1.1). Those encompass mainly the fields of labour mobility, e.g. the facilitation of exchanges between practitioners in performing arts (EU 2008: Art. 7.1; EC 2012a: Art. 6.1; 2012b: Art. 8.1); the exchange of knowledge, expertise, best practices and information, e.g. regarding the protection of sites and historic monuments or the digitalisation of audiovisual archives (EU 2008: Art. 9; European Council 2010: 31; EC 2012b: Art. 7); or the sharing of experiences between stakeholders and institutions, e.g. in the field of culture specific policy making (EEAS 2008: 2; EC 2012b: Art. 6.2). For the achievement of these goals, the cooperation frameworks propose various formats and instruments that promote mobility. Main examples within the cultural dimension are joint activities (e.g. expert seminars, trainings, studies, conferences, co-productions, and regular dialogues), professional exchanges and the general promotion of networks (EU 2002: Art. 40.3; EEAS 2008: 1; EC 2012b: Art. 8.1). The bilateral cooperation frameworks point out that the exchange between cultural sectors is conditioned by each party's commitment to international standards. This includes, for example, technological compatibility and interoperability in the audiovisual sector (EU 2008: Art. 5.3).

Structural asymmetries between the EU and its Latin American and Caribbean partners are addressed in different ways. The common regional strategy papers with MERCOSUR do not address such imbalances. The MERCOSUR-European Community Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006 describes the EU as a facilitator in the development of the cultural dimension of MERCOSUR (EC 2002: 24) and as a contributor to harmonize legislation and common policy in MERCOSUR (EC 2002: 19, 31). An explicit mention of possible imbalances and asymmetries can be found in the protocols on cultural cooperation negotiated in the scope of the 2008 EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement, the 2012 EU-Central America Association Agreement and the 2012/2016 EU-Colombia/Peru/Ecuador

Trade Agreement. These documents stress the will of the signing parties to “address the structural imbalances and asymmetries which may exist in cultural exchange” (EC 2012b: Art. 1.2) and highlight the parties’ awareness of their cultural sectors’ particularities, focusing especially on their cultural industries and its degree of development (EU 2008: 1, Art. 1.2; EC 2012a: Art. 1.2).

## **b) Policies and Programmes**

As we have seen, mobility in the cultural dimension played a role in all three levels of EU-LAC political dialogue mentioned above. However, concrete programmes addressing cultural mobility issues only existed with the strategic partner countries Brazil and Mexico. In the Joint Programme on Culture 2011-2014 (EC 2011b), the EU and Brazil agreed on sharing experiences on cultural policy-making and on the exchange of technical missions on cultural heritage. This included cooperation between museums, expert seminars, studies and conferences. Beside the implementation of exchange formats and instruments, like a round table with Brazilian cultural personalities (Brussels 2011) or a conference on the cultural and creative economy (2012), there is only a vague announcement of further activities in the field of cultural mobility (Crusafon 2015: 230; Smits 2014: 23).

In the scope of the EU-Mexico strategic partnership, two co-financed Joint Cultural Funds were launched. The first phase of the Cultural Fund (2008-2010) encompassed six projects of which two focussed their activities on art exchange. This phase began prior to the establishment of the bilateral strategic partnership and was funded with an amount of almost €1 million (50 per cent EU grant). During the second phase of the Cultural Fund (2009-2012), with a total budget of € 5.6 million (50 per cent EU grant), one out of three programmes (Proyecto de difusión y cultura cinematográfica: Europa en México) aimed to foster cultural exchange within the cinematographic sector (European Council 2010; Crusafon 2015: 229; Schneider 2014: 20).

Beyond these agreements with Brazil and Mexico, the European Union counts on additional instruments for bilateral cooperation with strategic partners in the field of culture. They address mobility in different ways. The EU Culture Programme 2007-2013, implemented by the Directorate-General of Education and Culture (DG EAC) and the competent Executive Agency, directly targeted the strategic partners in LAC. Thus, Brazil (2008: € 1.3 million) and Mexico (2011: € 2.2 million) were selected as countries for Special Actions in cultural cooperation (Lisack 2014: 21). Three out of seven activities realized in the case of Brazil, with a total amount of almost € 600.000, defined the mobility and exchange of artistic works, artists and professionals in Europe and Brazil as important project goals (e.g. In Vitro 1999 2009; Women’s Voices: Identity, memory, imaginary) (Smits 2014: 39-41). In the case of Mexico, mobility and the circulation of cultural assets were among the explicit objectives in 6 out of 13 projects. Other objectives related to the exchange of artists, knowledge, ideas and best practices between Mexico and the EU (e.g. Myths and beliefs about the beginning and the end of the world; GRAFF-ME Exchanges on urban art in Europe and Mexico; Schneider 2014: 21-28). Overall, a budget of € 700.000 was available for these programmes.

The Directorate-General of Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) designed various cooperation programmes in which culture played a certain role. The MERCOSUR Audiovisual Programme (2009-2011) received € 1.5 million (80 % of the total budget) from

the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), managed mainly by DG DEVCO. The programme was mainly directed towards the strengthening of the cinematographic and audiovisual sectors within MERCOSUR. The exchange of experiences with EU institutions and partners was merely addressed in the context of sector specific professional and technical training (Europe Aid 2008: 7).

The DG DEVCO's Investing in People Programme (€ 50 million), addressed to countries belonging to the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), focused on the exchange of cultural industries and cultural actors "as a way of allowing multicultural and multiethnic dialogues to improve mutual understanding and respect" (KEA European Affairs 2011: 69). Due to the missing focus on the Caribbean ACP countries, the programme was hardly taken into account by CARIFORUM's ACP member states (KEA European Affairs 2011: 25).

### **3.2.2 The cross-cutting topic inequality**

Inequality within the cultural dimension of the bi-regional relations between EU and LAC is mainly addressed in indirect ways through the notion of "equality". Culture is envisioned as an important dimension to reduce social exclusion and to promote social cohesion and social inclusion.

#### **a) Political Dialogue**

Inequality plays only a minor role within the framework of bi-regional political dialogue on cultural issues. The Summit Declarations adopted until 2006 regularly emphasize the common cultural heritage and mutual historical links as well as the wealth and diversity of the respective cultural expressions. They address these communalities as a comparative advantage that allows building an alliance between both regions in a "spirit of equality and respect" (EU-LAC Summits 1999: § 1; 2002; 2004: § 3; 2006: § 2). The Summit Statements also underline the importance of the cultural and educational spheres. Particular importance is assigned to the access to education for everybody and the right of peoples to preserve their cultural and linguistic diversity. Both are considered to be key factors to achieve a solid partnership and to reduce social inequalities in both regions (EU-LAC Summit 1999: § 54, 64). The Summit Declarations stress the need to jointly combat xenophobia and discrimination. They underline that efforts have to be taken to guarantee respect for cultural diversity in order to increase social cohesion and diminish, inter alia, inequality and social exclusion (EU-LAC Summit 2004: § 40).

The Summit Declarations adopted between 2008 and 2015 either fail to mention the issue of inequality within the cultural dimension of the bi-regional relations (EU-LAC Summits 2008, 2010a; 2010b; EU-CELAC Summit 2015a; 2015b; 2015c) or display the topic in a broader sense. An example of this logic is the declaration adopted at the first EU CELAC Summit in 2013, in which the parties express their will to foster equality and social inclusion and the importance of the citizens' participation in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of public policies (EU-CELAC Summit 2013a: § 17).

In the scope of the relations between the EU and individual LAC countries, sub-regions or sub-regional entities the issue of "inequality" gathers explicit attention only in the course

of the 2008 EU-Brazil strategic partnership and the respective Joint Action Plan (EEAS 2008: 14, 17). When defining objectives in the field of cultural cooperation, the contracting parties contextualize the promotion of social inclusion with the improvement of access to culture by fostering, *inter alia*, cultural activities at local level (EEAS 2008: 17). Other culture specific frameworks on bilateral level address “inequality” merely in terms of including sectorial particularities into more general cooperation guidelines with the aim to provide equal attention to distinct facets of the cultural field (EC 2011a: 2; 2011b: 2; 2012a; 2012b; European Council 2010: 32).

## **b) Policies and Programmes**

Specific programmes addressing the issue of inequality in the cultural dimension exist only in the context of the EU’s bilateral relations with Latin American partners. This applies above all to strategic partnerships with Brazil and Mexico. As part of the EU-Mexico strategic partnership, during the second phase of the Cultural Fund (2009-2012), with a total budget of € 5.6 million (50 per cent EU grant), two out of three programmes addressed the issue of inequality. They mentioned the “social inclusion of young people through the promotion of cultural opportunities” (Red Colectivos Culturales Comunitarios, Jóvenes de Tamaulipas; project budget: € 100.000; Schneider 2014: 20-21). They also referred to the “strengthening [of] the cultural identity and [the promotion of] new forms of socialisation, which respect the principles of multiculturalism, cultural heritage and the identity of rural communities, and in particular indigenous peoples; as well as the principles of participatory democracy, in order to reduce disparities and inequalities in terms of social, cultural and economic development” (Identidad Cultural y Desarrollo Comunitario en Campeche y Oaxaca; project budget: € 800.000) (Schneider 2014: 20-21).

In addition to the strategic partnership frameworks, the European Commission’s DG EAC launched the EU Culture Programme 2007-2013. In this context, the LAC counterparts of strategic partnerships enjoyed increased attention. Thus, Brazil (2008, with a total budget of €1.3 million) and Mexico (2011, with a total budget of € 2.2 million) were selected as countries for Special Actions in cultural cooperation (Lisack 2014: 21). In the case of Brazil, one out of seven activities addressed the issue of inequality by recognizing in the project’s guidelines the value of cultural diversity against all sorts of exclusion (Programme Safe Harbour: Performing cultural dialogues across the Atlantic; project budget: € 195.000) (Smits 2014: 39-40). In the case of Mexico, two out of 13 collaborative activities included the issue of inequality in their proposals. They recognized art as an instrument to foster social inclusion and cohesion (Mex in Dance; project budget: € 113.100). They addressed inequality indirectly as they focused on marginalized neighbourhoods as target areas (Re-Mex. El poder de las artes; project budget: € 122.382) (Schneider 2014: 21-26).

### **3.2.3 The cross-cutting topic diversity**

Different to inequality, the cross-cutting topic of diversity plays a central role in the context of the cultural dimension of bi-regional relations between the EU and LAC. Diversity is recognized as a fundamental element of EU-CELAC relations. In addition, it is considered to be a key feature of cooperation in the field of cultural industries. Furthermore, the definition of “cultural diversity” provided under the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Pro-

tection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, that emphasizes diversity, is an important conceptual reference for the bi-regional cooperation. For example, the 2007 EU European Agenda for Culture in a Globalising World underpins the role of the EU as “one of the driving forces behind the successful conclusion of the UNESCO Convention” (Loisen 2015: 215) on the international level by fostering “the richness of cultural diversity of partners” (Lisack 2014: 15).

This outwardly oriented understanding of cultural diversity of the EU differed partially from the approach of Brazil, which considered until recently promoting cultural diversity in its own country as a priority. The 2013 Brazilian strategy of culture in external relations aspires “to promote the country’s cultural and regional diversity” (Smits 2014: 13) and to overcome “the positioning of [the] brand ‘Brazil’ in the 70s and 80s [which] was [...] based on stereotypes and did not reflect the cultural diversity of Brazil” (Smits 2014: 7).

### **a) Political Dialogue**

The Summit Declaration adopted in Rio de Janeiro in 1999 identifies “the wealth and diversity of our respective cultural expressions” as a central pillar for a strategic bi-regional partnership (EU-LAC Summit 1999: § 1). Similarly, the Madrid Summit Declaration (2002) highlights diversity, along with cultural heritage, as a fundamental link of bi-regional integration (EU-LAC Summit 1999: § 59; 2002: § 76). Diversity and plurality are considered to be fundamental principles for the development of the bi-regional relationship “without distinction of race, religion or gender, precepts that constitute the ideal means of achieving an open, tolerant and inclusive society where the individual’s right to freedom and mutual respect is enshrined through equitable access to productive capacity, health, education and civil protection” (EU-LAC Summit 1999: § 54; 2002: § 66). The promotion of cultural industries such as the audiovisual sector through economic cooperation and exchange between cultural sectors, are seen as pathways to guarantee human dignity and social development by encouraging respect for cultural and linguistic diversity (EU-LAC Summit 1999: § 60, 61; 2002: § 74, 75). The 2004 Guadalajara Summit Declaration also emphasized the importance of cultural industries (EU-LAC Summit 2004: § 92). However, the 2004 Summit marks a decline of the attention to cultural diversity (EU-LAC Summit 2004: § 91), which may be connected to the upcoming UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in 2005. In further Summit Declarations, the role of cultural diversity is either not taken into account (Lima Declaration: EU-LAC Summit 2008) or is hardly mentioned (EU-LAC Summit 2006: § 54; EU-LAC Summit 2010a: § 19). The broad support<sup>7</sup> by EU and LAC countries of the 2005 UNESCO Convention apparently led to decreasing attention to the topic of cultural diversity in the context of the bi-regional Summit talks.

To the contrary, the ratification of the 2005 UNESCO Convention led to growing attention of the subject of cultural diversity in the context of bilateral and sub-regional agreements. There is consensus that the promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue should be important elements of foreign policy strategies (Lisack 2014: 14; Smits 2014: 10). All documents express a strong commitment to the 2005 UNESCO Convention, its definitions, contents and concepts. Some documents mention cultural diversity in quality of

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7. 32 out of 33 CELAC member states as well as all EU member states (28) have ratified the 2005 UNESCO Convention.

a “shared topic” (for example the MERCOSUR. Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 [EC 2007b: 60]) or an issue of “common interest” (European Commission – Brazil/Mexico, Joint Declarations, EC 2009a: 2; 2009b: 2), whereas others highlight cultural diversity as an objective to be implemented in the course of cultural policies (EU-CARIFORUM, EPA, Protocol on Cultural Cooperation, EU 2008: Art. 1.2; EU-Central America Association Agreement, Protocol on Cultural Cooperation, EC 2012a: Art. 1.2; EU-Colombia/Peru Agreement on Cultural Cooperation, EC 2012b: Art. 1.2).

Within the frameworks of the strategic partnerships with Brazil and Mexico, cultural diversity is emphasized as a concept to be promoted to “the enhancement of intercultural dialogue and to the fostering of cultural and creative industries” (EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership. EEAS 2008: 17; EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership. European Council 2010: 31).

## **b) Policies and Programmes**

Concrete programmes addressing cultural diversity existed only within the EU’s strategic partnerships with Mexico and Brazil. The EU-Brazil Joint Programme on Culture 2011-2014 (EC 2011b) identified the implementation of the 2005 UNESCO Convention as a priority (Crusafon 2015: 230). This seems to substantiate the activities realised in this context (e.g. bilateral round-table of cultural personalities 2011, conference on the cultural and creative economy 2012; Smits 2014: 23) that nonetheless lack of any further programmatic specification with regard to cultural diversity. In the case of the EU-Mexico strategic partnership, the second Joint Cultural Fund (2009-2012, that follows the first Joint Cultural Fund 2008-2010) was launched in order to promote cultural diversity as well as cultural industries (European Council 2010: 32; Crusafon 2015: 229). One out of five activities (Slam Poetry 2012) realized under the umbrella of the Joint Cultural Fund had a focus on cultural diversity (Schneider 2014: 20).

There are additional cooperation formats provided by the European Commission which address diversity within the field of culture. In the scope of the EU Culture Programme 2007-2013, conducted by the DG EAC, Brazil (2008, with a total budget of € 1.3 million) and Mexico (2011, with a total budget of € 2.2 million) were selected as countries for so called Special Actions in cultural cooperation (Lisack 2014: 21). In the case of Brazil, one out of seven programmes (Programme Safe Harbour: Performing cultural dialogues across the Atlantic; project budget: € 195.000) accentuated cultural diversity as a valuable concept “against all sorts of exclusion” (Smits 2014: 40). In the case of Mexico, two out of 13 programmes (FACE. A European-Mexican Theatre Research project for innovative training practice; project budget: € 191.000; Re-Mex. El poder de las artes; project budget: 122.382) referred to cultural diversity in quality of a programmatic purpose (Schneider 2014: 25, 27).

As members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), some CARIFORUM member states became beneficiaries of the ACP-EU Cultural Fund. This fund is managed by DG DEVCO under the umbrella of the 10th European Development Fund. It has to be noted “that these [funds] were not tied to the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement” but to the general ACP Convention (Europe Aid 2014: 24; Lisack 2014: 19; KEA European Affairs 2011: 22). The programme launched in this context, ACP Culture+ (with a total budget of € 12 million), emphasised the “strengthening of the capacity of institutions in the ACP countries to implement the UNESCO Convention on the Protection

and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions” (KEA European Affairs 2011: 68). It addressed in different sub-programmes the audiovisual sector, the production and distribution of ACP cultural goods, as well as “the improvement of the policy and regulatory environment for culture” (KEA European Affairs 2011: 22). The DG DEVCO Investing in People Programme (2007-2013, with a total budget of € 50 million) followed the objective “Access to local culture, protection and promotion of cultural diversity” (KEA European Affairs 2011: 69). The programme was hardly taken into account by CARIFORUM’s ACP member states; only few of them submitted proposals for this call (KEA European Affairs 2011: 25). The European Commission’s MEDIA Mundus Programme 2011-2013 was established for third countries, thus ACP countries, in order to “strengthen [the] cooperation [...] in the audiovisual sector by promoting competitiveness of the sector and cultural diversity” (KEA European Affairs 2011: 27).

### **3.2.4 The cross-cutting topic sustainability**

The issue of sustainability is rather a subordinated topic within the cultural dimension of bi-regional relations between the EU and LAC. It is mainly related to development issues with loose or indirect connections to culture in different contexts. Main examples are the preservation of cultural heritage, the fostering of cultural industries and the promotion of cultural diversity. The cultural dimension of bi-regional relations is displayed either as a factor that contributes to sustainable development or vice versa as an issue conditioned by sustainable development.

#### **a) Political Dialogue**

The 1999 Rio de Janeiro Declaration highlights the diversity of cultural expressions. It emphasizes the profound and unifying character of a common cultural heritage as the basis for a bi-regional partnership and as endowing factors to meet the principle of sustainable development (EU-LAC Summit 1999, § 1). The 2002 Madrid Declaration addressed sustainability within the cultural dimension in a broader context, recognizing the importance of promoting sustainable tourism as an effective instrument for economic and cultural development (EU-LAC Summit 2002: § 51). Both regions declared in that Summit their commitment to contribute to sustainable development by promoting higher education, in order to interpret, preserve and promote culture in its pluralist and cultural diversity context (EU-LAC Summit 2002: § 73). In the 2004 Guadalajara Declaration, commitments for regional integration projects which are designed to promote sustainable cultural development were given. Concerning the bi-regional basis, the parties aspired to foster cultural dialogue which “reflect[s] cultural identity, as well as cultural and linguistic diversity, and which benefit[s] human development, as a contribution to sustainable development, stability and peace” (EU-LAC Summit 2004: § 91). The Summit participants recognized “the important contribution of cultural industries to the promotion of sustainable development” (EU-LAC Summit 2004: § 79, 92). In later Summit declarations, the aspect of sustainability within the cultural dimension is either less displayed (EU-LAC Summit 2008) or not addressed (EU-LAC Summits 2006 and 2010a; 2010b). The issue of sustainability reappears in the 2013 EU-CELAC Summit Declaration, where the parties express the common will to support “all initiatives which imply the strengthening of cooperation, the transfer of knowledge and the preservation and conservation of natural and cultural heritage [...]” in order to achieve sustainable development (EU-CELAC Summit 2013a: § 13).

In the scope of the relations between the EU and individual LAC countries, sub-regions or sub-regional entities, the topic of sustainability in the cultural dimension finds attention only in joint action plans agreed on with Brazil (2008) and Mexico (2010). In the case of the EU-Brazil strategic partnership, the parties mention the improvement of access to culture as a common goal, in order to promote sustainable development (EEAS 2008: 17). In the Joint Programme on Culture 2011-2014, the promotion of sustainable cultural tourism is considered as a socioeconomic benefit of cultural heritage. The development of a sustainable cultural and creative economy is mentioned as one of the objectives to achieve during their four-year joint action (EC 2011a: 1; 2011b: 2). Within the strategic partnership with Mexico, cooperation in the field of sustainable development is highlighted as one of the most significant bilateral agenda subjects. In this realm culture and education are addressed as being of great relevance for sustainable development (European Council 2010: 4).

## **b) Policies and Programmes**

A concrete activity that takes into account sustainability in the cultural dimension could only be identified within the framework of the strategic partnership between the EU and Brazil. It refers to a bilateral seminar on culture and sustainable development, held in Brasilia in May 2013 in the course of the Joint Programme on Culture 2011-2014 (Smits 2014: 23; EC 2011a: 1). Beyond the strategic partnership frameworks, the European Commission's DG EAC launched the EU Culture Programme 2007-2013. Brazil (2008, with a total budget of € 1.3 million) and Mexico (2011, with a total budget of € 2.2 million) were selected as countries for Special Actions in cultural cooperation (Lisack 2014: 21). Whereas none of the seven activities realized in the case of Brazil addressed sustainability with regards to culture, in the case of Mexico, at least one out of 13 cooperation activities put sustainability and culture into the programmatic focus by seeking "to explore how culture, during a global financial crisis, can contribute to the development of a sustainable society through international cooperation and cohesion" (Mexico Programme, total budget of almost €200.000, Schneider 2014: 22).

The European Commission's DG DEVCO set up an EU/UNESCO Expert Facility Programme in order "to strengthen the governance for culture in developing countries and reinforce the role of culture as a vector for sustainable development and poverty reduction" (KEA European Affairs 2011: 71). Although the programme was "not set up [...] to implement the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation of the [EU-CARIFORUM] EPA", it is considered to "be useful for some CARIFORUM countries to implement the 'technical assistance' commitments embodied in the Protocol" (KEA European Affairs 2011: 28).

### **3.2.5 Impacts, Achievements and Challenges**

What is the impact of bi-regional relations between the EU and CELAC in the cultural dimension with regard to our cross-cutting-topics mobility, inequality, diversity and sustainability? Any attempt to establish causalities between bi-regional relationships and concrete effects on one or the other side of the Atlantic is of course problematic. As Andrew Murray writes about the effectiveness of EUNIC's activities:



One recurrent and very difficult issue for the practitioners and academics of cultural relations and cultural diplomacy is the lack of any tools for measuring its effectiveness, other than the measurement of inputs. Thus, we cannot measure whether EUNIC has in fact ‘improved cultural diversity and understanding’ between European societies or has ‘strengthened international dialogue and cooperation.’ (Murray 2016: 221)

This assessment also applies to the bi-regional cultural relations between the EU and CELAC. In any case, there are only a few programmes and projects in the cultural dimension, whose impacts could be evaluated with more details. There are no concrete budget-based programmes that would, for example, seek to increase the mobility of cultural workers between Europe and the LAC, to reduce inequalities or to preserve cultural diversity on a sustainable basis.

Overall, there are only a few reviews of bi-regional cultural relations and of the corresponding programmes. Our following reflections are therefore based on the few existing general inventories of European external cultural policy, on the cultural relations in strategic partnerships with Mexico and Brazil, and on the implementation of the cultural aspects of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and CARIFORUM. The challenges we identify relate only partially to concrete cross-cutting topics. Rather they are often general challenges to an external cultural policy of the European Union. In this sense they are also valid for relations with LAC.

An important achievement in terms of the cultural dimension of bi-regional relations between Europe and LAC is the discursive consensus that exists between the two regions on certain core values and goals. This is especially true in view of the high appreciation of cultural diversity, the protection of minority rights and the preservation of traditional cultures. For example, the mutual respect for cultural diversity between the EU and Mexico was emphasized in the first Partnership Agreement of 1994 and then reaffirmed again and again in later years. It can also be seen as an achievement that the 2008 Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States on one part, and the European Community and its member states, on the other part, for the first time included cultural aspects in an agreement otherwise dominated by economic and trade issues. In particular, the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation annexed to the Agreement should be seen as an achievement in our context. It also focuses on the fight against structural imbalances and provides preferential treatments, which is clearly an achievement in the fight against inequalities and structural asymmetries. The text of the protocol is also an achievement in terms of the promotion of the mobility of artists, as it provides for a simplified entry of artists from CARIFORUM member countries into the EU.

At the same time, cultural cooperation between the EU and CARIFORUM member countries is a very good example of many challenges that need to be addressed. The Protocol on Cultural Cooperation does not foresee any financial commitments for its implementation by the EU or its member states. There are no plans for specific programmes to implement the Protocol. Nor have the artistic coproductions of European and Caribbean cultural creators provided for in the protocol been set in motion as far as we are aware.

The market access rules for cultural professionals agreed between the EU and CARIFORUM are binding. However, they merely record the existing rules and do not go beyond them. One of the main problems for many cultural operators from the Caribbean with regard to access to the European cultural market is the fact that there are no uniform European rules but very different rules of access from country to country (KEA European Affairs 2011: 13ff.). What has been stated in another study on access to the EU for cultural workers from all over the world, of course, applies to cultural relations with LAC:

The current visa regime stands in flagrant contradiction to the desire for deeper cultural relations. Its negative impact has already cast a long shadow on cultural relations activities everywhere. Time and again, the consultation process revealed the serious difficulties that artists, academics and cultural operators often encounter in trying to obtain visas to come to EU member states, in some cases even when European national cultural institutes themselves support legitimate applicants. [...] While it is true that procedures have been made more flexible vis-à-vis certain countries, the EU as a whole is certainly not respecting either the spirit or the letter of the Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (notably, as regards developing countries, the provisions of Art. 16: Preferential Treatment for Developing Countries) (Isar 2014: 101f.).

Another challenge concerns the question of how certain elements of the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation are interpreted. While representatives of the European Commission consider the provisions of the Protocol to be “politically” binding, the representatives of individual EU countries see them as merely a set of best endeavours. They do not derive any obligation to act from them (KEA European Affairs 2011: 15). The Caribbean partners also identify a number of aspects that make it difficult for many Caribbean artists to take advantage of the Protocol’s potential benefits. These include a weak organisation of the cultural sector, lack of knowledge of cultural practitioners on how to benefit from the cultural provisions, absence of information on market access requirements and opportunities in EU member states, and difficulty to meet the requirements of provisions for the audiovisual sector (KEA European Affairs 2011: 15).

With regard to the cultural dimension of relations between the EU and its strategic partners, Brazil and Mexico, the cultural activities initiated in the first decade of the new millennium do not seem to have continued. Both countries are now considered to be middle income countries and are therefore no longer eligible to apply for the DCI budgets as they could beforehand. The Joint Programme on Culture 2011-2014 between the EU and Brazil has not continued. Neither the Declaration on the 7th EU-Brazil Summit in 2014 nor the Joint Declaration on the tenth anniversary of the launch of the Strategic Partnership in 2017 mention cultural issues. Efforts to develop cultural cooperation between Europe and Brazil beyond national activities appear to have largely shifted to EUNIC’s involvement. In 2018, EUNIC, in cooperation with the EU-Delegation, held a European Week (Semana da Europa) for the 14th time in Brazil. These activities are also an attempt to respond to the challenge of lacking visibility of the EU as a cultural actor. The EU is perceived primarily as a trading bloc. If that is going to change, the EU, not just in Brazil, needs to invest in its visibility as a cultural player; it must develop a common narrative (Smits 2014: 25ff.). Such a narrative must not

be confined to conjuring up again and again the assumed shared values and cultural similarities between the two regions. Of course, there are many things in common, but history, especially from a Latin American perspective, is often a burden that is far too little addressed and acknowledged by the Europeans. In times of post-colonial and decolonial discourses (even if one does not have to agree uncritically), the EU can no longer confine itself to drawing a harmonious picture of the common past and present time and time again.

The experiences of the EU's cultural cooperation with Mexico reveal another challenge: the different expectations on the partner side. While the Mexican cultural authority CONACULTA expects the EU to be more involved in heritage protection, the CDI (Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas), which is responsible for indigenous affairs, is more interested in promoting the cultural diversity of indigenous communities. In turn, the organization Pro Mexico is primarily interested in accessing new cultural markets (Schneider 2014: 14ff.).

In addition, we would like to address a set of further challenges to the external cultural relations of the EU, which not only relate to cooperation with LAC. Many cultural activities in third countries still take place on an ad hoc basis. The EU Delegations very often have neither dedicated budgets, nor staff members who are qualified for cultural activities. Moreover, cultural activities are still too one-sidedly conceived as a promotion for the EU and not as reciprocal activities (Isar 2014: 104). The external cultural relations of the EU need a strategic framework if they are to be more effective than before. This includes intra-European coordination mechanisms both between the various EU institutions and between the EU and the member states. For example, the various directorates-general of the Commission dealing with cultural issues (DG EAC, DG DEVCO, DG TRADE, DG CONNECT) would need to work together more institutionally, not just on an ad hoc basis. In terms of coordinating the activities of national cultural institutions, the work of EUNIC is a step in the right direction.

As the main responsibilities for cultural activities will remain with the member states, it would be important to pool national resources in the interests of a stronger EU-wide cultural policy. This could benefit smaller EU countries, which otherwise would not be able to engage in LAC because of scarce resources. Thus, such pooling or "subsidiary complementarity" (Isar 2014: 10) would also contribute to reducing inequalities within the EU. In order for such resource pooling to be more widely accepted by the individual states, it would also be necessary, especially from the perspective of already active countries, to clarify the added value of a European cultural policy vis-à-vis national commitments.

Another challenge arising from the Preparatory Action Report concerns communication. This applies both to the languages used (here, multilingualism is explicitly required) as well as the type and channels of communication. Young people in particular are hardly attracted to the cultural activities of the EU so far.

# 4. THE SCIENTIFIC DIMENSION

## 4.1 THE REGIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF THE SCIENTIFIC DIMENSION IN EUROPE AND LAC

### 4.1.1 European Union

The consideration of the scientific dimension at regional level dates back to the 1950s. This shows its early significance within the European integration process. At those times, research activities and funding of regional extent were primarily centred on the purposes of the coal, steel and nuclear industries. They were embodied in the 1957 established Joint Research Centre (JRC), a technical and scientific service of the European Commission. During the 1970s and 1980s, research, alongside with higher education, gained more weight as a crucial policy area for regional integration. Whereas previously, the related funding at regional level could only be based in the “residual powers clause” of article 235 (see chapter 3.2), the area found specific recognition in the 1986 Single European Act. From 1984 there was a first Pluriannual Research and Technological Development Framework Programme (FP). Since then, 8 consecutive FP editions<sup>8</sup> have been implemented. They favoured the diversification of research activities and funding beyond industrial purposes, even if the chapter on Research was explicitly introduced as serving the objective of strengthening EU industry and remains so since.

The scientific dimension’s continuous importance in the European integration process is also reflected by the establishment of the annual Euroscientia Conferences in 1994, in order “to stimulate reflection and debate on science and technology on a European scale” (Debru 1999: 371). In 2000, the European Research Area (ERA) was launched on the basis of Article 179.1 ECT.<sup>9</sup> The ERA aimed to create “a unified research area open to the world, based on the internal market, in which researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate freely” (EUR-Lex 2018a). The implementation of the ERA was a main objective of the 7th Framework Programme (2007-2013). It was fostered by the relaunch of the Lisbon Process in 2005 as a “New Lisbon Partnership for Growth and Jobs” (van Vught 2009: 5). In addition, the rearrangement of the EU’s research policy and the related FPs with the member states’ scientific and technological policies played an important role.

In order to consolidate the European Research Area, the European Research Council (ERC) and the European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) were established. Whereas the former was launched “to establish and operate new or existing research infrastructures

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8. Until today, eight multi-annual Framework Programmes (FP) have been executed consecutively. Six of these FP had a duration of 4 years; another two, including the currently running one, a duration of 7 years: FP1 (1984-1987: € 3.3 billion); FP2 (1987-1991: € 5.4 billion); FP3 (1990-1994: € 6.6 billion); FP4 (1994-1998: € 13.2 billion); FP5 (1998-2002: € 14.9 billion); FP6 (2002-2006: € 19.3 billion); FP7 (2007-2013: € 55.9 billion) and FP8, also known as Horizon 2020 (2014-2020: € 80 billion) (EC 2015a: 6-7; JEUPISTE 2018).

9. Article 179.1 TFEU: “The Union shall have the objective of strengthening its scientific and technological bases by achieving a European research area in which researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate freely, and encouraging it to become more competitive, including in its industry, while promoting all the re-search activities deemed necessary by virtue of other Chapters of the Treaties”.

on a non-economic basis" (EC 2018t), the ERC was set up as a bottom-up funding scheme to support "investigator-driven frontier research" (EC 2018u; 2018v). They complemented the Framework Programmes.

As stated in Articles 180 and 181 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the EU possesses no exclusive legal authority in the areas of research and technological development. It is a policy domain the EU shares with member states. At the same time, both the EU and its member states are obliged to coordinate their related activities in order to ensure the mutual consistency of research policies at the national and the regional level. At the external level, Article 186 of the TFEU explicitly empowers the Union to cooperate with third countries and international organisations in the areas of research and technological development. This allowed the European Commission to launch in 2012 a new strategy for international cooperation in research and innovation entitled "Enhancing and focusing EU international cooperation in research and innovation: a strategic approach" (EC 2012e). Following the principal objective to ensure the EU's standing and competitiveness at international level, the strategy highlighted the inclusion of science as a component of the Union's foreign policy. The so-called Science Diplomacy approach was defined as "an instrument of soft power and a mechanism for improving relations with key countries and regions" (EC 2012e: 4). The strategy laid one of the foundations for the current 8th Framework Programme (2014-2020), known as Horizon 2020. It gave continuity to partnerships with third countries established in previous FPs and expanded cooperation activities far beyond the scope of the EU and its neighbour countries (Bonde 2009: 127-129; Debru 1999: 371; van Vught 2009: 3-11; EUR-Lex 2018b; JEUPISTE 2018; EC 2000: 12-13; 2012e: 3; 2015a: 6-7).

Within the institutional framework at European level, the scientific dimension is addressed by a variety of bodies. The normal legislative procedure applies, involving the European Parliament, the EU Council and the consultation of the Economic and Social Committee. The legislative initiative is in the hands of the European Commission, which also receives the necessary implementing powers, exercised through the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and its Executive Agency (REA). The cooperation of DG RTD with other DGs whose operation affects or can affect scientific policy lacks an institutionalized framework. This happens despite the fact that in the areas of research and innovation (R&I) and science and technology (S&T), the directorates' respective activities are thematically and technically interwoven, and their mandates are complemented by the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Bonde 2009: 127-129; Selleslaghs 2017: 7-9).

DG RTD is in charge of the definition and implementation of Research and Innovation (R&T) and Science and Technology (S&T) policies at European level. It also takes care of the analysis and coordination of related European and national policy approaches and, above all, the coordination of the EU's principal research-related policy instrument and funding programme – the multiannual Framework Programmes (FPs). The FPs supplement national research efforts, creating and supporting collaborative networks at European level, such as joint research projects and centres associating universities from different European countries or the promotion of researchers' mobility and exchanges (Debru 1999: 371; van Vught 2009: 9).

The eight continuous editions of the FPs since 1984 have followed the following goals: 1) the strengthening of research, scientific exchange and research coordination at the European

level in order to maximize the field's potential and to extend its excellence; 2) the support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the stimulation of industrial innovation to improve the competitiveness and leadership of European enterprises at a global scale; as well as 3) the creation of a socio-economic knowledge basis to address major societal needs and challenges. Since its first implementation (1984-1987: € 3.3 billion), the amount of funding for the FPs has risen steadily. For the current 8th FP (2014-2020: € 80 billion), known as Horizon 2020, the largest budget has been allocated so far (EC 2015a: 6-7; JEUPISTE 2018).

The thematic pillars of the multiannual Framework Programmes address different complementary fields. Their programmatic implementation is jointly enabled by DGs with the respective thematic scope. Thus, alongside the DG RTD, DG EAC and other DGs are involved in actions which encompass the fields of research and education at European level. Examples are cross-border trainings and mobility programmes for scientists under the umbrella of Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA), as well as activities of the 2008 founded European Institute of Innovation and Technology's (EIT) and its Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs) on sustainable energy, climate change adaptation and mitigation, and future information and communication society (EC 2016b: 7, 28; EUR-Lex 2014a/b).

In the external area, European R&I and S&T policy approaches are primarily implemented by DG RTD, whose mandate is interwoven with EEAS' foreign policy guidelines. Both refer to the Union's 2012 internationalization strategy, where R&I cooperation is defined "as a new pillar of external relations in addition to the traditional ones of diplomacy, trade and development cooperation" (EC 2018s). The related approach of Science Diplomacy aims at strengthening the "Union's excellence and attentiveness in research and innovation as well as its economics and industrial competitiveness" (EC 2016d). It wants to spin an alternative thread in the European Union's relations with strategic partner countries, international organisations, EU enlargement and neighbour countries as well as other world regions (EC 2012e: 3-4; 2016d; 2018s).

The EU currently counts on 18 bilateral S&T cooperation agreements with partner countries,<sup>10</sup> which are also involved as participants in the EU's Framework Programmes. Beyond that, 16 European neighbour countries<sup>11</sup> have been included in Horizon 2020 activities by temporary cooperation agreements and as part of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (EC 2016a: 4-5; 2017a; 2017b). Further on, the EU established S&T cooperation activities as components of bi-regional dialogue schemes, such as the EU-CELAC S&T cooperation, the EU-ASEAN STI Days 2016 in Vietnam, or the continuous EU-African Union High Level Policy Dialogue on Science Technology and Innovation (STI) (EC 2016c; 2017c; 2017d). As part of the former, a bi-regional Partnership of Food, Nutrition Security and Sustainable Agriculture was launched. Co-financed by DG RTD (Horizon 2020) and DG DEVCO (Pan African instrument), the Partnership interlinks the areas of research and development cooperation, as specified in the guidelines of DG DEVCO's financial tool – the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI, 2014-2020) – where R&I are addressed as issues in order to underpin objectives of inclusive and sustainable growth within the EU's geographic assistance programmes (EC 2014: 59-66).

10. Until today, the EU has established bilateral S&T agreements with the following 18 individual countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, and Tunisia (EC 2017b).

11. In the context of the 8th multiannual FP, known as Horizon 2020, the EU has established association agreements with Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Faroe Islands, Georgia, Iceland, Israel, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine (EC 2017a).

#### 4.1.2 Latin America and the Caribbean

As in Europe, in Latin America and the Caribbean, science, research and technology policy is first and foremost a domain of national governments. Nonetheless, there has been a long-standing effort in LAC to strengthen international cooperation in this dimension. Since the 1950s, many LAC countries have professionalized and institutionalized their science and technology policies. In countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico, National Research Councils were founded. The support of international organizations such as UNESCO, the ICSU (International Council for Science) or the Organization of American States (OAS) played an important role in the development of national scientific systems (Feld et al. 2013: 27f.). A study published in 2005 examined the importance of support given by organizations such as the Ford Foundation, the US Agency for International Development (AID) or the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) for the development of training (scholarships, visiting professorships) and research infrastructures (equipment, libraries, etc.) (Levy 2005).

Since the 1970s, the importance of intra-LAC cooperation in science and research has grown. Examples include the Latin American Advanced School of Informatics (ESLAI) launched by the Argentine government in 1986 or the 1986 Regional Biotechnology Program for Latin America and the Caribbean (Feld et al 2013: 31f.). Since the 1990s, the internationalization of Higher Education has become a major trend across the region. Bilateral and sub-regional, regional, hemispheric and international cooperation in research and teaching have been steadily expanded. Since the turn of the millennium, the election of left-wing governments in many countries in the region has increased regional scientific cooperation and made topics such as social inclusion, poverty, social inequality, social and economic regional differences more prominent.

A large number of actors are involved in shaping regional scientific cooperation in LAC. These include, for example, nongovernmental organizations and networks such as the Association of Universities of Latin America and the Caribbean (UDUAL; created in 1949), the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO; created in 1967) or the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO; created in 1957). Already in 1974, the Latin American and Caribbean countries signed a Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education “with the purpose of strengthening and increasing cooperation in education, recognizing academic qualifications between countries, enhancing mobility, and increasing integration within the region” (Jaramillo/ Knight 2005: 326). However, this convention does not deal with changes in cross border education, mobility, qualification recognition, or quality assurance, which means that without updating and revising, it no longer has much relevance to current developments. Sub-regional actors like the Association of Universities of the Amazon (UNAMAZ; created in 1987), the Council of Central American Universities (CSUCA, created in 1948) or Montevideo Group of Universities (AUGM; created in 1991) should also be mentioned, as well as efforts to strengthen scientific cooperation in sub-regional integration processes.<sup>12</sup>

The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) paid significant attention to the scientific dimension, particularly within the scope of political dialogue. The

12. An overview of important actors and programmes that contribute to the connectivity of scientific cooperation in LAC can be found in the articles by Jaramillo/ Knight (2005) and Gual Soler (2014).

Summit Meetings held regularly since 2013 highlighted the advances in science, technology and innovation (STI) as tools for intra-regional development. The cooperation on STI issues of regional interest – green energy, education, and infrastructure development or communication technology – was emphasized as a central concern. This included the exchange between national STI sectors and the accessibility of scientific knowledge for the region's people (CELAC 2013a: §40; 2014a: §49; 2016: §15). Furthermore, the importance of STI as a thematic field to be addressed at regional level was manifested through its repeated consideration in annual action plans, the launch of thematically related working groups and by continuous expert reunions and ministerial meetings (CELAC 2014b: 8; SELA 2015b; Itamaraty 2016; 2017).

In 2014, the CELAC Senior Officials' Meetings on Science and Technology stressed the necessity to generate synergies between national and regional policies and programmes. It was explicitly stated that this should be done in a differentiated way to countries with lower levels of scientific and technological development and ensuring the sustainability of the scientific workforce in the countries of origin (Itamaraty 2018; CELAC 2014d: §2). On that basis, the CELAC 2020 Planning Agenda Proposal focused on three goals: "1) Increase the percentage of people that have completed secondary education; 2) Increase gross enrolment rate in higher education, and 3) Increasing investment in research and development as a percentage of GDP in the region" (SELA 2015a: 9-10).

#### 4.2 THE SCIENTIFIC DIMENSION OF EU-(CE)LAC-RELATIONS

Both EU and CELAC give central importance to the scientific dimension within the respective processes of regional integration and share a strong aspiration to cooperate in the scientific area at international scale. Regarding the scientific cooperation between both regions, Europe and LAC can refer to a long tradition of exchanges between individual researchers, universities and non-university research institutions. Since the mid-1980s, the degree of institutionalisation of bi-regional cooperation in the fields of science, research, technology and innovation has been steadily increasing. Nowadays it is embodied in a variety of cooperation schemes at bi-regional, sub-regional and nation level.

The scientific cooperation at the bi-regional level encompasses diverse formats of political dialogue, the exchange of expertise, concrete policy planning and monitoring as well as the development and implementation of joint activities and projects. The dialogue process between both regions started with the 1999 EU-LAC Summit, when education, science and technology were identified as strategic fields of bi-regional partnership and cooperation (EU-LAC Summit 1999: § 7-9; priorities of action § 49). At subsequent Summits (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010), the frame of bi-regional exchanges on science, technology and innovation (STI) has been amplified. Key formats have been regular EU-CELAC Ministerial Meetings on Science and Technology (S&T) and the launch of bi-regional Senior Officials' Meetings (SOM) on S&T. Several thematic working groups have continuously held meetings since 2000 (EU-LAC Summit 2002: 26).

With the aim to develop and implement the EU-LAC Knowledge Area, and in order to consolidate the respective bi-regional dialogue as well as common cooperation approach-



es, the Joint Initiative on Research and Innovation (JIRI) was launched in 2010 (EU-LAC Summits 2004: § 93; 2006: § 51, 53; 2010a: § 38-42; 2010b: 2). Complementary to the JIRI process, the Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) on S&T has expanded its thematic spectrum. Currently, its co-chaired Working Groups cover the following thematic priorities: bioeconomy including food security (coordinated by Argentina and France); renewable energies (coordinated by Mexico and Spain); biodiversity and climate change (coordinated by Colombia and France); information and communications technology for meeting societal challenges (coordinated by Chile and France); health (coordinated by Spain and Brazil). In addition, a cross cutting working group on funding instruments (coordinated by Portugal and Mexico) and a working group on research infrastructures (coordinated by EC and Uruguay) exist (EC 2017o; ALCUE-NET 2016d).

The EU-LAC Knowledge Area was redefined in 2016 as an EU-CELAC Common Research Area (CRA), emphasizing the thematic pillars mobility of researchers, research infrastructures, and societal challenges (EU-CELAC Summits 2013a: § 29; 2013b: 1-2; 2015a: § 60-61; 2015c: 2; EC 2017o). In order to support this expansion of the bi-regional scientific dialogue, further exchange schemes and activities on STI were set up in the context of the bi-regional Summits, such as activities related to the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat), the two tracks of EU-CELAC Academic and Knowledge Summits, congresses of researchers and universities from both regions, and the EU-Latin American and Caribbean Knowledge Week (Selleslaghs 2017: 8; EC 2017n).

The different editions of the EU's multiannual Framework Programmes (FPs) had enabled and strengthened since 1984 the STI cooperation between Europe and LAC. However, only since the 2004 EU-Guadalajara Summit, the bi-regional dimension of scientific cooperation has gained importance. Since then, the FPs have included LAC as a target region and encouraged mutual and broad participation (EU-LAC Summits 2004: § 93; 2006: § 53). Two projects explicitly pursuing "horizontal" bi-regional cooperation were implemented within FP7 (2007-2013) and FP8 (2014-2020): the Latin America, Caribbean and European Union Network on Research and Innovation (ALCUE-NET 2012-2017) and the Network of the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean Countries on Joint Innovation and Research Activities (ERANet-LAC 2013-2017). The latter was a consortium of 17 funding agencies of both regions able to co-fund research projects without further EU assistance (EC 2017o; Selleslaghs 2017: 10-11; EULAC-Focus 2018; EU-CELAC Summit 2015a: § 61).

At the State level, the scientific collaboration between both regions is represented by four S&T agreements between the European Union and specific countries: EU-Argentina (since 1999), EU-Brazil (2004), EU-Chile (2002) and EU-Mexico (2004). These agreements laid the foundation for deepening cooperation of the respective research and innovation funding agencies. They implied also the involvement of partner countries as participants in the EU's Framework Programmes. Examples are bilateral projects as the Increasing International Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation between Brazil and the EU (INCOBRA 2016-2019) or the Chile-European Union STI Initiative (CEST+I 2013-2015) (EC 2017o; 2018aa; 2018ab; 2018ac; 2018ad; EULAC-Focus 2018). Within the EU's 2012 Strategy on International Cooperation in Research and Innovation, S&T agreements were once again emphasized as an important part of bilateral co-operation between EU and LAC countries (EC 2012e: 7).

#### 4.2.1 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC MOBILITY

In the scientific dimension, mobility encompasses primarily people and knowledge. People include university-level students, doctoral students and post-docs, university professors and senior researchers in non-university institutions. Bi-regional mobility has a different impact on each of these groups and follows different patterns depending on the position and career step of each individual. The mobility and generalizability of scientific knowledge is one of the specificities of these forms and practices of knowledge (e.g. compared to local knowledge). Scientific knowledge encompasses insights, data, information, methods, theories, and techniques. It also includes specific scholarly cultures, bureaucratic styles and institutional logics. The production, exchange, transfer and circulation of knowledge in the scientific realm cannot be disconnected from the existing research infrastructure. This includes research facilities such as laboratories, equipment, computer- and data centres, libraries, museums, archives, field stations but also infrastructure for teaching and scientific events (e.g. conference centres). Availability and access to infrastructure is important. Publications (books, articles, working paper, etc.) are important means to circulate scientific knowledge beyond national borders. Academic and scientific mobility can be enabled, fostered or hindered by collaborative agreements and legal frameworks (e.g., inter-institutional recognition of academic degrees, specific visa regulations and work permits for researchers).

Mobility is central to bi-regional relations between EU-LAC in the field of science, technology and innovation (STI). As Gaillard/Arvanitis (2013a) note in a comprehensive study of EULAC scientific collaboration, the bi-regional impetus to initiate international collaboration in the area of science and technology is itself motivated by the mobilization of information, knowledge, technologies and researchers. Although the specific motives and drivers for mobility are not necessarily the same on each side of the Atlantic and differ with regard to status groups, disciplines and interests, key factors for mobility include access to cutting edge science and complementary know-how, gaining entry to internationally renowned technology markets, the valuation of skills, information, and insights concentrated in other countries, and access to funds from foreign institutions and foreign funding agencies. Moreover, beyond a motivation for scientific collaboration in the framework of bi-regional relations cooperation in the field of science, technology and innovation shows a positive correlation between increased international collaboration and increasing international mobility of people and knowledge as an outcome (Gaillard/Gaillard/Arvanitis 2013: 151).

##### **a) Political Dialogue**

Scientific mobility between the EU and LAC is based on a long history of exchange among re-searchers from both regions. Already in the 1940s, when some LAC countries underwent a period of institutional and professional development in the areas of research and higher education, some European countries responded to their needs by providing technical assistance. This included hiring foreign researchers or the initiation of scholarship programmes (e.g. for students to pursue doctoral studies in Europe). Since the 1980s, this type of developmental or assistance-focus exchange has shifted towards more balanced formats of academic and scientific collaboration (EULAC-Focus 2018). The 4th EU Framework Programme (FP4 1994-1998) established clear guidelines for cooperation of the EU with third

countries. In response to this, various Latin American governments set up complementary funds for the collaboration with the EU. Mobility was further encouraged by the fact that several Latin American countries increased general funding in order to enable their researchers to participate in international mobility schemes (Gaillard/Gaillard/Arvanitis 2013; Kreimer/Levin 2013).

Since the initiation of a more institutionalized EU-LAC bi-regional relationship in the wake of the first bi-regional Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1999, scientific mobility has been a part of the Summit agenda (EU-LAC Summit 1999: § 41). Thus, Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) on Science and Technology (S&T) have taken place regularly since 2000 as a forum for defining joint political priorities for the field of science and technology. These priorities include mobility of students, postdocs, senior researchers and university professors, but also the development of joint research infrastructures in order to enhance comparison, access and research connectivity. Key thematic foci have been climate change and the diversification of the energy matrix, including renewables (EULAC-Focus 2018). The 2004 Guadalajara Summit emphasized the political will to create an EU-LAC Knowledge Area:

We consider that the future EU-LAC Knowledge Area should be built on the results of the successful science and technology bi-regional dialogue and include reinforcement of cooperation in science and technology, higher education, innovation and information and communication technologies. Considering the importance of science and technology for the economic and social development of our countries, and guided by the outcome of the ministerial meetings and of the bi-regional working group on scientific and technological cooperation, we agree to launch a partnership in science and technology with a view to including Latin America and the Caribbean as a target region for the EU Framework Programmes in these sectors, thereby contributing to deepening and developing bi-regional links and encouraging mutual participation in research programmes (EU-LAC Summit 2004: § 93).

The introduction of the Joint Initiative on Research and Innovation (JIRI), launched between the EU and LAC in 2010 during the bi-regional Ministerial Meeting on S&T in the context of the Madrid Summit, meant a qualitative and strategic step in the EU-LAC relationship. It had significant effects on scientific and academic mobility. Through the JIRI mechanism, research ministries from both regions came together for the first time in order to develop a governance structure for the establishment of a “regular bi-regional dialogue on science, research, technology and innovation to consolidate EU-CELAC cooperation and to update common priorities, encourage mutual policy learning and ensure the proper implementation and effectiveness of cooperation instruments” (ALCUE-NET 2016d). Since then, “Science, Research, Innovation and Technology” constitutes a separate chapter of the bi-annual EU-CELAC Action Plans (ALCUE-NET 2016d).

Three bi-regional Academic Summits have taken place since 2013. The first of these Academic Summits was organized in the context of the 2013 Summit in Santiago de Chile. It was a bottom up initiative coordinated by a consortium of Chilean universities and the French network Institut des Amériques. Its goal was to strengthen the ongoing EU-LAC Common Area of Higher Education, launched in Madrid in 2002 (EU-LAC Summit 2002: § 30) and subsequent initiatives undertaken by political officials from both regions. The second Academic Summit was held in Brussels in 2015 and emphasized the development of

an EU-LAC Space of Higher Education, Science, Technology and Innovation (Irelac 2015: 4). During the second EU-CELAC Summit taking place at the same time, the parties commended advances made by JIRI and proposed to create a concrete basis for a Common Research Area (CRA) (EU-CELAC Summit 2015c: 2-4).

At the 5th EU-CELAC Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) on Science and Technology (S&T) in Brussels in 2016, consensus was achieved on focusing on the following three strategic pillars of the CRA: a) Mobility of researchers; b) International outreach of research infrastructures; and c) Increased thematic cooperation to address global societal challenges. Each of these strategic pillars was discussed, described and concretized at the 6th and 7th Senior Officials' Meeting in 2017. Regarding mobility, the participants came to the agreement to open the EURAXESS Worldwide Network to CELAC, in order "to provide information on mobility jobs and funding opportunities for CELAC researchers in Europe" (EC 2017h: §8). As part of the preparatory work for the later cancelled 2017 EU-CELAC Summit San Salvador hosted in October 2017 an EU-CELAC Knowledge Week. This included an event for national authorities on research and innovation, an Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020 Information Event, a Seminar on the recognition of study periods abroad and the first CELAC-EU Academic and Knowledge Summit. Besides emphasizing the importance of mutual recognition of study periods and diplomas, the Summit focussed on a broader use of the JIRI mechanism and the CRA framework, in order to increase bi-regional academic and scientific dialogue and mobility (ALCUE-NET 2016d; EU 2016: 7-8; EC 2016e: 7; 2017n: 9-10; 2017o).

## **b) Policies and Programmes**

At the bi-regional level, science funding agencies from both regions have developed academic and scientific mobility through joint calls, mobility schemes, scholarship programmes as well as common thematic foci. For example, EULARINET (European Union Latin American Research and Innovation Networks) was a four-year programme that started in 2008 with the goal of jointly establishing, implementing and monitoring collaboration of mutual interest in science and technology and promoting the participation of LAC countries in the EU's 7th Framework Programme (FP7 2007-2014). Bilateral sub-regional exchange was organized annually in three sub-regions: Mexico and Central America; the Andean countries; and the MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) countries, thereby explicitly involving the policymaking, science and industry communities (EC 2008: 28-29; 2012c). Another example, already mentioned, is ALCUE-NET (Latin America, Caribbean and European Union Network on Research and Innovation 2012-2017), a platform for strengthening the National Contact Points of EU Framework Programmes in LAC countries that provide information and training in order to increase the participation of researchers from Latin America in EU research and mobility programmes. At the bilateral level, the European Research Council (ERC) has signed implementation arrangements with Argentina (2015), Mexico (2015) and Brazil (2016) in order to enable early-career scientists to join a research team run by an ERC grantee (EC 2016e: 6; 2016f).

In the realm of concrete research projects and exchange programmes among individual researchers or research teams of all academic levels between the two regions, mobility has taken place largely through the funding, infrastructure and thematic priorities of the

EU Framework Programmes. Under the EU's 7th Framework Programme (FP7 2007-2013), there were 314 projects funded with CELAC countries, leading to 734 participations in the programme (EU contribution: 95.6 million EUR; CELAC contribution: 40 million EUR in total) (EC 2016e: 4). In addition, under FP7, a total of 3,700 researchers from Latin America and the Caribbean were awarded mobility grants through the Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions. More than 150 LAC institutions participated in projects under the same funding scheme. The Marie Skłodowska Curie Action calls in 2014 and 2015 led to 87 actions entailing mobility from EU to LAC countries, of which 84% were related to research and innovation staff exchanges (RISE) and smaller amounts to innovative training networks. Since 2016 138 researchers from CELAC states have been participating in Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions within the latest EU Framework Programme Horizon 2020 (FP8 2014-2020), including 31 post-docs and 36 doctoral researchers, as well as 71 who are participating in research and innovation staff exchanges (RISE) (EC 2016e: 4, 6).

Moreover, universities and research centres have established networks of interinstitutional cooperation and exchange. On the European Union side, these have been supported through the América Latina Formación Académica Programme (ALFA 1994-2013), Erasmus Mundus (2007-2013) and Erasmus+ Programmes (2014-2020), such as CAMINOS, a consortium of 28 European and Latin American partner institutions that promotes best practices in order to enhance regional LAC student and staff mobility (EC 2018z; Caminos 2018; EULAC-Focus 2018).

In addition to the importance of the EU Programmes, it is worth noting that the increase in the mobility of people and knowledge has also been the result of the fact that Latin American countries have enacted policies that encourage the participation of their researchers in European projects, particularly through increased funding (Kreimer/Levin 2013: 89). Along with their respective financial commitments, both regions are endeavouring to improve the bi-regional scientific mobility by means of expanding their common research and communications infrastructure. For example, the EllaLink System is a joint-venture project established in 2015 that should become operational in 2020. It entails an advanced sub-sea cable system offering secure high capacity connectivity on a low latency transatlantic route from Portugal to Brazil with nodes in countries of South America such as Argentina, Chile and Peru (EllaLink 2018). The cable should enhance research in areas such as physics, cultural heritage, biodiversity and carbon cycle. The Building the Europe Link to Latin America Consortium (BELLA) will coordinate the extension of the cable to other academic networks in Latin America (such as GuyaLink and CariLink). BELLA is implemented by a Consortium of the Latin American Research and Education Network RedCLARA, GÉANT, the leading European collaboration on e-infrastructure and services for research and education, and the National Research and Education Networks of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Funding for BELLA is provided by the European Commission (DG-CONNECT, DG-DEVCO and DG-GROWTH) and Latin America National Research and Education Networks. It is expected that increased conductivity will expand opportunities for Latin America and the Caribbean to participate as beneficiaries in other infrastructure projects to be defined in the future (EC 2016e: 7). In January 2019, GÉANT and Red-CLARA, on behalf of the BELLA Consortium, announced that EllaLink and Alcatel Submarine Networks have finalised agreements for the construction of the EllaLink submarine fibre optic cable system.

### c) Impacts, Achievements and Challenges

As detailed above, scientific and academic mobility has had an overall positive impact on EU-CELAC relations. It has increased the exchange, circulation, co-design and co-production of knowledge, the growth of international collaborative experiences, it fostered knowledge gain and capacity development of academics and researchers at various levels (students, PhD students, post-docs, professors, established researchers), and allowed better access and use of research infrastructures.

From a European perspective, EU-LAC bi-regional scientific mobility has paid off. In the mid-1980s, the scientific cooperation between US and Canada and LAC was stronger than the one between EU and LAC. For example, European researchers co-authored only 40% of international publications by LAC researchers, compared to 56% with US and Canada. By 2007 this trend had been reversed. Between 1984 and 2007, more research teams from Latin America and the Caribbean co-authored with European partners than with the US and Canada (98,155 and 87,540 publications, respectively). However, regional differences must be taken into account: While researchers from the Southern Cone favour collaboration with Europe — 54% of internationally co-authored papers with the EU versus 44% with the US and Canada —, Mexico and Central America prioritize US-American and Canadian partnerships. They produce 53% of internationally co-authored papers with their North American colleagues compared to 45% with European colleagues. This suggests that geographical proximity is an important factor in defining the geographical scope of mobility. The Caribbean follows yet another trend: 55% of their international scientific collaboration takes place with Europe versus 31% with the US and Canada, a fact that suggests the relevance of colonial ties in the choice of international cooperation (Russell/ Ainsworth 2013: 63).

A positive effect of increased mobility in the scientific field has been the initiation of other types and formats of scientific and academic collaboration of some Latin American countries. Thus, on the basis of the established collaboration between EU and LAC, several countries of Latin America have expanded the geographical scope of their collaborative networks beyond the traditional centres of knowledge in Europe and the US, including to a greater extent the Global South. For example, Argentina and Brazil have diversified their international relationships through bilateral scientific agreements with China, Angola, Mozambique, Israel, and Russia (Feld/Casas et al. 2013: 39).

Some of the main indicators of the positive effects of an increased mobility of people and knowledge in the scientific and academic field are: an increase in scientific and academic mobility, measured by number and types of international projects, an increase in the number of students and scientists at various academic levels and types of institutions participating in mobility programmes and the number of co-authored international publications and institutional agreements.

Beyond all the benefits, transnational scientific and academic mobility can also have ambivalent impacts. This is especially the case with regard to outgoing mobility of post-docs, professors and researchers of countries that are already suffering from brain drain, i.e., from an expatriation of researchers and professionals, of scientific knowledge and academic skills (Docquier/Rapoport 2012). Brain drain affects countries in diverse, often unequal ways. It can have relatively high negative and long-lasting impacts in countries in which

“the smaller the national resource base of highly skilled people, the higher the percentage of highly skilled expatriates” (Docquier/Marfouk 2006, cited in Gaillard / Arvanitis 2013b: 9). On the other hand, countries in the Global South with a higher gross domestic product and/or a more developed scientific landscape have implemented policies to reverse this trend to some extent. For example, countries such as Chile, Mexico or Brazil have launched a series of policies that try to reconnect and mobilize the diaspora of national scientists living abroad towards their countries of origin (Feld / Casas et al. 2013: 39).

One of the major challenges for bi-regional mobility in the scientific dimension is to reduce structural inequalities between EU and CELAC and within the regions, achieve a more balanced relation between brain gain and brain drain, in the sense of a more symmetric knowledge circulation and a less disparate pattern of mobility. For example, international collaboration and mobility tends to concentrate around a group of four Latin American countries, described as “very active” in the field of international cooperation in the area of science and technology with the European Union: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile.<sup>13</sup> These are countries with a traditionally strong scientific and academic system. Therefore, they are in the position to successfully compete for international funds and at the same time are attractive as cooperation partners. Collaboration is less intensive between the EU or EU member states and Colombia, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Costa Rica that have a less developed scientific and academic system. Countries such as Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay or Venezuela nearly do not participate in mobility programmes with the European Union. This pattern of unequal participation in bi-regional scientific and academic cooperation and unequal capability to articulate in the international scientific system has not significantly changed over time. In the same way, also the degree and intensity of participation of EU countries in bi-regional mobility is unequally distributed. Without considering differences in academic disciplines, one can say that United Kingdom, Italy, France, Spain and Germany are the countries with persistently the highest rate of collaboration with LAC countries. However, for these countries scientific and academic cooperation with the US is by far more important than collaboration with LAC (Kreimer / Levin 2013: 83-84).

As Kreimer / Levin rightly assess, “on the whole, LAC participation in scientific collaboration with the EU has increased significantly, both in terms of number of projects and project funding” (2013: 90). The growth of funding by certain LAC countries is of key relevance for Trans-Atlantic scientific mobility. The collaboration of non-EU countries in EU research programmes is only partly funded by the EU, thus depending on counterpart funding (Kreimer / Levin 2013: 84). This, however, leads to a significant aspect of scientific mobility between EU and LAC, which is that mobility is not homogeneous within both regions. Rather, it entails the participation of a handful of countries on each side of the Atlantic. Especially for the LAC countries that do not have the capacity of co-funding research projects with Europe, alternate funding formats would be needed.

Bibliometric studies have shown that co-authorship between the two regions has also increased significantly. International co-authored publications between authors from LAC and EU countries have quintupled in the last 20 years (Kreimer / Levin 2013: 81). However, not all countries participate equally, which is why such general assessments must be seen from the backdrop of asymmetries within and among both regions.

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13. The term “very active” refers to participation in 50 or more projects during the sixth and seventh EU Framework Programmes (Kreimer / Levin 2013: 90).

When designing mobility programmes, structural inequalities within and between the two regions should be considered in more systematic and encompassing ways. Key questions in this regard are: Who can participate in bi-regional mobility programmes? Who can fulfil the required qualifications and formal conditions and prove through internationally recognized indicators of excellence (e.g. highly ranked journal articles) the thematic, methodological and theoretical expertise? And which countries and institutions can position themselves as attractive partners for scientific exchange?

#### **4.2.2 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC INEQUALITY**

As already mentioned in the analysis of the cross-cutting issue of mobility, inequalities in the scientific dimension of the bi-regional relations between EU and LAC are connected to unequal opportunities and possibilities to participate in international and bi-regional collaboration. These include spatial disparities among regions, countries, or regions within countries. They also refer to asymmetries between institutions (universities, non-university research institutions, funding agencies, etc.), disciplines or areas of science (e.g. between natural sciences or engineering and social sciences or humanities) and languages (e.g. predominance of English). Further inequalities exist regarding access to university education and higher academic degrees, funding for research and scientific mobility, to high level publications as well as research infrastructure. In many countries basic and applied sciences are not valued in the same way.

##### **a) Political Dialogue**

In the scientific dimension inequality is addressed through the political dialogue and the broad policies that seek to mobilize funds and set-up programmes for bi-regional and bi-lateral scientific and academic collaboration. These policies implicitly recognize the relative asymmetries in access to economic resources and means for research and university education, what is reflected, for example, in the EU's greater role in providing funds for collaborative research projects as well as scientific and academic mobility. Relations in the scientific field have moved away from a decades-long emphasis on so-called technical assistance towards a "more equal partnership between the two continents" (Gaillard / Arvanitis 2013: 1; 17). Bi-regional policies have tended to favour a model of co-funding. However, not all countries are in the same position to participate in co-financing schemes. Therefore, the grown investments of the past decades to increase exchange, deepen co-production of knowledge and enhance joint knowledge circulation in order to reduce inequalities among both regions have reproduced persistent inequalities within the EU and to a much greater extent within LAC. Researchers, academics and students from countries that can invest in co-financed research and mobility schemes are able to participate more intensively in collaborative projects, what enhances their possibilities to compete for further international funds.

Since the 1990s several Latin American countries set up collaborative funds, such as the Fund for Scientific and Technological Research in Argentina or the Mexican Fund of International Co-operation in Science and Technology EU-Mexico, a trend that has increased over time (Gaillard / Arvanitis 2013: 10). And while this has led to a more equal partnership between these countries and the EU, it is well worth noting that co-funding schemes



have not enhanced equality between “two continents” as Gaillard and Arvanitis (2013: 1) rightly underline. In addition, specific bilateral S&T agreements and cooperation programmes with strategic partner countries (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Argentina) also promote the participation of researchers from these countries in EU-funded programmes. This leads to an additional advantage in the cooperation with European research institutions for the “big four” in LAC: “[...] the more scientifically developed countries are the most active in their scientific collaborations in European projects: both in FP6 [2000-2006] and in FP7 [2007-2013] the four largest countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) accounted for 75% of the Latin American share” (Gaillard / Arvanitis 2013: 13).

## **b) Policies and Programmes**

Some programmes address inequality as a main topic of research. This is in particular the case of social-science studies with a policy transfer component analysing access to formal employment or the inclusion of the gender perspective in broader programmes such as EUROsocial, that has existed since 2005 and is currently in its third phase of implementation (2016-2021) (EC 2018f).

EU Framework Programmes such as FP7 (2007-2013) also have considered socio-economic inequalities as an important topic. The 8th Framework Programme, Horizon 2020, identifies the reduction of inequalities and social exclusion as crucial challenges for the future of Europe (EC 2018w). Under the thematic pillar of “excellent science” of Horizon 2020 the reduction of inequalities in a bi-regional scope is expressed as an important goal. The work programmes of FP8 (2014-15; 2016-17; 2018-20) address inequality under the thematic pillars of “societal challenges” and “science with and for society”. Inequality is a thematic reference in exclusively European-centred calls and projects. It is further considered in the context of enhancing gender equity in the research process and taking gender aspects in research themes and approaches into account (EC 2015b; 2017e; 2018x; 2018y). The Work Programme of 2016-2017 launched two thematic calls on international cooperation with regard to research infrastructures. They aimed enhancing bi-regional coordination and cooperation in the area as well as to ensure the interoperability, reach and reciprocal use of research infrastructures (EC 2015d). That means, they want to make a contribution to reduce asymmetries regarding research infrastructures, enhancing their articulation, access and development.

Already in 2015, the bi-regional BELLA project (Building Europe Link with Latin America) was set-up. The project aims at the installation of a transatlantic optic fibre cable, interlinking Portugal with Brazil, and thus the two regions. With its activation planned for 2020, the intercontinental submarine cable shall contribute to improve the cooperation efforts between the research communities of both regions. It is thought as a direct collaboration channel with equal accessibility for research and non-profit organisations in the EU and LAC (EC 2017j; 8; CORDIS 2017a; 2018). Another initiative in this context is the European Research Council (ERC), a Horizon 2020 “flagship component”. Through its “investigator-driven” approach, the ERC aspires to reverse the logic of top-down priority-led research budgets, providing different funding opportunities for researchers in any field, independent of their nationality and current place of work, but with the minimum requirement of scientific excellence (BMBF 2018b; EC 2015e).

There remain important issues concerning the way in which EU-LAC programmes address or not inequalities. An important question is whether Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) programmes developed between EU and CELAC are targeting in practical terms only small scientific and academic elites or whether they reach broader scientific and academic communities. If the programmes only benefit the top research institutions and universities on both sides of the Atlantic they may have the effect of contributing to greater inequality among regions, countries, institutions, and researchers. In Latin America they can create a greater distance between top research institutions and universities and the rest of the research institutions and universities in those countries. Some evidence for these types of inequalities can be found in the assessments of (bi-regional) programmes such as ENLACE (Enhancing Scientific Cooperation between the European Union and Central America) which finds that only 23% of people interviewed on a sample of researchers and policymakers in Central American countries have been even aware of the existence of the EU 7th Framework Programme (CORDIS 2015; ENLACE 2016: 3).

### **c) Impacts, Achievements and Challenges**

The scientific cooperation between EU and CELAC does not take place equally among all countries. The so-called EU-15 countries<sup>14</sup> account for more than 80% of internationally co-authored papers. France, Spain, the UK and Germany are leading the collaboration with 22,529, 19,756, 19,744 and 17,506 publications between 1984 and 2007, respectively (Gaillard/Arvanitis 2013b: 12). Collaboration is even more disparate on the LAC side: Between 1994 and 2007 Brazil produced the largest volume of internationally co-authored papers (32,389) with EU-15 countries. It is followed by Mexico (15,520), Argentina (14,951) and Chile (10,632). All other countries produced fewer than 4,000 internationally co-authored publications. Indeed, these four countries are also the countries in LAC in which funding for research has increased steadily until recently (see also Kreimer/Levin 2013: 82; Russel/Ainsworth 2013: 61-70). This is reinforced by the fact that there has been a trend over time in EU LAC collaboration towards cofinancing. The substantial increase in LAC funding in the last decade concentrates mainly on the “big four” Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Argentina — from FP6 to FP7 (from 5.26% to 12.04%) (Kreimer/Levin 2013: 87, 89). Responding to the unequal involvement of both LAC and EU countries in European research programmes, the participants of the 6th and 7th Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) on Science and Technology (S&T) underlined in 2017 the necessity to explore support mechanisms that foster a broader participation (EC 2017g: §4c; 2017h: §4d), following the 2016 bi-regional Assessment of Programmes and Actions (EU 2016: 8).

Inequalities are also evident in terms of scientific career opportunities. Researchers and academics from Latin America and the Caribbean show a stronger interest for scientific collaborations with Europe than vice versa. This is related to the fact that collaboration with Europe is more important to the scientific careers of researchers and academics from Latin America and the Caribbean than it is for their EU colleagues (Gaillard/Arvanitis 2013b: 14). Further on, political priorities in the type and profile of research as part of the bi-regional agenda have led to a strong emphasis on the natural sciences and engineering. Far less emphasis is put on the social sciences or the humanities. As Gaillard and

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14. The EU-15 countries include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Gaillard/Arvanitis 2013b: 12).

Arvanitis note, “humanities and social sciences remain rather less internationalized than natural sciences” (Gaillard / Arvanitis 2013b: 5). Examples to highlight these disparities are the Working Groups on Bioeconomy, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) or Energy of the Joint Initiative on Research and Innovation (JIRI). JIRI is an umbrella for policies that since 2010 have been at the centre of bi-regional Action Plans (EU-CELAC Summit 2015c: 3, 24; EC 2017f: §8). In these working groups, the natural sciences tend to be prioritized over the social sciences and humanities. The projects further promote application-driven technology development and innovation and to lesser extent focus on basic research. Thematic fields of JIRI such as Biodiversity, Climate Change and Health are much more transversal and include a greater participation of the social sciences, to a lesser extent also the humanities. Another more encompassing field of cooperation is Sustainable Urbanization, which is dealt within a special SOM task force and emphasized as an EU-LAC shared priority (EC 2017i: 9).

The design of many programmes privileges a close connection between certain technologies and their economic applicability. For example, JIRI wants to contribute towards “strengthening the interface between research and innovation and to technology transfer and adaptation in formats accessible to micro and [small and medium enterprises]” (EU 2016: 7). However, there are considerable differences between Europe and LAC and within both regions with regard to the private sector’s commitment to research and innovation. For example, Germany is a country in which the private sector invests enormously in research. In 2015, almost two thirds of the domestic research and development expenditure of EUR 88.8 billion were financed from private sources, such as the automotive industry (BMBF 2018a: 71). Since application-oriented research in Germany is heavily subsidized by private funds, public research funding can more easily emphasize the freedom of science and the need to promote excellence. By contrast, private research expenditure is very low in many LAC countries. Therefore, governments focus their research funding primarily on application-oriented projects. It is an important aspect of bi-regional political dialogue to define jointly what types and formats of research are mostly needed and how the designs of the programmes should address this. For example, the 2016 bi-regional Assessment of Programmes and Actions (EU 2016: 7-8, 15) recommended strengthening the links between the CELAC-EU Academic Summits and the Business Summits with representation from various industrial sectors and many enterprises.

To sum up, there are a series of inequalities in the scientific and academic relations between EU-CELAC that have to be reduced. These include participation in collaborative research and mobility schemes, the framing of research (areas, themes, designs, formats, etc.), and the allocation of funding opportunities. Only a small number of countries from both regions are able to position themselves with a strong agency in the competitive field of scientific and academic international cooperation. Especially in times of financial volatility and political crisis, many countries are unable to guarantee stable research funding and to invest in long-lasting scientific infrastructures.

### 4.2.3 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC DIVERSITY

In the scientific dimension of bi-regional relations between the EU and CELAC, diversity is understood almost exclusively as biodiversity or biological diversity. The diversity of forms and practices of knowledge and the inclusion of so called “traditional or ancestral knowledge” have been politically recognized. However, they have not been addressed explicitly through scientific collaboration.

#### a) Political Dialogue

Biological diversity is briefly mentioned in the first bi-regional Summit Declaration of 1999 in Rio de Janeiro (EU-LAC Summit 1999: §16, 35). All subsequent Summit documents address bio-logical diversity – often calling it “biodiversity”. In the 2006 Vienna Summit, the common goal to preserve biodiversity was underlined as a joint bi-regional effort to strengthen the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity “with the aim of effectively implementing the three objectives [...], namely the conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources” (EU-LAC Summit 2006: § 27). Similar common objectives were emphasized in the declarations of the 2008 Lima Summit (EU-LAC Summit 2008: § 31, 33, and 47). For mega-biodiverse countries such as Colombia, Mexico or Brazil, the conservation of natural resources is closely linked to the potential of the economic valuation and use of nature. Such science based economic valuation of natural resources is considered to be of great importance for the development of these countries. In this context, cooperation with European partners (e.g. in the areas of bioeconomy, green technologies, renewable energies) are of great interest. Also, the access to European research facilities and research infrastructures associated with the conservation and use of biological resources is important (ALCUE-NET 2016c: Annex III, 32-42).

The nexus between valuation and economic use of biological diversity goes back to at least the 1990s. It has risen in prominence through the development of bioeconomy as a scientific, economic and political field related to multilateral UN conventions on environment and development. Since the 2010 Madrid Summit, biodiversity has gained in importance at the bi-regional political level. Although biodiversity does not appear in the Science and Technology chapter of the Action Plan (EU-LAC Summit 2010b: 2-4), together with the issue of climate change it has been at the centre of a special working group of the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) on Science and Technology (S&T) since 2011 (ALCUE-NET 2016d). In the frame of the 7th SOM in 2017, the Working Group defined the promotion of “interdisciplinary research projects on ecosystem-based adaptation and resilience, including Biodiversity and Climate communities” as one of the next steps to reach (ALCUE-NET 2017b: 4).

Besides biological diversity also the diversity of the energy matrix plays a role in the scientific dimension of EU-LAC relations. Energy is an important topic in the bi-regional political dialogue. The 2004 Guadalajara Summit explicitly addresses energy diversification, making reference to technologies such as hydrogen cells (EU-LAC Summit 2004: § 82, 83). In the Vienna Summit (2006) and the Lima Summit (2008) the topic of energy is treated in a specific chapter of each Summit document (EU-LAC Summits 2006: § 29, 30; 2008: § 31, 36, 40-45). Energy diversification is of strategic political importance not only to the EU but also to some countries in the LAC region. For example, Brazil practically dominates inter-

national ethanol trade markets and Argentina is a key player in biodiesel markets. In the 2016 SOM Bioeconomy Report, CELAC is presented as “the only region in the world that would be able to meet its energy requirements based on ‘bio’ alternatives” (ALCUE-NET 2016c: 4). Therefore, the science based development of alternative energy sources should become one of the priorities of bi-regional research collaboration: “further efforts should be made to capitalise on related EU research projects on energy fund[ing] through the EU Research Framework Programmes, and to promote the EU-LAC knowledge area in this field” (EU-LAC Summit 2008: § 45). Since the 2010 Madrid Summit (EU-LAC Summit 2010a: § 13, 14), energy is an important topic of the bi-regional Action Plan (EU-LAC Summit 2010b: 4-7). In 2011, it has been taken up by the 1st Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) on Science and Technology (S&T) (ALCUE-NET 2016d). Following a request by Mexico energy was included in a Working Group that focused on bioenergy (biomass, biofuels), solar energy (thermal, photovoltaic), wind, ocean and geothermal energy, and more generally on energy efficiency. At the 2016 bi-regional Ministerial Meeting on S&T, energy again was an important topic with new funds allocated specifically towards the Caribbean (EC 2016g). In the scope of the 7th SOM, the Working Group on Energy assessed the EU and CELAC in terms of the efforts undertaken in order to diversify the region’s energy sector. In addition, the group defined common topics of interest concerning the different sources of energy (ALCUE-NET 2017c: 3-11).

At the political level of bi-regional relations there has been some emphasis on “taking into account the contribution of ancestral and traditional knowledge” (EU-LAC Summit 2010b: 2) with-in the field of science, technology and innovation. According to the Joint Action Plan that accompanied the Madrid Summit 2010 declaration, a main objective is to develop the EU-LAC Knowledge Area through “enabl[ing] sustainable research innovation and knowledge sharing taking into account the contribution of ancestral and traditional knowledge” (EU-LAC Summit 2010b: 2). This phrasing also remains in revised and updated versions of the Action Plan in the context of the 2013 Santiago Summit and the 2015 Brussels Summit (EU-CELAC Summits, 2013b: 1; 2015c: 2). However, until the present, “traditional or ancestral” forms and practices of knowledge seem not to play any role in the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) on Science and Technology (S&T), its political priorities or its Working Groups.

## **b) Policies and Programmes**

Biological diversity and climate change are addressed through a variety of bi-regional co-operation activities. In order to identify priority topics and joint actions in these areas of EU-CELAC cooperation, the respective SOM Working Group organized four bi-regional workshops (2014-2017). The group also facilitated thematic get-togethers to enhance knowledge exchange and capacity building, foster the establishment of networks and promote exchanges with other key initiatives and stakeholders, such as the Latin America, Caribbean and European Union Network on Research and Innovation (ALCUE-NET) or BiodivERsA, a consortium of European organisations that fund research on biodiversity. Both have been funded under the 7th and 8th Framework Programme (ALCUE-NET 2016e: 11-16; 2017d: 1). In 2016, ALCUE-NET and BiodivERsA published an analysis on biodiversity research collaboration between Europe and LAC. It showed that the scientific communities of both regions have taken up the challenge of working together on biodiversity and climate change (Dangles/Loirat 2016: 22).

Besides setting up the basis for initiatives such as ALCUE-NET or BiodivERsA, the different multi-annual Framework Programmes represent a central frame for the development of bi-regional cooperation on biodiversity and climate change. Seven projects involving both European and LAC countries have been implemented under FP6 (2000-2006); nine additional projects were implemented as part of FP7 (2007-2013) (ALCUE-NET 2014: 9-10). The current FP8 (2014-2020) also includes projects. It launched several calls of bi-regional scope taking biodiversity and climate change into account. As part of the third funding period (2018-2020) and embedded in the thematic pillar on societal challenges, three calls existed, one addressing “interrelations between climate change, biodiversity and ecosystem services” (EC 2017l), one focusing on “international cooperation on sustainable urbanisation: nature-based solutions for restoration and rehabilitation of urban ecosystems” (EC 2017j), and the third launching a “multi-stakeholder dialogue platform to promote nature-based solutions to societal challenges” (EC 2017m).

Despite the increasing attention received in political dialogues, the diversification of energy sources has been so far poorly developed as a subject of concrete bi-regional programmes and projects. Currently, it appears only within bilateral cooperation schemes with Brazil on biofuels and with Mexico on geothermal energy (EC 2017i: 9). The 2017 EU-CELAC Roadmap for S&T Co-operation encourages participation of the CELAC research communities in the 8th Framework Programme, Horizon 2020 and the development of a project focusing on sustainable deployment of second-generation biofuels in the rural areas of Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay (EC 2017i: 6, 9).

Regarding the diversity of knowledge forms and practices, so called “traditional and ancestral knowledge” has been acknowledged as politically important. However, this political recognition has not been translated into concrete programmes or thematic priorities. The various SOM Working Groups do not seem to have taken up the topic, at least if we take publicly accessible documents into account. In a document from the 2008-2010 EULAKS Programme “Connecting Research on the Knowledge Society in the European Union and Latin America” some critical remarks are made regarding the role of “ancestral and traditional knowledge” and the risk of privatization of these knowledge practices (Zuckerfeld 2009: 73-75). At national levels, this is underpinned by the fact that only six LAC countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru) address the promotion of ancestral knowledge systems through specific policy instruments (Bermúdez/ Aguirre-Bastos 2017: 4). Nevertheless, at least one of the projects show-cased under the EU-LAC Knowledge Area makes explicit acknowledgment of the role of traditional knowledge systems. The 2009-2014 bi-regional network VALORAM (Valorising Andean microbial diversity through sustainable intensification of potato-based farming systems) seeks to connect “the most advanced genomics and other frontier research with traditional knowledge about farming systems centred on potatoes” (EC 2010b: 16).

### **c) Impacts, Achievements and Challenges**

In the scientific dimension of the bi-regional relations between EU and CELAC, diversity is addressed in manifold ways within the sphere of political dialogue and in the scope of policies and programmes. As described above, the science-diversity nexus is particularly evident in the contexts of biological diversity and the diversification of energy sources. Both topics are highlighted as being of common political and societal interest. They are

pursued at the regional level with the aim of providing technical support for their inclusion into political dialogue and joint cooperation projects. Thus, biological diversity (in conjunction with climate change) and energy are regularly treated in specialised Working Groups of the Senior Officials' Meetings (SOM) on S&T. Especially in the case of biological diversity this approach has led to its multiple consideration within the framework of bi-regional programmes. Examples for this are the projects BIOVEL (2011-2014 Biodiversity virtual e-laboratory) and ROBIN (2011-2015 Role of biodiversity in climate change mitigation), both realized under the 7th Framework Programme (FP7 2007-2013) (CORDIS 2017 b/c).

The successful establishment of biological diversity as a topic of common interest, its inclusion into different schemes of political dialogue and its consideration in bi-regional cooperation projects are important achievements. The case of biological diversity shows in a paradigmatic way, how a multidimensional, complex topic, can be positioned and developed in dynamic ways within the frame of the EU-CELAC relations. In contrast, the example of "ancestral and traditional knowledge" highlights how a topic important for assuring cultural diversity in the future can reach its limits in the bi-regional arena. It is developed in more concrete forms at the sub-regional level, for example in the Andean region or at the multilateral level in relation to UN Conventions (e.g. ILO 169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, UNESCO conventions on cultural diversity, UN Convention on Biological Diversity). Due to the varying importance given to the topic of ancestral and traditional knowledge within both regions, its embeddedness in the scientific dimension of the bi-regional relations should be reconsidered.

#### **4.2.4 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC SUSTAINABILITY**

In the scientific dimension of bi-regional EU-LAC relations, sustainability is defined by two related concepts that are important research paradigms in both the natural and the social sciences: "sustainable development" and later "sustainability". While both terms are of common use in both social and natural science research, the former is not typically addressed by basic research in the natural sciences. In the context of EU-LAC scientific relations there has also been a tendency to associate certain research topics, approaches and technologies with sustainability and in the case of the technological applications, to treat them as synonymous with one another.

##### **a) Political Dialogue**

Since 1999 EU-LAC Summit documents have given continuous attention to the term "sustainable development" (EU-LAC Summit 1999: § 5, 17-18, 20). Sustainable development is a focus that is closely tied to a well-established development agenda at the multilateral level in which socioeconomic issues are prominent. In terms of research, sustainable development is addressed through the lens of socioeconomic inequality and social exclusion, that is to say core themes of social sciences. At the same time, in recent years there has been an emergent tendency to emphasize sustainability in a way that is decoupled from this former emphasis on development. Despite the common semantic root, the parallel emphasis on sustainability tout court appears to reveal a change in policy emphasis outlining a new role for science and technology.

In EU-LAC Summit documents, “sustainable development” has not been supplanted by, but has been complemented by the related but different notion of “sustainability”. Sustainable development remains important as an “overarching priority for collaborative research” (Fresco et al. 2013: 73) for the European Research Council (ERC). At the same time, from the Madrid Summit in 2010 and the establishment of the Joint Initiative for Research and Innovation (JIRI) onwards (EU-LAC Summit 2010: § 41-42), “sustainability” has been used in close relation to and even synonymously with certain technologies, considered to be sustainable, and closely linked to the term “green economy” (EU-CELAC Summits 2013a: § 40; 2015a: 27). The concept of “green economy” rose to global prominence in 2012 via the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), among others. This approach to sustainability is reflected in the publication of the EU’s Bioeconomy Strategy, also published in 2012 under the Title, “Innovating for Sustainable Growth: A Bioeconomy for Europe” (EC 2012d: 1). Although themes associated with the older agenda of sustainable development - climate change, energy or health - remain prominent, they are now addressed with the framework of “green economy”. A special feature of this new research agenda are the close interconnections with scientific-technological innovations, which implies a focus on natural sciences and technology development (EC 2012d: 2-7).

At the 6th and 7th Senior Officials’ Meetings (SOM) on Science and Technology (S&T) in 2017 sustainability was considered as a common priority for bi-regional S&T cooperation. In particular, sustainable urbanisation was emphasized as an area for joint collaboration, encompassing a broad range of topics, such as soil and water pollution, loss of biodiversity, waste management, electrification and urban mobility. Another key area of future S&T cooperation is sustainable agriculture; this relates to issues such as plant breeding, diseases, soil management, animal health and fisheries management (EC 2017g: §8a-b; 2017h: §10b-c; 2017i: 9-10).

## **b) Policies and Programmes**

Bi-regional policies and programmes associated with sustainable development do not necessarily use the term “sustainable” in an explicit way. But they are conceptualized with the goal of contributing to sustainability. The Working Groups of the Senior Officials’ Meetings (SOM) on Science and Technology (S&T) identified bioeconomy, energy, climate services and sustainable urbanization as key thematic areas for transregional collaboration. In several conferences the EU has promoted the green economy or bioeconomy as a pathway for sustainable development. One example is the conference “Transforming life sciences knowledge into new, sustainable, eco-efficient and competitive products” organized in 2005 (EC 2005b). At this conference the EU Commissioner for Science and Research, Janez Potočnik underlined that the EU “is very interested in finding solutions that lie in the life sciences and biotechnology, because these are sustainable solutions that can help us find a balance between the needs of our economies and our environment” (EC 2005b). At the 2010 Madrid Summit (EU-LAC Summit 2010: § 39-42) research on bioeconomy and the development of green technologies have been highlighted as ways to achieve the “sustainable transformation of biological resources”. As the SOM Working Group on Bioeconomy defines more precisely, this means “the development of sustainable processes for the transformation of biomass in added-value products” (ALCUE-NET 2016c: Annex IV).



Sustainable urbanization came into the spotlight of Senior Officials' Meetings (SOM) on Science and Technology (S&T) and has been addressed since 2017 by a special task force. It was included as a research theme of common bi-regional interest into project calls set-up within the third funding period (2018-2020) of Horizon 2020. In the 8th Framework Programme it is embedded in the thematic pillar on societal challenges. It is connected with the UN Sustainable Development Goals on sustainable cities and actions against climate change (ALCUE-NET 2017a: 4; EC 2017i: 9). The first call focuses on "strengthening international cooperation on sustainable urbanisation: nature-based solutions for restoration and rehabilitation of urban ecosystems" (EC 2017j), whereas the second call emphasizes "urban mobility and sustainable electrification in large urban areas in developing and emerging economies" (EC 2017k).

Sustainability has also been addressed as a thematic umbrella in the ongoing Transformations to Sustainability Programme (2017-2022). This programme was first implemented in the 2016-2017 funding period of Horizon 2020. The programme aspires to "develop understanding of and promote research on transformations to sustainability which are of significant social, economic and policy concern throughout the world" and aims to cultivate "durable research collaboration across multiple borders, disciplinary boundaries, and with practitioners and societal partners" (NORFACE 2018; EC 2015c). Within the programmes' scope, six out of 12 research projects considered LAC regions (South America, Amazonian Basin) or took specific European (Germany, United Kingdom, Finland) and LAC countries (Brazil, Nicaragua, Chile, and Peru) into account. Five of these cooperation projects are reciprocally organized, as their research teams include both, European and Latin American researchers (NORFACE 2018).

### **c) Impacts, Achievements and Challenges**

To assess the impact of the topic of sustainability on the scientific dimension of bi-regional relations, it is important to note that, in comparison to other cross-cutting issues analysed in this report, the use of sustainability is characterized by making reference to a broad range of definitions. In addition, diverse indicators of sustainability and sustainable practices are taken into account. Moreover, what is considered sustainable has been (re)defined within the context of EU-LAC scientific relations through particular technologies that are themselves per se assumed to be sustainable.

Policy documents that frame the bi-regional scientific relation such as the Concept Note of the EU-CELAC Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) on Science and Technology (S&T) (ALCUE-NET 2016b) state that "new technologies and technology transfer underpin[s] sustainable socio-economic development" (ALCUE-NET 2016b: 3). According to the Santiago Declaration of 2013, the green economy is seen as "one of the important tools available for achieving sustainable development" (EU-CELAC Summit 2013a: § 40). The kinds of sustainable green technologies associated with these processes are described in documents such as the 2016 Thematic Report of the SOM Working Group on Bioeconomy. The Working Group underlines that intensification technologies such as no-till farming, genetically modified organisms, i.e., molecular engineering, biofuels and in general other biotechnologies can be seen in principle as "ecological" (ALCUE-NET 2016c: 4).

This definition of certain technologies as per se sustainable creates a set of potential question marks in the sense of promoting and producing valid and useful scientific research. First, technologies cannot be seen as independent of the social relations that frame them at a given point in time. The impact of this perspective is that scientific research is restrained to those opinions which do consider these technologies to be sustainable, at the detriment of other positions within the scientific field questioning the sustainability of those same technologies. Also, possible conflicts of interest exist between the promotion of these technologies as sustainable following interests of industries that want to sell these technologies. This risk has to be discussed carefully given the fact that the sustainable technologies associated with bioeconomy are to “be advanced as a working model for S&T cooperation” between the two regions (ALCUE-NET 2016c: 5).

It is an achievement that the issue of sustainability has managed to become a mainstay of the agenda, not only at the political levels of regional cooperation but also as one of the research priorities as shown by the types of projects prioritized in programme calls, mobility schemes and funding priorities for research in both regions.

At the same time, care must be taken to avoid language that a priori would assume that certain research approaches and in particular certain technologies would themselves be sustainable as such. Here, it is important to emphasize a basic insight of critical studies of technologies in the social sciences, highlighting that technologies cannot be considered as autonomous entities independently of the social context—including the scientific, social and political context—in which they emerge and into which they are inserted. As a result, it would be adequate for the SOM Working Group on Bioeconomy to examine in more detail empirical studies that have dealt with the impact of the use of so-called genetic modification, no-till farming, biofuels, the removal of “residual biomass”—all of which are assessed in the report as “sustainable”—in order to evaluate whether or not these can be said to be used sustainably in the Latin American context (ALCUE-NET 2016c: 19; 10).

In this context, it is a good development that the SOM Working Group on Bioeconomy proposed the creation of a Bioeconomy Observatory (ALCUE-NET 2016a: 4). The objective of the Bioeconomy Observatory is to “promote [the] bioeconomy in CELAC by facilitating its knowledge to the general public and stakeholder”, to “promote business development and support investment decisions in the related sectors” or to “provide a promotion tool to increase the levels of social acceptance of the Bioeconomy principles, sectors and products” (ALCUE-NET 2016a: 5). This means that the observatory’s role seems to be to promote bioeconomy and green technologies, and not so much to develop critical assessments of biotechnologies and their potentials to strengthen sustainability. A key element of a critical assessment would be to include different perspectives, that is to say to consider civil society beyond business sectors or political stakeholders (ALCUE-NET 2016c: 6).

# 5. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION

## 5.1 THE REGIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN EUROPE AND LAC

In the context of EU – LAC relations, the term “social” is used in quite diverse and ambiguous ways, both within each region as at the bi-regional level. The EULAC Focus’ Plan of Action will use the term with a restricted meaning, in conformity with its meaning in the framework of the TFEU currently in force. For the purposes of this Working Paper, we’ll use it with the wider meaning that is usually given to the term in mainstream literature.

### 5.1.1 European Union

It can be argued that the “logic” of the European integration process is very different from that of the setting up of the different models of European welfare states, with their associated sets of social policies. However, for the purposes of this Report, we will follow the standard literature which assumes that the importance of the social dimension for the European integration process is traceable, on the one hand, through the constitutive treaties<sup>15</sup> – Rome (1957), Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997) and Lisbon (2009). On the other hand, the interdependencies between economic integration and the social dimension are at the basis of one of the European Union’s principal goals: the creation of a competitive social market economy (EC 2017p: 34; Goudswaard/Riel 2004: 2-3; Naumann/Brodie 2016: 2; Cechin/Mihut et al. 2013: 18).

Thus, the different phases of economic integration since the 1950s were accompanied by efforts to develop some sort of a common social policy on the EU level: first the need to ensure the principle of labour mobility by guaranteeing workers’ rights and social benefits in the host country (Treaty of Rome 1957, articles 48-51); second the necessity to reduce socio-economic inequalities between EU member states or entire regions within Europe by enhancing social cohesion, increasing life standards, work conditions and levels of social protection (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, articles 1.2, 1.5, 2.2, 58-59), primarily with the aim to minimize social dumping and “social tourism” in relation with labour mobility; and third the need to ensure healthier and better educated workforce in order to enhance economic efficiency (Cechin/Mihut et al. 2013: 21-22; Naumann/Brodie 2016: 3).

For some authors, the role of the EU in the social dimension is first of all “[...] to ensure national policies, or to initiate measures which are to be applied according to methods established by each Member State” (Cechin/Mihut et al. 2013: 18). In the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, Art. 4.2, 151-164) social policy is established as one of the areas with shared competences between the EU and its member states. However, several fields, such as social protection or welfare systems (e.g. social insurance, minimum wages, labour market policies, taxation), remain exclusively in the scope of national sovereignty. This does not apply for the EU anti-discrimination principles with regard to labour mobility, which remains one of the “founding principles” of the EU Treaties since the Treaty of Rome. They guarantee EU citizens access to the benefits of health protection and

15. For further details regarding the EU in the domain of social policy see EULAC Focus 2019f.

security systems in other member states when they settle there (Goudswaard/Riel 2004: 3; Naumann/Brodie 2016: 3; Eichhorst/Kendzia et al. 2010: 21). The EU has also created a number of programmes and Structural Funds in order to enhance social cohesion, even if their approach is more “territorial” than based on the correction of individual inequalities. They intend to diminish negative social impacts of regional economic integration and globalisation within its member states (Vanhercke 2012: 5-6; Cechin/Mihut et al. 2013: 20).

In its external relations, the EU is, somehow paradoxically, less restricted in taking action on social issues. This is related to the fact, that the EU can include a “social dimension” in a broad sense within one of its autonomous policies: that of development cooperation, for which already in the middle of the 1960s a specific legal basis was introduced in the Single European Act. The external dimension of EU social policy and its respective specifications encompass a wide range of topics, such as the reduction of poverty and its eradication in the long term, the promotion of decent work and labour standards in non-member countries or the promotion of inclusive and sustainable growth and development (Mestrum 2015: 5-8; Eichhorst/Kendzia et al. 2010: 16; Bossuyt 2009: 704, 722).

Since the beginning of the new millennium, the EU has shown growing commitment towards the incorporation of social priorities into its external relations. The still predominant market-oriented policies got more balanced by social policies which in sum showed “a strong ambition to contribute to the social dimension of globalization” (Eichhorst/Kendzia et al. 2010: 16). However, the large number of actors involved in social topics and the division of competences between different bodies lead to complex decision-making processes and make it difficult to implement a harmonized external social policy (Eichhorst/Kendzia et al. 2010: 21). External action in this area follows the usual legislative procedure involving the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. Initiatives and many aspects of implementation are at the charge of different DGs in the European Commission, mainly, the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) and the Directorate-General for Trade (DG TRADE).

The European External Action Service (EEAS) also plays an important role in terms of interlocution with third countries. Established by the 2010 Lisbon Treaty as the EU’s diplomatic service, the EEAS is responsible for the coherence of the area’s objectives, policies and actions with the EU’s external relations, as those have to represent the values and fundamental interests of the EU. EEAS objectives and policies in development cooperation also ought to be complementary to the member states’ initiatives and vice versa, without undermining each other’s competences. It is not always easy to ensure complementarity, especially with regard to the combination of development cooperation and the field of social policy on the EU level, because to the in-ward it is mainly dominated by the member states and to the outward more coordinated by the EU itself (Mestrum 2015: 6-8; Eichhorst/Kendzia et al. 2010: 21).

DG DEVCO and its cooperation office EuropeAid are responsible for defining and implementing the EU’s development cooperation policy. Implementation takes place mainly in the framework of three financing instruments: a) the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI, 2014-2020) which includes thematic and geographic assistance programmes concerning low income countries, e.g. in Latin America or South-East

Asia; b) the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI, 2014-2020, formerly European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) aimed at fostering stabilisation, security and prosperity in the EU's Mediterranean and East European neighbour countries; c) the European Development Fund (EDF). While DCI and ENI are completely financed from the EU budget, the EDF is financed by the member states and is therefore subject to a parallel set of rules. The EDF is directed to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to overseas countries and territories (OCTs) (Mestrum 2015: 6, 14; EEAS 2016; EC 2018a; 2018b).

The mandate and activities of DG ECHO encompass the interventions in case of disasters, crisis or catastrophes – such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake – in order to “save and preserve life, prevent and alleviate human suffering and safeguard the integrity and dignity of populations” (Mestrum 2015: 6; EC 2018q; 2018r).

DG TRADE is a key element of the EU's international presence, as the Union has exclusive powers in the area of external trade and acts as a single player (Eichhorst/Kendzia et al. 2010: 21). For decades, the establishment of a “trade-social nexus” (Kerremans/Orbie 2009: 630) within EU external relations has been notable. Of particular importance in this context are the design and implementation of autonomous instruments – such as the System of Generalized Preferences, but also through the inclusion of specific social sections or chapters into bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). The basic purpose of FTAs, however, continues to be “to increase European investment opportunities and market access in key emerging and developing economies in Asia and Latin America” (Bossuyt 2009: 706). Despite committing the contracting parties to dialogue on social issues and integrating agendas on decent work (international labour standards) and on sustainable development into the trade agreements, civil society organizations have criticized the approach of the EU. They accuse DG TRADE, and the European Union as a whole, of giving more priority to promoting EU competitiveness by exploring new markets rather than promoting social cohesion in partner countries (Kerremans/Orbie 2009: 633; Manners 2009: 794; Bossuyt 2009: 704ff.). The consideration of social issues within the framework of FTAs also serves in their opinion to legitimize these agreements. Nevertheless, DG TRADE's proactive approach to social issues can be considered as an important contribution to the promotion of the EU's external social agenda (Bossuyt 2009: 716). In summary, despite the increasing consideration of social aspects in FTAs, the main contributions of the EU's external social policy are to be found in the areas of foreign and development policy (Kerremans, Orbie 2009: 640).

### **Latin America and the Caribbean**

Since the 1990s, the social dimension has gained in importance in the various Latin American and Caribbean cooperation and integration processes. This initially applied to regional mechanisms such as SICA, CARICOM, CAN and MERCOSUR, and later also to the regional level, where social issues were taken up in the context of CALC and CELAC. The consideration of the social dimension in the various integration mechanisms reveals similarities and differences. The latter are related to different thematic priorities of integration, diverse institutional backbone of each mechanism, and the dissimilar positioning of the integration initiative in the context of regional and international challenges. In most of the cases the consideration of the social dimension was

connected to the axis of economic integration. In the case of MERCOSUR, it was meant as a supplement to counterbalance the economic crisis of the 1990s. CARICOM's efforts on labour and social policy previous to the launch of the Common Single Market Economy (CSME) in 2006 should have helped anticipating the social effects of a deeper economic integration. The members of the Pacific Alliance consider the social dimension as complementary to economic cooperation. They also expect it to promote growth and competitiveness. In contrast to these examples, in the case of ALBA the social dimension has a priority compared to the economic dimension (Baert et al. 2008: 19-21; Blackett 2007: 38-42; Díaz 2015: 15; Hernández/Chaudary 2015: 12; Mark/Oxman 2002: 1; Riggirozzi 2014: 437-439).

At the **regional level**, that means in the context of CELAC and the antecedent Summits of Latin America and the Caribbean Heads of States and Government for Development and Integration (CALC, 2008-2010), the social dimension was given attention in the scope of political dialogue. This included Summit Declarations, Annual Action Plans, and continuous ministerial meetings. In addition, an exchange with sub-regional institutions and mechanisms active in the social field was maintained. Reducing extreme poverty and inequalities, eradicating hunger, ensuring food security and universalizing health were defined as social priorities at the regional level (CALC 2011: § 23, 33, 34; CELAC 2011: § 30; CELAC 2012; SELA 2014; 2015a; Itamaraty 2017: § 5, 6; UNESCO 2014). In 2015, CELAC adopted a Plan for Food and Nutrition Security and the Eradication of Hunger 2025. The plan was supported by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC/CEPAL) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Central aspects of it are the coordination of food security strategies, and the sustainable access to food and nutritional wellbeing (FAO 2015: 8-14; SELA 2015b; Itamaraty 2016: §1). The 2015 CELAC Action Plan of Public Policy on Social Matters included issues like the universalization of health, specific programmes on alphabetization and post-alphabetization, as well as the universalization of education (SELA 2015c).

In the **Andean region**, four phases of socio-political influence can be identified within the framework of regional integration. During the 1970s, the Andean Pact focused primarily on co-operation between the member states in the health sector (1971 Hipólito Unánue Convention), the regulation on intraregional migration (1973 Andean Migration Card) and the establishment of an exchange forum between labour ministers, employers and employees (1973 Simón Rodríguez Agreement). With the conversion of the Andean Pact into the Andean Community (CAN) in 1996, social issues became even more important. The deepening liberalisation of regional trade was accompanied by the establishment of advisory formats on issues such as business, safety and health at work, labour migration, and social security (1998 Andean Labour Advisory Council and Andean Business Advisory Council). Ministerial exchange on labour was formalised, intraregional travel facilitated and the Andean Instruments of Labour Migration and Social Security (2003) were set. The establishment of the Andean Network of Employment (RED ANDES) and the regional Certification of Labour Competencies (CERTIANDINA) gave ground to a third phase of a regional labour and social policy. In 2004, CAN adopted an Integral Plan of Social Development. Cross-border travel within the Community was facilitated by the introduction of a common passport in 2005. The spectrum of issues addressed was further amplified by the 2009 Andean Programme on Gender Equality and Equal Opportunities. The intro-

duction of the Andean Labour Card (2008) aimed at facilitating regional labour migration through the mutual recognition of university titles, labour law guarantees and access to social security and pensions. The current phase is marked by a nexus of social and development-specific concerns (2010 Andean Strategic Agenda). Programmatic guidelines and activities have been extended to food security, rural development and social and economic cohesion. Issues like the establishment of the Andean citizenship have been added to the agenda. Most recently – with the aim of reducing poverty and achieving social justice – the Andean Goals of Economic and Social Development (OANDES) were formulated as quantifiable and measurable objectives to be achieved by 2019 (Baert et al. 2008: 18-19; CAN 2016: 34-45; CAN 2018; Riggirozzi 2014: 437; SELA 2007: 9-19).

In **Central America**, the growing importance of social aspects was recognized when the Central American Integration System (SICA) was founded in 1993. Also, the establishment of the Alliance on Sustainable Development in Central America (ALIDES) in 1994 and the adoption of the Treaty of Social Integration in Central America in 1995 underline the relevance of the social dimension. ALIDES focused on the integral development of the SICA member states and the Central American region as a whole. The reduction of extreme poverty and the social reintegration of displaced people were formulated as central objectives. Later, further objectives were added in the areas of sustainable development, environment protection, eradication of violence, and economic and social justice (SELA 2007: 30). The 1995 Treaty built the basis for today's institutional embeddedness and differentiation of the social dimension within the framework of SICA. The Secretariat of Social Integration in Central America (SISCA) as well as the Council of Social Integration in Central America (CIS) play leading roles in technical and political terms. There are also a number of specific advisory and exchange bodies. In order to strengthen social integration at the regional level, SICA pursues various approaches. This includes the formulation of regional policy guidelines, the implementation of regional programmes and the coordination and gradual harmonisation of member states' social policies. The topics prioritised in this context are education and culture, health, nutrition and food security, housing and human settlements, gender equality, labour and social security as well as local development. In 2006, four Central American countries agreed on a common passport (Baert et al. 2008: 21). On the other hand, regulations on labour migration and migrant workers' rights are still difficult challenges at the regional level (Ruiz Estrada 2015). The most recent activities of SICA in the field of social integration include the implementation of a Regional Programme on Nutrition and Food Security (PRESANCA), a Regional Policy on Gender Equality (2013), a three years Regional Action Plan on Poverty and Social Protection (2017), and the Regional Intersectoral Agenda on Social Protection and Productive Inclusion with Equity (2018-2030) (Baert et al. 2008: 21; Jácome 2008: 6; Ruiz Estrada 2015; SELA 2007: 29-34; SICA 2013; 2017c; 2018a; 2018b; 2018c).

The **Caribbean Community** (CARICOM) initially paid little attention to the social dimension. The main objective was to create a common market that by itself would reduce economic imbalances between stronger and less developed member states. The common market was gradually transformed into a single market economy in order to improve the region's competitive position in the international market. The strategic repositioning was accompanied by fundamental structural and substantive innovations which intended to make the region "socially integrated and economically viable" (Jácome 2008: 5). In the

course of the expansion and deepening of regional integration, policy guidelines on labour and industrial relations (1995), social security (1996) and a separate Charter of Civil Society (1997) were drawn up. The Charter of Civil Society referred to the foundations necessary to strengthen a vibrant civil society: freedom of movement, freedom of association, gender equality and fundamental labour law aspects such as equal access to work, to social security and to health at work. The Charter established the development of regional model laws aimed at harmonising national labour legislation in CARICOM member states. Despite certain tendencies towards convergence, the effectiveness of these rules is poor because of the domestic institutional reality and the competitive pressures of the global market (Mark/Oxman 2002: 26).

In 2002 CARICOM established a Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD). Central tasks were the sectorial improvement of health, education, living and working conditions of workers as well as of youth and women in the Community. In 2003 the Caribbean Association of National Training Agencies (CANTA) was launched as a regional qualification framework. A joint CARICOM passport was created in 2005 in order to facilitate travelling within the region. In 2006, the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME) came into force. In subsequent years, the issues of health and food safety increasingly became part of the regional policy agenda. The launch of the Caribbean Agricultural Health and Food Safety Agency (CAHFSA) in 2010 pointed to the strengthening of agricultural health and food safety. The Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA), established in 2011, endeavours a harmonization of regional public health arrangements (Baert et al. 2008: 21; Blackett 2007: 33-44; CARICOM 2013a; 2013b; 2015; 2018a; 2018b; Jácome 2008: 5-6; Mark/Oxman 2002: 1, 26; Martínez 2013: 22-23).

In the same way as Caricom, also the **Common Southern Market** (MERCOSUR) initially was concerned almost exclusively with economic issues. However, the effects of the regional and economic crises of the 1990s led to a rethinking of the overall orientation. Awareness about the importance of social aspects as part of the regional integration process increased. The election of more leftist presidents in various member states of MERCOSUR in the first decade of the new millennium created the conditions for greater consideration of the social dimension (Pucheta 2014: 13-14). This was reflected in the establishment of specific advisory bodies as the 1994 created Economic and Social Consultation Forum (FCES). As part of the political dialogue, the social dimension was established as a permanent issue of the agenda in 2000 during the Meeting of Ministers and High Authorities of Social Development (RMADS). By the Agreement on Social Security in 1997, a coordination mechanism between the social welfare systems of the member states in favour of MERCOSUR's migrant workers was established. The Social-Labour Declaration of 1998 pointed to the recognition of fundamental labour rights and the "obligation to practice non-discrimination and effective equal rights in employment or occupation" (Pucheta 2014: 13). The 2003 Buenos Aires Consensus reaffirmed both the central role of member states in implementing social policies and the creation of new regional institutions and policies. According to the 2007 Declaration of Principles of Social MERCOSUR, deepening social inclusion should be a priority over economic integration. This included a common Social Labour Strategy. The Structural Fund of Convergence (FOCEM) was created as a financing instrument for regional projects to strengthen social cohesion. The Social Institute of MERCOSUR (ISM) should develop, promote and implement regional social policies. By 2021 there should be a



common MERCOSUR citizenship to facilitate free movement within the common area. Despite the prioritisation of the social dimension for regional integration during this phase, the Strategic Plan for Social Action (2011) highlighted the close connection between economic and social policies to guarantee an equal integration (Baert et al. 2008: 19-21; Pucheta 2014: 11-15; Riggiozzi 2017: 9; 2014: 439; Saguier/Brent 2015: 144-145).

For the **Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA)**, the social dimension played a key role right from the start. The main focus was on activities implemented under the approach of “social diplomacy” (Hernández/Chaudary 2015: 5-6). In order to reduce poverty and to promote social development, the programmes targeted the less developed countries of the region and focused on three areas: education, health and nutrition, and food security. The programmes were largely financed from Venezuelan oil revenues channelled into the ALBA-Caribbean Fund created in 2005. The technical implementation of the programmes – also known as “missions” – was mainly realized with Cuban support. The fund financed 88 projects, of which around 70% addressed to social issues (SELA 2015d: 24). ALBA encouraged the creation of a number of social institutions. These included a drug registration agency (ALBAMED) and an institution for the production of pharmaceuticals (ALBAFARMA). The political dialogue on health topics was supported by a permanent exchange platform for ALBA Ministers of Health (AL-BAPROR). Food security should be promoted through the establishment of public-owned food producers (ALBA-ALIMENTOS) (Absell 2012: 75-77; CFS 2012; Gallo 2017: 4-5; Hernández/Chaudary 2015: 5-14; SELA 2015d: 3-24).

The **Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)**, founded in 2008, also acknowledged the importance of the social dimension. In its Constitutive Treaty (UNASUR 2008: § 2, 3), the organization assigned an important role to social issues in order to reduce the “regional social deficit” (Riggiozzi/Yeates 2015: 222-223). The Union’s main activities focused on the establishment of ministerial councils, the adoption of action plans and the launch of permanent institutions. Already in 2008, the South American Council on Health (CSS) was founded and the Action Plan 2010-2015 was adopted. The plan focused on the creation of a regional network of health surveillance, the development of universal health systems and the access to medication. In 2011, the South American Government Health Institute (ISAGS) was established as a regional think tank on health matters. The 2009 launch of the South American Council of Social Development (CSDS) led to the establishment of numerous working groups on socio-political issues at regional level. In addition, biennial action plans have been adopted for the years 2009-2011, 2012-2014 and 2015-2017 (Riggiozzi 2014: 440-443; 2017: 9-10; Riggiozzi/Yeates 2015: 222-224; Saguier/Brent 2015: 143; SELA 2015e: 17, 24; UNASUR 2008; 2018a; 2018b; 2018c).

The Pacific Alliance (AP) refers to social issues as a rather complementary facet of economic integration. At the institutional level, the social dimension is addressed through technical working groups. For example, there is a Technical Group on Labour. It deals with the rights of intraregional migrant workers and the promotion of information exchange on regulatory standards (Angeles 2016: 1-5; AP 2018; Díaz 2015: 13-15; Echebarría/Estevadeordal 2014: 27-28).

## 5.2 THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF EU-(CE)LAC-RELATIONS

A number of factors affect the bi-regional relationship between the EU and CELAC in the social dimension. These include the competences and thematic priorities of the actors on both sides of the Atlantic. There are similarities as well as differences. In both regions, social policy is first and foremost a competence of national governments. However, on the EU side, there are some limitations to national sovereignty in the social dimension. These include, in particular, the anti-discrimination rules on labour mobility. They are mandatory for all member states and thus limit the autonomy of national labour and social policy. CARICOM has made efforts to harmonize social policies, but this is always subject to the consensus of all its members.

As part of Latin American regional and sub-regional integration efforts, socio-political issues are dealt with exclusively in intergovernmental fora and with a coordinating rationale. In some cases, social topics are also addressed by permanent organizations that play an advisory role. As mentioned above, in the case of the EU too, inward social policy competences are relatively limited, but, in addition, the EU has competences to pursue social policy initiatives towards external partners.

With regard to the thematic priorities, labour mobility and labour legislation in the context of economic integration are of common interest for EU as well as LAC integration initiatives on sub-regional level. Even with different orientation, the topic of poverty eradication is shared between the EU and its most populous LAC counterparts: CELAC and UNASUR. In the EU, the programmatic attention to poverty eradication goes back to the 1970s. The focus nowadays lies on counterbalancing the social consequences of globalization and regional economic integration within its member states. LAC programmatic efforts in this scope are more recent and of a more divergent focus. Whereas UNASUR aims at reducing the regional social deficit attributed to decades of neoliberal policies, CELAC focusses on nutrition security and eradication of hunger.

The foreign policy guidelines of the European Union towards Latin America and the Caribbean went through a process of redefinition between 2005 and 2009. Main developments prior to this process were the realization of bi-annual Summits between both regions since 1999, and the establishment of cooperation frameworks of different type and scale – EU-MERCOSUR (1999), EU-Mexico (1997) and EU-Chile (1997 and 2002-05). In the context of this relationship pattern, the social dimension was already of importance. Ministerial meetings on social security or the highlighting of social cohesion as a shared goal during the 2004 EU-LAC Summit represented a cross sectional component in the course of bi-regional dialogue. In the EU-Mexico global agreement (EU 1997: § 36) and in the EU-Chile association agreement (EU 2002: § 44), socio-political topics were considered as a particular field of cooperation. The EUROsociAL programme, launched in 2004, systematically tackled social issues (EC 2006: 25).

On the EU's side, the modification of the structural framework of bi-regional relations aimed at strengthening these relations. The EU's new foreign policy guidelines aspired "to tailor political, trade and cooperation relations more to the actual situation of each [...] [LAC country and sub-region]" (EC 2005a: 9), taking into account recent developments,

challenges and complexities of the integration processes in the LAC region (EC 2005a: 9). On this basis, the expansion and deepening of the EU-LAC relations took place on various levels – bilateral, sub-regional and bi-regional. This development was particularly noticeable in the area of the EU's foreign trade relations. The trade-agreements with Mexico and Chile were complemented by partly implemented agreements with CARIFORUM (2008), Central America (2012), Peru/Colombia/Ecuador (2012/2016) and ongoing negotiations with MERCOSUR (EC 2006: 18; 2018c). The repercussions of the guidelines' modification on the bi-regional level were favoured by the establishment of the CELAC in 2011 (Gardini/Ayuso 2015: 17). Another important change was the reorganisation of the competences of development policy within the European Union in 2010. While the co-ordinative patronage of this area lies with the EEAS, the responsibility for policy formulation and implementation lies primarily with the DG DEVCO and its cooperation office EuropeAid.

An important basis for strengthening the social dimension of bi-regional relations was provided by the 2004 EU-LAC Summit and the subsequent redefinition of the EU's foreign policy guidelines towards Latin America and the Caribbean. They led to common thematic foci and strategic goals. The promotion of social cohesion was considered to be fundamental for the fight against poverty, the reduction of inequalities and the consolidation of democracy. Social cohesion was also highlighted as a key factor for enhancing equal access to employment and the benefits of economic growth (EC 2005a: 12-13; 2006: 23-25). Whereas in the European experience, the promotion of social cohesion is an indispensable component for regional integration (EC 2006: 24), its importance from the perspective of LAC institutions – such as CEPAL – is assessed differently: “growth needs equality and equality needs growth” (EP 2011a: 11). Nevertheless, both regions share the aspiration “of building socially cohesive and inclusive societies” (Sanahuja 2015: 36). In 2009, the European Commission reaffirmed the continuous importance of its strategic objectives towards Latin America and the Caribbean: strengthening political dialogue, pursuing regional integration and promoting social cohesion (EC 2009c: 1).

In order to understand how the social dimension is taken into account in the framework of current bi-regional relations, we have to focus on how social issues, in a broad sense, are given continuity within the schemes of political dialogue, trade-related cooperation and development cooperation.

In the sphere of political dialogue, the social dimension is continuously addressed in the course of the EU-CELAC Summits in 2013 and 2015 and in the scope of the respective action plans. Besides the corroboration of common efforts on social inclusion and cohesion (in relation to education, employment, regional integration and interconnectivity), the establishment of an EU-LAC Ministerial Forum on Education, Innovation and Social Inclusion was proposed (EU-CELAC Summits 2013a; 2013b; 2015c). The political dialogue also turned its attention to the continuation and extension of bi-regional cooperation programmes related to the social dimension – such as the Cooperation Programme on Drug Policies (COPOLAD, since 2010), EUROcLIMA (since 2010) and EUROsociAL (since 2005) – as well as to the intensification of thematic exchanges through the creation of new dialogue fora. This includes the EU-CELAC Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs, a platform for national drug coordination bodies for exchange of experiences, good practices and information. In addition, previously established mechanisms have been con-

tinued, such as the EU-CELAC Structured and Comprehensive Bi-regional Dialogue on Migration – also known as EU-CELAC Project on Migration – launched in 2009 (EC 2018f; 2018g; 2018h; 2018i).

The social dimension also plays an increasing role in the areas of economic cooperation and development cooperation. In both areas, the EU is guided by the 2005 EU multilevel cooperation strategy. There are various cooperation formats for collaboration with Latin America and the Caribbean. The trade related realm of cooperation, conducted by DG TRADE, is based on diverse frameworks of collaboration (strategic partnership, economic partnership, trade or association agreements) with individual LAC countries (Mexico 1997, Chile 2002), sub-regions (Central America 2012, Colombia/Peru/Ecuador 2012/2016) and sub-regional entities (CARIFORUM 2008, MERCOSUR – under negotiation). In all these agreements, the social dimension is explicitly designated as a separate field of cooperation (EU 2000: § 36; EU 2002: § 44). The social dimension receives even more attention in the scope of the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Central America Association Agreement. These agreements extend the field of cooperation by social security and protection issues (EU 2008: § 191-196) and through thematic foci on social cohesion, fight against poverty, inequalities and exclusion (EU 2012a: §41-42). By contrast, the Trade Agreement between the European Union and Colombia, Peru and Ecuador has few concrete references to social cohesion and social security (EU 2012b).

The inclusion of the social dimension into the field of development cooperation is tied to specific peculiarities. The multilevel cooperation approach – EU with individual LAC countries, sub-regions or sub-regional entities – is extended to cooperation schemes on bi-regional level. The cooperation goes beyond the sphere of political dialogue and is reflected by real programmatic correspondences on all levels. The EU's reference to the LAC region varies and is occasionally differentiated into "Latin America", "Latin America Continental", "the Caribbean" or "Latin America and the Caribbean". This differentiation can come to bear in the allocation of funds by the responsible agency DG DEVCO, as they can come from more general (DCI) or more specific funding instruments (EDF – directed to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries). The cooperation activities are framed in different types and levels of programmes (national, sub-regional and regional multiannual indicative programmes, annual action programmes, annual work programmes) with thematic as well as geographical focus. Each programme is based on specific policy guidelines (defined by EEAS and partner countries and regions), funding periods and budgets.

Development cooperation between the EU and individual Latin American countries comprised a total of 17 Latin American and three Caribbean countries for the period 2007-2013. For the period 2014 and 2020, 9 Latin American and 14 Caribbean countries are EU partners. The activities are implemented under the umbrella of national multiannual indicative programmes (NIP). The duration of each project is two to six years. These are some examples of project themes related to the social dimension: education for employment (Nicaragua); food security, decent work and social protection policy (Honduras); fight against illicit drugs (Bolivia); environment and climate change (Jamaica); sustainable trade and investment (Colombia); sustainable agriculture and food security (Cuba) (EC 2010a: 21-32; Kosiel 2014: 60-62; EC 2018j).

Development cooperation schemes at the sub-regional level during the 2007-2013 period embraced collaborations of the EU with MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and Central America. The projects concerned topics such as regional integration, economic and social cohesion, and prevention of illicit drug cultivation. During the 2014-2020 phase, only the EU-Central America cooperation continues as a Sub-Regional Multiannual Indicative Programme. The focus is on the areas of regional integration, sustainable and inclusive growth, the development of more resilient societies and the reduction of violent crime (Kosiel 2014: 63; EC 2018k). The Caribbean is also the subject of a sub-regional programme, funded by the EDF.

**Bi-regional** development cooperation encompasses a regional Multiannual Indicative Programme for Latin America (RIP, 2014-2020), regional investment facilities and various horizontal programmes with different duration and thematic priorities. The RIP programme is a DCI-funded cooperation scheme and embraces only countries of the Latin American continent (adding Cuba and excluding the Latin American countries included in the list of ACP countries). It focuses on poverty reduction through inclusive and sustainable growth and by the promotion of environmentally sustainable development (EC 2013: 2; EC 2018k). In the years 2009 to 2016, particular investment facilities for Latin America (LAIF) and the Caribbean (CIF) were also located at this level. They provided financial support for projects related to sustainable cities and climate change, SME-development, sustainable energy, and water and sanitation management (EC 2016i: 14-19, 29-33).

The **horizontal** programmes of bi-regional cooperation focus on the following thematic priorities:

- the reduction of poverty, inequalities and social exclusion by the minimization of the digital divide in Latin America (@LIS – Alliance for Information Society EU-Latin America 2002-2013);
- poverty reduction in the context of sustainable development and climate change by promoting the use of renewable energy and facilitating the access to electricity for isolated rural communities (EURO-SOLAR 2007-2013) as well as through reinforcing the resilience of the Latin American region to climate change and promoting opportunities for green growth (EUROCLIMA 2010-2016);
- the strengthening of social cohesion and inclusive growth by fostering the productivity and improving the ability of Latin American SMEs to penetrate global markets (AL-Invest, since 1994), by increasing the level of urban policy coordination between local, regional and provincial governments in Latin America (URB-AL 1994-2013) and through peer-to-peer learning on public policies and exchange of experiences between counterpart institutions in Europe and Latin America (EUROsociAL, since 2005).

Other relevant horizontal programmes are the Cooperation Programme on Drug Policies (COPOLAD, since 2010), the EU-CELAC Project on Migration (since 2009) and the SO-CIEUX Programme (2013-2016), a peer-to-peer expertise approach for selective technical assistance on social protection, labour and employment (Kosiel 2014: 63-67; EC 2018f; 2018g; 2018h; 2018i; 2018l; 2018m; 2018n; 2018o; 2018p).

### 5.2.1 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC MOBILITY

The cross-cutting issue of mobility is important for the social dimension of bi-regional EU-CELAC relations in two ways. On the one hand, mobility addresses transborder movements of people, that is migration. In particular, the long-term migration of workers affects not only individual migrants, but also their wider social networks, both in the country of origin and in the country of destination. In this context, the transfer of money (remittances) from immigrants to their Latin American and Caribbean home countries has become increasingly important. On the other hand, mobility is linked to the very negative phenomenon of illegal cross-border drug trafficking and its social consequences. The fight against drugs and related organized crime has been an important theme of bi-regional relations since the 1990s. In the bi-regional political dialogue between EU and LAC developed since 1999, both issues have both been recurring topics. It can be criticized that they are often discussed together.

#### a) Political Dialogue on Migration

The subject of migration has been addressed at the bi-regional level since the Second EU-LAC Summit in Madrid (2002). Migration is mentioned as one point amidst a sundry list of other topics and is presented as a positive phenomenon “that has brought and continues to bring great benefits to both [regions]” (Madrid Declaration, EU-LAC Summit 2002: § 31). Until the fifth Summit in Lima (2008), the political dialogue consisted in only two expert meetings and did not provide a more structured policy framework. During the fifth Summit in Lima (2008) the bi-regional political process gave place to the creation of a Bi-regional Structured and Comprehensive Dialogue on Migration. It set-up an arena for discussing matters of mutual interest and for collecting information in order to better understand the dynamics of migration, as well as the relationship between migration and development.

After the Lima Summit, bi-regional relations regarding migration were burdened by “Directive 2008/ /115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in member states for returning illegally staying third-country nationals” (Return Directive). The Directive proposed a number of measures that are judged by many as detrimental to safeguarding the human rights of migrants without a clear legal status in the EU. Measures include a period of detention for up to 1.5 years, an EU-wide re-entry ban of 5 years for those who have been forcibly returned and the right to detain and return unaccompanied minors. The new directive raised a number of critical voices in Latin America. MER-COSUR issued a statement recalling the hospitality which Latin American countries had given European migrants for centuries and during the past decades in which millions of European migrants were welcomed (Acosta Arcarazo 2009). Bolivian president Evo Morales issued a statement recalling that the EU did not manage to achieve a minimum of 0.7% of GDP for development aid. He emphasized the importance of migrants’ remittances for many Latin American countries, noting that Bolivia receives more than 10 % of its GDP in remittances, amounting to 1.1 Billion USD or a third of the revenue in national gas exports (Morales 2008). Morales also noted that while “freedom of movement is promoted for merchandise and finance” the mobility of persons faces repression and illegality (Morales 2008).

Despite these tensions in bi-regional relations, the Comprehensive Dialogue on Migration began in 2009. During the sixth EU-LAC Summit in Madrid, 2010, governments from the EU and LAC adopted further initiatives. The fourth chapter of the 2010 Madrid Action Plan proposed to facilitate an exchange of information on migration flows and to promote programmes to prevent trafficking and smuggling networks. It also agreed on strengthening policies that connect migration and development. It also encouraged the development of measures to make the transfer of remittances less costly and more transparent as well as to continue cooperation in education and health of migrants (EU-LAC Summit 2010b: 8-9). Further progress on structuring the dialogue was made during the following Summits in Santiago (2013) and Brussels (2015).

## **b) Political Dialogue on Drugs**

Drug control has been an important component of the bi-regional dialogue agenda between the EU and LAC since the 1990s. The European “harm reduction” approach to illicit drugs proposes an integrated strategy to reduce both drug demand and drug production. Such an approach goes, at least in its letter, beyond the “war on drugs” propagated by actors such as the US, which focuses primarily on reducing drug production through repressive means. An important European-Latin American consensus has always existed on the principle of “shared responsibility”: both sides agree that production and demand for drugs must be combated together. To develop common strategies is more important than to perpetuate traditional distinctions between producer, transit and consumer countries, which anyway are no longer as clear as they were a few decades ago. More and more Latin American countries are no longer just confronted with the challenge of producing drugs, but also with a strong growth in drug consumption. Conversely, with the spread of synthetic drugs, European countries have increasingly become drug-producing countries themselves. In many joint declarations at the bi-regional (EU-Rio Group; EU-CELAC) and sub-regional (EU-MERCOSUR, EU-CAN, EU-Central America) level, both sides have repeatedly stressed that illegal drugs are not only a security problem but also a social problem that can only be effectively tackled with a comprehensive approach (Gratius 2012; Selleslaghs 2016: 527-530).

Already since 1995, there is a specialized high-level political dialogue on drugs between EU and CAN. In 1998, the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean established the Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs. Meetings of technical committees and sub-regional discussions accompany this annual high-level dialogue. Thus far, the Cooperation Mechanism has held a total of 18 High-Level Meetings (EU 2016: 12). The issue has also been discussed during the EU-CELAC presidential Summits. Several paragraphs of the Rio Declaration of 1999 refer to the topic, as do subsequent Summit Statements. In 2010, the first joint programme to combat the drug economy was started. The first Action Plan for bi-regional cooperation, defined after the 2013 Santiago Summit, addressed the issue of drugs in Chapter 6. The goal is to strengthen the bi-regional dialogue and to consolidate efforts to tackle the “world drug problem”. In this context mobility is directly addressed, as trafficking of illicit drugs “carried out by organized crime and criminal organizations” (EU-CELAC Summit 2013b: 9).

The Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EUROLAT) and, previously, the joint conferences of the European and Latin American Parliaments have also dealt with the topic of drug-related cooperation. Bilateral dialogues on security, law enforcement and drug issues were established with the strategic partners Brazil and Mexico. In addition, several politico-juridical institutions and agencies such as EUROPOL and EUROJUST maintain a regular dialogue with counterparts in Latin America and the Caribbean (Selleslaghs 2016: 531).

### **c) Policies and Programmes on Migration**

The first EU-CELAC Migration Project was launched in 2011. The Migration Project lasted for a period of 48 months and was extended until July 2015. It has not been continued since. The Migration Project was financed solely by the EU with a budget of only 3 million EUR. The project was implemented by the UN International Organization for Migration (IOM, Geneva, Switzerland) in partnership with the Fundación Internacional para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas (FIIAPP, Madrid, Spain). In this project, 350 civil servants from 150 institutions of 30 countries were trained on the collection, management and sharing of migration data. In addition, several studies and manuals were developed (European Commission International Cooperation and Development 2016). Two further projects included public-private partnerships for the maximization of remittances as a development tool in countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Haiti, and a pilot project entailing labour market re-integration in countries such as Mexico, Peru and Guatemala.

### **d) Policies and Programmes on Drugs**

The most important joint programme in the field of drugs is the Cooperation Programme on Drugs Policies (COPOLAD), set up in 2009. COPOLAD is structured around four components, namely capacity-building to reduce both supply and demand, the consolidation of national drugs observatories and the bi-regional dialogue mechanism. The first phase of the programme was launched in 2010 with a total budget of 6.5 million EUR. It was prolonged in 2014 for a second period 2016-2019 with a budget of 10 million EUR and its geographical scope was extended in order to include the Caribbean. Both periods of the programme were financed entirely by the EU. COPOLAD aims at strengthening capacities and encouraging a different drug policy development process in Latin American and Caribbean countries. It consolidates National Observatories, including a system of collecting comparable drug indicators on production, consumption, illegal trafficking, associated crime, and related drug policies. It further includes capacity-building for the reduction of demand, including prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, as well as capacity-building for the reduction of supply, entailing coordination in the areas of law enforcement and alternative development with existing initiatives of LAC countries, other donors and related European Commission cooperation programmes (COPOLAD 2016).



## e) Impacts, Achievements and Challenges Regarding Migration

To understand how the mobility of people has had an effect on the social dimension of bi-regional relations between EU and LAC, it is important to consider the nature of migratory dynamics between the two regions. From a historical perspective, migratory flows from Europe to Latin America have been more significant in terms of numbers of people than migratory flows in the opposite direction. Of the 22-26 million European emigrants to the Americas between 1815 and 1914, about one half went to Latin America. In addition, many more were exiled as a result of nazi-fascist regimes in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s (Córdova Alcaraz 2015: 22). It was not until the second half of the 20th century that significant migratory movements from LAC to Europe took place. From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, the United Kingdom was the destination for many migrants from the Caribbean. About 1% of the UK population has Caribbean roots. Today, migration from Latin America towards the EU concerns mainly a few EU member states, in particular the Iberian Peninsula and Italy, and over all Spain. Recently, Spain has been the primary destination of Latin American migrants to the EU. Migration to Europe, however, accounts for only a small part of the total migration from Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2010, 70% of LAC migration went to the US, 15% was intra-LAC migration and 8% went to Spain (International Organisation for Migration 2015: 29).

Taking into account the time frame of this report (1999-2018), it is important to note that the mobility of people from LAC to the EU has been shaped by at least three major global events. The first of these is the fact that migration from LAC to the United States decreased in the wake of the large-scale deportations in the United States after 9/11. Second, the process of regional integration within Latin America and the Caribbean, including MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, the Central American Integration System and the Caribbean Common Market has facilitated the mobility of people within LAC (Córdova Alcaraz 2015: 30). The financial crisis of 2008, which hit Spain particularly hard, led to an eight percent decline of LAC migration to Spain, a four percent increase of migration to the United States, and a three percent increase in migration to other European countries (International Organisation for Migration 2015: 30) as well as a return flow of LA migrants to their countries of origin and an outflow from Spain.<sup>16</sup>

The central driving factor behind movements of people from LAC to the EU is labour-related migration. Towards the end of the 20th century, the southern European economies of Spain, Portugal and Italy experienced a period of growth with increasing demand for flexible, informal labour. In some cases, these jobs have been characterized by low labour security, long working hours and poor pay, and many of them have been filled by migrants. Thus, out of 3.8 million new jobs created in Spain between 1999 and 2012, only 1.7 million were filled by Spanish citizens. Many others were filled by the more than 1.5

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16. In recent years, the economic and social crisis in Venezuela has led to a significant increase in emigration from this country. Most affected were Latin American neighbours such as Colombia and Brazil, but Venezuela's emigration to the EU has also grown sharply. The number of Venezuelan asylum applications in the EU rose from 150 in February 2016 to 985 a year later. In February 2018, there were as many as 1,400 Venezuelan asylum applications in the EU. The largest part of it (1,160) was submitted to the Spanish authorities. See <<https://www.easo.europa.eu/news-events/venezuelans-seeking-asylum-eu-almost-800-two-years>> (12.11.2018).

million migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean between 15 and 49 years of age who were incorporated into the Spanish labour market between 2000 and 2012 (Córdova Alcaraz 2015: 34).

Creating the framework for labour migration is one of the most important aspects in addressing the issue of migration at the bi-regional level. First of all, this pertains to the effect of remittances in Latin America and the Caribbean. In some countries of LAC, remittances are very important, making up more than 15% of the GDP in El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras and Jamaica. The main destination countries for remittances in terms of value stemming from the EU are Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Dominican Republic and Bolivia. In Brazil, they made up 1,596 million USD in 2012. 62% of all remittances from the EU to LAC stem from Spain, reflecting the country's role as a major destination for LAC migrants to Europe (Córdova Alcaraz 2015: 77ff.). The flow of financial values toward LAC decreased in the wake of the world financial crisis in 2008. In spite of the economic relevance of the remittances for many Latin American and Caribbean countries, the permanent emigration of highly skilled people has a strong negative impact on social relations and on these countries' ability to achieve higher levels of social well-being and to diversify their economies.

Even with a total of ten bi-regional High-Level Meetings on Migration (as of November 2016), the development of common policies on migration has not progressed. As the 2016 bi-regional Assessment of Programmes and Actions notes, the Action Plan in respect to migration has not achieved all expected results. Each region has a different approach to priorities in terms of migration politics (EU 2016: 11). While the EU faces new waves of interregional and external migration, there has been no coherent migration policy, nor has it been easy to coordinate national policies which have changed abruptly in the wake of particular political events. This situation also reflects upon the fact that an initiative of the European Parliament to create a Migration Observatory was not successful (Gratius 2015: 13). Nevertheless, over time, the issue of migration has become somewhat more prominent on the political agenda for several reasons. One reason is the European Union's interest in regulating migration. Thus, the EU's revision of its global migration policy in 2011 is not only a reflection of migratory flaws from war in neighbouring countries and regions, but also an attempt to adapt migration to suit the needs of labour markets in the face of ageing European populations (Wölkner 2015). Another reason was that, after 2011, tense bi-regional relations made it necessary to tackle some real-world problems. This included the regulation of legal migration (Stuhldreher 2015: 109). As the migration issue is of great importance to both sides, in the wake of increasing global tensions, it could be given more attention in the future as part of the bi-regional relationship between the EU and CELAC. Most, but not all EU and CELAC member states have signed the 2018 United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.<sup>17</sup> This proves how politically difficult it is to reach consensus on migration issues.

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17. A total of 152 countries voted in favor of the pact at the United Nations General Assembly on 19 December 2018. At a meeting in Morocco earlier in December, 165 UN members had agreed on it. Among the five nations that voted against it, three (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland) were EU members. Five EU members (Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia and Romania) abstained and Slovakia did not vote. Almost all CELAC members voted for the pact. The governments of Chile and the Dominican Republic refused to sign. Brazil initially supported the pact, but the Bolsonaro government opposed it.

## **f) Impacts, Achievements and Challenges Regarding Drugs**

The assessment of bi-regional efforts to combat drug trafficking and the associated crime and social problems depends on what standards are set. On the positive side, the long-term dialogue has strengthened mutual trust. Improving the flow of information between EU and Latin American police forces, coordinating police and judicial action against drug trafficking, and increasing the amount of seized drugs are all among the positive balance sheet items. It could therefore be said that much has been achieved from a European target achievement perspective (Selleslaghs 2016: 533).

However, critics emphasize a number of problematic issues. Despite all cooperation, it has not been possible to significantly reduce the production, trade and consumption of drugs as well as the related crime and criminal economy. The social causes and side effects of the drug problem that existed in the producer and consumer countries could not be reduced either. Despite all the rhetoric of shared responsibility, most EU drug development projects continue to focus on reducing drug production. Only a small part is aimed at reducing consumption. Only a small proportion of the projects are aimed at helping Latin American governments to improve the social conditions that are at the root of the drug problem. Also, only a small part of the projects is in the area of “alternative development”, that is to say projects that seek to offer smallholders an economically viable alternative to drug cultivation (Gratius 2012: 17). Although the rhetoric of the EU generally declares Latin America and the Caribbean to be a strategic partner in the fight against drugs, in practice there is often a preference for sub-regional and bilateral agreements to reduce drug production (Chanona 2015: 168).

From this analysis arise a number of challenges for future bi-regional cooperation in the fight against drugs. This would include better funding for drug development projects, more focus on alternative development projects, and more projects aimed at reducing demand. So far, defining a common strategy has proved difficult because the financial resources available are rather limited and the levels of concern are different. For some Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Peru and Honduras, the drug problem poses a fundamental challenge to their national security. Not only the police, but also the armed forces of these countries are involved in the fight against drugs. For other countries, the drug problem remains essentially on the public security agenda. For European countries too, the problem of drugs is primarily a public health and public security issue (Chanona 2015: 160-166).

By tying in more closely to what the different Latin-American counterparts exactly would like to achieve through EU cooperation mechanisms, as well as bringing social and health indicators more central to evaluate its potential impact, the EU's interregional approach could be considerably strengthened (Selleslagh 2016: 535).

One challenge is to ensure that the comprehensive approach, shared in principle by most European and Latin American countries, is reflected in concrete policies. The focus should also be on the structural causes of the drug problem and the associated social problems and violence.

Many stakeholders recognize that fundamental progress in combating the drug economy and its related crime and social problems will only be possible if it succeeds in adopting new strategies at the global level. While the problems between the EU and CELAC are far from being identical, there are enough bi-regional consensuses to influence more than ever the global drug control strategies. These include the debate over the release of “soft” drugs, the decriminalization (not necessarily legalization) of drugs, and the criticism of a drug-control policy based largely on repression. Connecting the European and Latin American and Caribbean debates on drugs, the EU and CELAC could propose a fundamental change in the global policy against drugs, contrary to the idea that prohibition and repression will lead to their eradication (Gratius 2017). Of course, such joint action is only promising if the dialogue with the US does not get out of sight.

### 5.3 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC INEQUALITY

Inequalities in the social dimension between EU and LAC are addressed referring mainly to economic inequality, gender- and ethnic-based inequality, and the challenge of social cohesion. However, inequalities in terms of access to justice, primary and secondary education and the (formal) labour market are also considered.

#### a) Political Dialogue

Social inequality has been a recurring topic at the political level of EU-(CE) LAC relations since 1999. In early Summit Declarations, LAC is commended for being on a path towards an increase in social wellbeing and a reduction of inequalities by strengthening formal electoral democracies and free trade. The EU is presented as a model that would have achieved regional integration and social well-being, emphasizing that the EU has one of the lowest levels of inequality worldwide (European Commission 2015: 6). Typical statements of early Summit documents thus include a political determination of Latin America and the Caribbean “to persevere in the advancement of democratic processes, social equality, modernisation efforts, trade liberalisation and broad-based structural reforms” (Madrid Declaration, EU-LAC Summit 2002: § 2).

More recently, gender equality has become more prominent within the political agenda. This was reflected in the supplement to the Action Plan as updated during the Santiago Summit (2013) to include a seventh chapter on gender (EU-CELAC Summit 2013b: 10-11). It has also been reinforced through bi-regional attention given to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The EU-CELAC 2016 bi-regional Assessment of Programmes and Actions recommends that the title of Action Plan chapter seven should be amended to read “gender equality” and to make a stronger effort to implement this chapter of the Action Plan. Reference is made to a study commissioned and published by the EULAC Foundation in 2015, titled “The Issue of Gender in Relations between the EU and LAC”. In this way, priorities for action could be identified (EU 2016: 13).

Another element of bi-regional political dialogue, which deals with the cross-cutting issue of inequality, is social cohesion. As defined in the context of the EU, social cohesion is closely related to inequality given that it aims at reducing disparities linked to labour market integration, equal opportunities for men and women, as well as sustainable economic development. However, the issue of cohesion is mainly linked to the notion of territorial cohesion, which addresses unequal levels of development between different European countries and regions within the different countries. Underlining how the EU defines social cohesion and inequality in the social sphere is important given the fact that the social agenda between the EU and Latin America appears to be strongly guided by a European definition of social inclusion. There is an implicit understanding that Latin America is the main addressee for improvement in the context of the dialogue. Bilateral programmes exist for achieving social development in Latin America and the Caribbean, but not the other way around.

A qualitative change in the way that inequality has been dealt with as part of bi-regional relations has to do with the transformation in the Latin American economies, primarily as a result of the so-called commodity boom or commodity super-cycle (between roughly 1993 and 2014). The reduction in poverty and extreme poverty rates between 2002 and 2014 was linked to LAC countries' economic growth, but it was also the result of social protection and labour market policies developed in the region. The average poverty rate fell from 39% to 28% of the total population between 2005 and 2012. In the Brussels Declaration (2015), Latin America and the Caribbean are commended for "lifting millions of people out of poverty" (EU-CELAC Summit 2015a: § 59). Even as the LAC region remains the most unequal in the world in terms of wealth distribution, according to Gratius "the reduction in poverty, the expansion of the Latin American middle-class and the exclusion of countries like Brazil or Chile from classical development assistance is part of the EU's success story as a global development actor" (Gratius 2015: 10). The change in policy envisioned by the EU is a trend towards a decrease in official development assistance flows in the increase role of private banks and nongovernmental organizations as part of addressing the challenges of these so-called middle-income countries. For the time since the end of the commodity boom CEPAL states an increase in regional levels of poverty and extreme poverty, although the rates in most individual countries continued to decline (ECLAC 2018: 81).

A further qualitative change in the bi-regional political relations addressing social inequality is related to a shift in EU policy towards so-called second-generation reforms which tend to deemphasize social cohesion but place greater emphasis on the notions of sustainable development, climate change and governance (see section 4.6).

## **b) Policies and Programmes**

For most of the institutionalized EU-LAC relations social inequality was primarily addressed through the issue of social cohesion, even if, from a LAC perspective, many disagree with this approach. It has been described by the European Commission as a "leitmotif of the bi-regional relationship with Latin America, endorsed at the highest political level since the Third EU-LAC Summit" in 2004 (EC 2015f: 6). From 2005 on-

wards, one of the central programmes to emerge directly from this Summit was the multiyear programme known as EUROsociAL (2004-2009). It was later expanded to a second and third phase as EUROsociAL II (2011-2015) and EUROsociAL+ (2016-2021). The Programme's central goal of increasing social cohesion sought to improve "welfare based on equal opportunities, with a sense of belonging and with solidarity".<sup>18</sup>

A central methodology of the three EUROsociAL programmes has been the exchange of experiences between public administrations ("peer to peer") in different thematic areas. These include social policies such as labour monitoring systems, adapting education curricula and protecting vulnerable groups such as minorities, women and handicapped persons, addressing fiscal policies such as tax reforms and tax education, equal access to justice including strengthening public defence office, conflict resolution and violence prevention, good governance policies such as fighting corruption, and gender equality policies including assistance to victims of gender violence (EUROsociAL s.a.; European Commission 2015). EUROsociAL is expected to create synergies with other programmes in the common framework of the multi-indicative regional programme for Latin America (2014-2020), in which social cohesion is a priority. It is also expected to create synergies with UN development programmes as well as with bilateral programmes between specific EU and Lac countries. According to the 2016 bi-regional Assessment of Programmes and Activities, EUROsociAL is a key initiative because of its relevance to various chapters of the Action Plan that touch on the area of social inclusion and social cohesion (EU 2016: 10). It is valued, in particular, for its "demand-driven / bottom-up" approach.<sup>19</sup>

### **c) Impacts, Achievements and Challenges**

Social inequality is addressed mainly through employment, fiscal policy, access to justice and good governance policies. The issue is largely addressed without a view towards socioeconomic inequality. From the perspective of the institutional actors at the bi-regional level of EU-LAC relations, specific policies to reduce inequality and attain social cohesion in Latin America are seen as successful. These might include successful measures such as improving the quality of local government public spending through better linking plans and budgets, integrating evaluation and monitoring into the public policy cycle and monitoring, and defining a core set of social indicators for measuring health equity. These are important measures to support local and regional initiatives to address inequality in areas such as access to health, employment or education.

Although it is frequently highlighted that programmes such as EUROsociAL are characterized by a methodology that underlines an exchange of experiences among equal partners, the review of the programmes' content highlights that they focus mainly on issues that pertain to Latin America and the Caribbean. Whereas the vulnerability of minority groups, the precarisation of labour markets, corruption, and gender inequality are by far not un-

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18. See <<http://www.eurosocial.eu/en>>.

19. In 2018, the EU-LAC Foundation and the EUROsociAL+ Programme launched a call to present good practices and innovations for the inclusion of young women in the world of work. As a result of the project, the study "Good practices and innovations for the inclusion of young women in the labour market in Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union" (Renzi 2018) was published.

known problems at the European level, the magnitude of these issues on the other side of the Atlantic lead to a way of dealing with social issues that is strongly asymmetrical. Moreover, the way in which problems are dealt with is strongly related to the fact that almost all programs in the social dimension are financed almost exclusively by the EU. The agenda setting and the problem definition often follows the maxim “who pays the bill, drives the agenda”.

According to the 2016 bi-regional Assessment of Programmes and Activities, central bi-regional programmes such as EUROsocial must ensure that the exchanges that are promoted through the programme “are not limited to sharing knowledge but become learning experiences that materialize in actions oriented to improve public policies and strengthen the capacity of institutions responsible for them” (EU 2016: 10-11).

## 5.4 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC DIVERSITY

In the social dimension of EU-LAC bi-regional relations, diversity is defined in the same way as inequality through the lens of social cohesion and social inclusion. It is mainly addressed by means of programmes that aim at fostering the inclusion of migrants, youth, homeless people, women and groups marginalized according to ethnicity. Diversity in the social dimension is therefore closely linked to social inequality.

### a) Political Dialogue

As just mentioned, diversity pertains, in the framework of bi-regional EU-LAC relations, to social inclusion in the sense of explicitly supporting the inclusion of vulnerable social groups who are excluded or disadvantaged. It is linked to aspects of equality/inequality, and of inclusion/exclusion. This is the case since the first Summit in Rio (1999) when both parties declared their commitment to work together “on the basis of the principles of equality and respect for plurality and diversity, without distinction of race, religion or gender” (Rio Declaration 1999: § 54). In the following summit declarations, it remains a recurring topic. Related issues such as ethnic discrimination, linguistic inclusion, addressing xenophobia and the vulnerability of migrants are addressed.

Diversity in the social dimension does not have a very high political priority in the Summits, even if it is addressed in the bi-annual EU-LAC action plans. In the Madrid Action Plan (2010) it is indirectly addressed under Chapter 5, “Education and Employment to Promote Social Inclusion and Cohesion” whose main objectives to promote education, improve access to labour markets and dignified work “tak[e] into account diversity and levels of vulnerability [...] in particular for women and young people, as well as for other vulnerable groups” (EU-LAC Summit 2010b: 9-11).

A chapter on gender issues has been included in the Action Plan, which was revised during the Santiago Summit in 2013. It states that the political participation of women has to be guaranteed, gender-based violence has to be eliminated, and the economic empowerment of women must be supported (EU-CELAC Summit 2013b: 10-11).

## **b) Policies and Programmes**

Diversity in the sense of guaranteeing the inclusion of socially vulnerable groups is not the main subject of any specific social programme to result out of the EU-LAC bi-regional relationship. Rather, the specific goal of the EU-LAC Action Plans to “implement programmes to reduce discrimination at work of young people, women and persons with disabilities” (Madrid Action Plan, EU-LAC Summit 2010b: 10) is one of the lines of work within the larger EUROsociAL programmes that have been in place since 2005. Here, the programme focuses on some “priority groups”. According to the programme, these are groups that “due to their age, gender, ethnic origin and /or physical or mental condition are at risk, preventing them of development and access to better welfare conditions” (EUROsociAL Website, 2016).

The programme aims at reducing the vulnerability levels of these groups by supporting local policy initiatives that target the specific vulnerable groups in particular countries and regions in those countries. These include among others: supplementary financial aid / support with job-market assistance, free fiscal advice for inserting small businesses into the formal economy, working with local governments to revise government protocols to improve assistance to homeless persons, assistance in revising programmes that assist children vulnerable to engage in child labour (EUROsociAL Website, 2016). As is customary for a EUROsociAL programme, the emphasis is placed on supporting existing government initiatives or on making them more efficient through training and capacity-building.

## **c) Impacts, Achievements and Challenges**

Diversity as an important aspect of the wider political theme of social inclusion does not as such have a direct impact on the social-dimension of bi-regional relations between EU and LAC. Rather, it plays an important role as a centre of attention in programmes such as EUROsociAL that deal explicitly with issues of social inclusion.

A main achievement in this area is to have attained a sustained focus on the issue of diversity in the sense of considering the vulnerability or exclusion of certain groups as a cross-cutting issue in the most important programme that came out of the bi-regional political, dialogue, EUROsociAL, in its three phases.

A challenge for the future could be to focus more on the interactions between different dimensions of bi-regional relations. This would also mean that the effects of free trade agreements on social development are being taken more seriously. For example, the question arises as to how far social diversity is endangered by free trade.



## 5.5 THE CROSS-CUTTING TOPIC SUSTAINABILITY

In the social dimension of bi-regional relations between EU and LAC, sustainability has been largely framed by the important social policy and development policy paradigm of sustainable development. Sustainable development draws to attention the interconnections between the viability and future resilience of social systems and natural environments.

### a) Political Dialogue

Sustainability has been a steady mainstay on the political agenda between EU and LAC through the notion of sustainable development. The concept first gained prominence in the wake of the Brundtland Report (1987) and following the World Summit in Rio de Janeiro (1992), the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002), and most recently through the Sustainable Development Goals of 2015. The importance of the concept is also reflected in the recent EU-LAC Summit documents: While the Vienna Summit (2006) document uses the terms “sustainable development” or “sustainability” only seven times, the terms are used 16 times in the Lima Summit Declaration (2008). In the Santiago Summit Declaration (2013) they are used 28 times. More recently, the importance of sustainability in the social dimension has been highlighted by the political weight given in the bi-regional political dialogue to the 2013 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Assessment of Programmes and Actions, EU 2016).

In the social dimension of bi-regional relations, sustainability qua sustainable development tends to highlight not only socioecological environments, but especially the way in which they intersect with the viability of or durability of social systems over time, often captured through the notion of wellbeing. In the EU-LAC relationship, this has been addressed through a number of subjects that have been the focus of Summit Declarations including climate change, food security and nutrition or sustainable agriculture. But while some topics have been temporary at the political level — for example, the emphasis on food security in the 2008 Lima Summit can partly be assessed as a political statement in the midst of a hunger crisis as global food prices for basic staples soared globally —, others have been given ongoing centrality in the bi-regional relationship. This includes topics that have figured more prominently in bi-regional texts, especially since the Lima Summit in 2008 containing a special chapter on Sustainable Development, Environment, Climate Change, Energy (Lima Declaration, EU-LAC Summit 2008) and have been given more attention in the bi-annual Action Plans since the 2010 Summit in Madrid (updated in Santiago 2013 and Brussels 2015) and in particular in Chapter two of these documents, which addresses exactly these topics (Madrid Action Plan, EU-LAC Summit 2010b: 4-6; Santiago Action Plan, EU-CELAC Summit 2013b: 3-5; Brussels Action Plan, EU-CELAC Summit 2015c: 5-6).

As detailed in the Action Plans, the points of bi-regional convergence centre most prominently on the issue of climate change, the effective implementation of the Kyoto protocol, and developing policies and instruments for adaptation and mitigation to climate change. The outstanding emphasis here on climate change and the amount of space it is granted in bi-regional political documents as well as in recent Summit Documents can be read as a reflection of EU priorities in the relationship with LAC as defined by the European Commission. This is also reflected in the budget that the EU provides for cooperation with Latin America. Of the 925 million euros available from the EU for the period 2014-2020, 557 million euros will be spent on common action on climate change, sustainable development and good governance (Gratius 2015: 14).

A common goal is the full implementation of the three objectives laid out in the 1993 UN Convention on Biological Diversity. Another important issue is the subject of energy and energy efficiency and their accessibility. In the context of the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development, including the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, these topics are to be brought together more closely with social issues such as the modalities for achieving inclusive economic growth while decreasing inequality, access to finance, the vulnerabilities of Small Island Developing States, and the effects of bi-regional cooperation on middle-income countries that no longer qualify for funding under the Official Development Assistance (ODA) framework. In the framework of the bi-regional political dialogue, this has been considered important, given the importance of ODA “as a lever for effective implementation of the [Sustainable Development Goals]” (Assessment of Programmes and Activities, EU 2016: 5).

## **b) Policies and Programmes**

A prominent example of the type of programmes that anchor the topic of sustainability in the social dimension is the programme known as EURocLIMA. Following the dialogue at the 2008 EU-LAC Summit in Lima, this regional EU programme was conceived in order to address climate change mitigation and adaptation within the context of Latin American public development policies and plans. Therefore, the countries that participate in the programme are supposed to benefit from studies and information material, seminars and workshops, on-site as well as online courses and webinars as well as technical assistance in the framework of the Paris Agreement in 2015 and in countries’ efforts to draw up their Nationally Determined Contributions. EURocLIMA works by creating information and dialogues that are then channelled towards the improvement of local policies regarding subjects such as soil erosion and loss or gaining access to funding mechanisms in the context of UN Programmes such as REDD and REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation). Currently, a follow up programme continues these actions after 2016 and is known as EURocLIMA+ (CELAC-EU, 2016: 9). In addition, in the context of the EU Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for Latin America, funding has been agreed upon to support climate change and disaster risk management for the region between 2014 and 2020.

While EURocLIMA (2009-2012) and EURocLIMA+ (2012-2015) only involves Latin American states, Caribbean countries participate in a separate programme known as the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), a programme that is not specific to the Caribbean but which is conceived as targeting least-developed countries and has been funded by the EU since 2007 (Global Climate Change Alliance 2012). The programme

comprises a two-pronged strategy consisting of, first, a political dialogue aiming to integrate climate issues into national development strategies, plans and budgets as well as building a dialogue to feed into the climate negotiations; and, second, technical assistance such as mangrove management or disaster risk reduction, sometimes through CARIFORUM as a base for economic dialogue with the EU (GCCA 2012). The programme has been expanded as of November 2015 and is now known as GCCA+.

It is important to note that while these climate change programmes and activities are also meant to feed back into the political process at the level of the global climate change negotiations, this has not necessarily led to cooperation between EU and LAC in the context of the UNFCCC climate negotiations as such. This is of course related to the heterogeneity of countries and interests in the two regions and the fact that this heterogeneity gives rise to disparate interests and strategies, among other in terms of industry interests affected by climate negotiations, the urgency of how climate change is affecting the various countries in the region, or the availability of resources available to prevent or respond to these effects. As a result, climate change programmes have rather led to a bi-regional dialogue on particular topics leading up to the climate negotiations or to assistance in areas such as defining the Nationally Determined Contributions leading up to the 2015 UNFCCC climate negotiations, but have not led to the possibility of representing common positions or common strategies in climate negotiations. This is a situation that furthermore holds true of other international conventions such as the UN Convention on Biological Diversity.

The working groups that have been established in the context of the EU-CELAC Science, Technology and Innovation Senior Officials' Meetings also play a role in moving the policy agenda forward. While some of the initiatives focus on research specific undertakings, others include concrete actions such as the implementation of a pilot public-private partnership on energy in the bio-economy focusing on biomass conversion or refining, and the EU Partnership Instrument is active in Latin America with projects including low carbon emissions, energy efficiency, resources accounting and valuation of ecosystems, and supporting the phasing out of ozone-depleting substances (Assessment of Programmes and Actions, EU 2016: 9).

An important characteristic of bi-regional cooperation on issues related to sustainability in the social dimension has been the emphasis placed on Corporate Social Responsibility. The issue of Investment and Entrepreneurship for Sustainable Development has been, since the Santiago Summit in 2013, a Chapter on the bi-regional Action Plan which promotes the idea that social inclusion, environmental quality and sustained economic growth are not at odds with each other but can be fostered through the capacity building of micro-small and medium enterprises as "new social actors of the economy" (EU-CELAC Summit 2013b: 12). These issues are addressed as part of a political dialogue such as the one conducted in the framework of CELAC-EU Ministers of Economy Meetings as well as industrial dialogues, seminars and events with some Latin American countries in order to strengthen and align industry policy issues between the two regions on issues that include raw materials, Global Earth observation (e.g. geo-information for environmental as well as security purposes) as well as disaster preparedness to prevent earthquakes or tropical storms) (Assessment of Programmes and Activities, EU 2016: 14).

The emphasis on Corporate Social Responsibility, especially since the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002), underscores the general trend to address issues of economic growth and environmental sustainability jointly whereby it is assumed that private businesses should be encouraged as important factors in the area of sustainability and that their goals do not stand in opposition to sustainability as it pertains both to the environment as well as to social cohesion. As a result, bi-regional cooperation in the area of sustainability has put a strong emphasis on the role of business, as shown not only by the inclusion of a particular chapter on investments and entrepreneurship for sustainable development into the bi-regional action plans but also by a number of programmes. The latter include, among others, AL-INVEST, the Latin American Investment Facility, the European and Latin American business services and Innovation Programme (ELAN) or COPERNICUS, an EU-based programme for geo-information related to sustainability and security. Moreover, six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru) host Enterprise Europe Network Business Corporation Centres. The latter provide support to help small and medium enterprises in doing businesses beyond their national borders and opens up the possibility for European and Latin American small and medium enterprises to seize business opportunities in both regions (Assessment of Programmes and Actions, EU 2016: 14).

### **c) Impacts, Achievements and Challenges**

The way in which sustainability has been dealt with in the framework of the EU-LAC relationship and its particular focus on sustainable development has meant that cooperation can be achieved on this issue, where, at least at this level, there seems to be sufficient political convergence. Climate change and the EURocLIMA and GCCA programmes are probably the best example of this type of cooperation.

At the same time, at the level of the impact on the social dimension of bi-regional relations, this type of programme reflects an implicit developmental approach in which the Latin American and Caribbean partner countries are addressed as the area to benefit from improvement or efficiency in policies to prevent or mitigate the effects of climate change. Thus, all 18 participant countries in the EURocLIMA and GCCA programmes are Latin American and Caribbean countries while no European countries are included. It is thus an asymmetrical constellation assuming that the European side already succeeds on this terrain while the LAC region is called on to improve, even if Europe is, on the whole, responsible for a larger footprint in the emissions that cause climate change.

Furthermore, in order to assess the impact of sustainability on the social dimension, it must be taken into account how sustainability has been treated in other areas of the bi-re-

gional relationship. As discussed above, in the scientific dimension there is a tendency to assume that certain policies and technologies are sustainable in and of themselves. This assumption can also be seen critically from the perspective of the social dimension and its emphasis on sustainable development. Thus, goals are at conflicts when, on the one hand, programmes try to preserve the fertility of soils, biodiversity or water in Latin America through sustainable development policies, while, on the other, Latin America is praised as having a strong strategic potential based on land available for agriculture or biodiversity in the context of a bio-economy promoting that these resources be exploited in the context of new green growth (ALCUE-NET 2016c: 4-5).

Regarding the increasingly important role that is given to the business sector within the context of bi-regional relations, it is important to note that bi-regional relations are also given shape through business actors and therefore business interests. The encouragement of the voice of business actors in the area of sustainability (as well as other areas such as scientific innovation) stands in contrast with those of other actors which are sometimes mentioned in the political dialogue and which are given a political voice (e.g., EU-LAC Civil Society Forum) but do not have the same political weight in terms of implementing the bi-regional relationship through programmes and initiatives.

However, it remains that sustainability and sustainable development are significant issues of political agreement in the bi-regional political relationship between the EU and LAC. A common vision exists, in particular, in the area of climate change mitigation and adaptation. This has led to the implementation of concrete programmes such as EURoCLIMA and the GCCA. But, as described above, it remains a challenge to dissociate the social dimension of bi-regional relations from a classic North-South development agenda in which EU-RoCLIMA partner countries are expected to improve one-sidedly even as the EU is deeply implicated in Climate Change as a major producer of green-house gas emissions.

As mentioned in the 2016 EU-CELAC Assessment of Programmes and Actions, cooperation in areas such as climate change should reflect previous Action Plans' attention to areas such as the use of indigenous and traditional knowledge as well as the "use of nature-based solutions" (EU 2016: 10). This would be a counterweight to the already much stronger role of various actors in the business sector whose participation is encouraged through Corporate Social Responsibility.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

### 6.1 THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF BI-REGIONAL RELATIONS

Despite the increasing visibility of the field of culture at multilateral levels, the cultural dimension of EU-CELAC bi-regional relations is less pronounced than the scientific and social dimensions. This does not mean that the cultural dimension would be less important for the relations between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. Rather, it is a consequence of the fact that cultural policy is still primarily a domain of national foreign policies. A major challenge for the EU's external cultural policy is precisely to better coordinate the multiple activities of different actors and bodies.

Within the bi-regional framework of EU-CELAC relations, the cultural dimension remains exclusively at the level of political dialogue. So far, no bi-regional cultural programmes or policies exist. There are no concrete budget-based programmes that would, for example, seek to increase the mobility of cultural workers between Europe and the LAC, to reduce inequalities or to preserve cultural diversity on a sustainable basis. However, cultural exchange programmes exist between the EU on the one hand and sub-regional and strategic partners in Latin America and the Caribbean on the other. In addition, for the cultural cooperation between the two regions the framework of UNESCO plays an important role. In both regions, culture is seen as a factor that is important for the success of regional cooperation and integration processes. Cultural aspects are therefore included in many programmes and policies at different levels.

An important achievement in terms of the cultural dimension of bi-regional relations between Europe and LAC is the discursive consensus that exists between the two regions on certain core values and goals. This is especially true in view of the high appreciation of cultural diversity, the protection of minority rights and the preservation of traditional cultures.

The protocols on cultural cooperation signed by the EU with some sub-regional partners in Latin America and the Caribbean are a step into the right direction. However, they often merely record the existing rules and do not go beyond them. One problem for many cultural operators from LAC with regard to access to the European cultural market is the fact that there are no uniform European rules but very different rules on access from country to country. The current visa regime stands in contradiction to the desire to deepen and expand cultural relations. Another challenge concerns the question of how the Protocols on Cultural Cooperation are interpreted. While representatives of the European Commission consider them to be "politically" binding, the representatives of individual EU countries see them as merely a set of best endeavours. They do not derive any obligation to act from them.

The external cultural activities of the EU are also an attempt to respond to the challenge of lacking visibility of the EU as a cultural actor. The EU is perceived primarily as a trading bloc. If that is going to change, the EU needs to invest in its visibility as a cultural player;

it must develop a common narrative. Such a narrative must not be confined to conjuring up again and again the assumed shared values and cultural similarities between the two regions. Of course, there are many things in common, but history, especially from a Latin American perspective, is often a burden that is far too little addressed and acknowledged by the Europeans. In times of post-colonial and de-colonial discourses (even if one does not have to agree uncritically), the EU can no longer confine itself to drawing a harmonious picture of the common past and present time and time again.

A major challenge for the external cultural policy of the EU is given by the different expectations on the part of the partners. While some are involved in heritage protection or promoting the cultural diversity of indigenous communities, others are primarily interested in accessing new cultural markets. In addition, the ambiguity of culture itself in international relations produces conflicts of interest between partners. Is it a field to build shared global patrimony or to negotiate multiple identities or is it simply a dynamic market?

As the main responsibilities for cultural activities will remain with the member states, it would be important to pool national resources in the interests of a stronger EU-wide cultural policy. This could benefit smaller EU countries, which otherwise would not be able to engage in LAC because of scarce resources. Such pooling would also contribute to reducing inequalities within the EU. In order to be accepted by the individual states, it would be necessary to clarify the added value of a European cultural policy vis-à-vis national commitments.

## 6.2 THE SCIENTIFIC DIMENSION OF BI-REGIONAL RELATIONS

Both EU and CELAC attribute central importance to the scientific dimension within the respective processes of regional integration and share the aspiration to cooperate in the scientific area at international scale. Europe and LAC can refer to a long tradition of exchanges between individual researchers, universities and research institutions. Since the mid-1980s, the degree of institutionalisation of bi-regional cooperation in the fields of science, research, technology and innovation has been steadily increasing. Nowadays it is embodied in a variety of cooperation schemes, in particular at bi-regional and bilateral levels.

Mobility is central to bi-regional relations between EU-LAC in the field of science, technology and innovation. Although specific motives and drivers for mobility are not necessarily the same on each side of the Atlantic and differ with regard to status groups, disciplines and interests, key factors for mobility include access to cutting edge science and complementary know-how, gaining entry to international technology markets, the valuation of skills, information, and insights concentrated in other countries, and access to funds from foreign institutions and foreign funding agencies. A qualitative and strategic change in the EU-LAC relationship with a significant effect on the mobility of information, knowledge and researchers is marked by the initiation of the Joint Initiative on Research and Innovation (JIRI), launched between the European Union and LAC in 2010 at the Madrid Summit. Mobility has had a positive impact on EU-CELAC relations in the sense of increasing knowledge exchange, knowledge circulation and the co-production of knowledge, the growth of international collaborative experiences, knowledge gain and capacity development of academics and researchers at various levels (students, PhD students, post-docs,

professors, established researchers), and the expansion of access and use of infrastructure. Nevertheless, structural inequalities between EU – LAC and within the regions in terms of who can participate in mobility (i.e., who can fulfil the adequate formats in terms of formal requirements, qualifications, thematic foci; and which countries and institutions can position themselves as attractive institutions for scientific exchange) should be taken into account when considering the increased mobility of knowledge. One of the major challenges for bi-regional mobility in the scientific dimension is to reduce structural inequalities between EU-CELAC and within the regions, achieve a more balanced relation between brain gain and brain drain, in the sense of a more symmetric knowledge circulation and a less disparate spatial and temporal pattern of mobility.

In the scientific dimension of bi-regional relations between EU and LAC, inequality is framed on several levels related to the opportunities regarding participation in international, bi-regional collaboration. These include disparities among regions, countries, and regions within countries as well as disparities between institutions and language skills. Further asymmetries stem from access to university education and higher academic degrees, funding for research, access to high level publications, access to international mobility, and access to research infrastructure. Some of the challenges that should be addressed in bi-regional collaboration include: Inequalities regarding the participation of the natural sciences and engineering fields vs. social sciences and humanities; differences between the two regions and among particular countries with regard to the funding of basic science on the one hand and applied science, on the other; disparities in the participation of certain clusters of countries within the bi-regional collaboration; asymmetries in access to scientific collaboration, including publications, circulation, and visibility of science research as a result of language differences; challenges to collaboration as framed by gender, class and ethnicity.

In the scientific dimension of the bi-regional relations between EU and CELAC, diversity is addressed in manifold ways within the sphere of political dialogue and in the scope of policies and programmes. The science-diversity nexus is particularly evident in the contexts of biological diversity and diversification of energy sources. Both highlighted as matters of common interest, the topics are pursued at the regional level with the aim of providing technical support for their inclusion into political dialogue and joint cooperation projects. This successful establishment of biological diversity as a topic of common interest, and its inclusion into different schemes of political dialogue and further consideration in bi-regional cooperation projects can be seen as an achievement. In contrast, the example of ancestral and traditional knowledge indicates that a topic with a science-diversity nexus can also reach its limits in the bi-regional arena. Thus, the further processing of corresponding positions formulated at this level may remain of sub-regional interest (LAC, in particular Andean countries) or may be perceived as a questioning of nation-state competencies, as this topic is closely linked to the ILO 169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention which is supported in Europe and LAC in very different ways. Due to the varying importance given to the topic of ancestral and traditional knowledge within both regions, its embeddedness in the scientific dimension of the bi-regional relations should be reconsidered.

It can be seen as an achievement that the issue of sustainability has managed to become a main-stay of the bi-regional scientific agenda, not only at the political levels of regional



cooperation but also as one of the research priorities as shown by the types of projects prioritized in programme calls, mobility schemes and funding priorities for research in both regions. At the same time, care must be taken to avoid language that a priori would assume that certain research approaches and in particular certain technologies would themselves be sustainable as such. Here, it is important to emphasize a basic insight of critical studies of technologies in the social sciences, highlighting that technologies cannot be considered as autonomous factors independently of the social context—including the scientific, social and political context—in which they emerge and into which they are inserted.

With regard to bi-regional cooperation in research for innovation and competitiveness, it seems necessary to demystify certain conventional conceptions and take a more critical and diversified attitude that contemplates that Universalist models of innovation face a crisis of both technical reproducibility and social support. The geography of innovation is completely unequal. The repeated failures of attempts to stimulate innovations in developing or underperforming regions have shown the limits of thinking about innovation in terms of almost universal models or the transfer of best practices. At the heart of this problem is the persistent inability to seriously include socio-economic traditions, political cultures and regional identity in mainstream innovation theory. It would be advisable that the bi-regional cooperation between the EU and CELAC take actions to counteract these tendencies.

### 6.3 THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF BI-REGIONAL RELATIONS

In the social dimension of bi-regional relations between EU and (CE)LAC, several areas concern mobility. These include the legal and illegal Trans-Atlantic mobility of people, in particular: long-term labour migration; the transfer of remittances sent by labour migrants from Europe to Latin America and the Caribbean; legal and illegal bi-regional circulation of money; and the illicit trafficking of goods, with an emphasis on illegal drugs. Poverty is also a key issue in this context as a structural cause of labour migration.

Creating the framework for labour migration is one of the most important aspects in addressing the issue of migration at the bi-regional level. But the development of common policies on migration has not progressed. The Action Plan in respect to migration has not achieved all expected results. Each region has a different approach to priorities in terms of migration politics. While the EU faces new waves of inter-regional and external migration, there has been no coherent migration policy, nor has it been easy to coordinate national policies which have changed abruptly in the wake of particular political events. As the migration issue is of great importance to both sides, and is affected by increasing global tensions, it should be given more attention in the future as part of the bi-regional relationship between the EU and CELAC.

The assessment of bi-regional efforts to combat drug trafficking and the associated crime and social problems depends on what standards are set. On the positive side, the long-term dialogue has strengthened mutual trust. Improving the flow of information between EU and Latin American police forces, coordinating police and judicial action against drug trafficking, and increasing the amount of seized drugs are also among the

positive balance sheet items. It could therefore be said that much has been achieved from a European target achievement perspective. However, critics emphasize a number of problematic issues. Despite all cooperation, it has not been possible to significantly reduce the production, trade and consumption of drugs as well as the related crime. The social causes and side effects of the drug problem that existed in the producer and consumer countries could not be reduced either. Despite all the rhetoric of shared responsibility, most EU drug development projects continue to focus on reducing drug production. Only a small part is aimed at reducing consumption. Only a small proportion of the projects are aimed at helping Latin American governments to improve the social conditions that are at the root of the drug problem. Also, only a small part of the projects is in the area of “alternative development”. Although the rhetoric of the EU generally declares Latin America and the Caribbean to be a strategic partner in the fight against drugs, in practice there is often a preference for sub-regional and bilateral agreements to reduce drug production.

Many stakeholders recognize that fundamental progress in combating the drug economy and its related crime and social problems will only be possible if it succeeds in adopting new strategies at the global level. While the problems between the EU and CELAC are far from being identical, there are enough bi-regional consensuses to influence more than ever global drug control strategies. These include the debate over the release of “soft” drugs, the decriminalization (not necessarily legalization) of drugs, and the criticism of a drug-control policy based largely on repression. Connecting the European and Latin American and Caribbean debates on drugs, the EU and CELAC could propose a fundamental change in the global policy against drugs, contrary to the idea that prohibition and repression will lead to their eradication. Of course, such joint action is only promising if the dialogue with the US does not get out of sight.

In the social dimension of bi-regional relations, the inequalities addressed include economic inequality, gender- and ethnic-based inequality, and the challenge of social cohesion. In the programmes, inequalities targeted also include differences in access to justice, primary and secondary education and the (formal) labour market. As they apply to Latin America and the Caribbean as a deeply unequal region, these inequalities have had a profound impact on bi-regional relations between LAC and EU. This impact has been in the sense of an important asymmetry between the two regions in which LAC is the area that is expected to develop, and the EU is a model. Although bi-regional programmes in the social area such as EUROsociAL emphasize a methodology based on an exchange among equal partners, issues of social cohesion, corruption, precarisation of the labour market and gender inequality are only directed towards LAC. Nevertheless, these are not unknown problems on the other side of the Atlantic.

In the social dimension of LAC-EU bi-regional relations, diversity is defined through the lens of social cohesion and social inclusion, principally via programmes that seek the inclusion of the population considered as vulnerable — e.g., groups excluded on the basis of gender and ethnicity, or language. Diversity in the social dimension is therefore closely linked to social inequality. A main achievement in this area is to have attained a sustained focus on the issue of diversity in the sense of considering

the vulnerability or exclusion of certain groups as a cross-cutting issue in the most important programme that came out of the bi-regional political dialogue, EUROsocial, in its three phases. A challenge for the future could be to focus more on the interactions between different dimensions of bi-regional relations. This would also mean that the effects of free trade agreements on social development are being taken more seriously. For example, the question arises as to how far social diversity is endangered by free trade.

Sustainability and sustainable development are significant issues of political agreement in the bi-regional relationship between the EU and (CE)LAC. A common vision exists in the area of climate change mitigation and adaptation. This has led to the implementation of concrete programmes such as EURoCLIMA and the GCCA. It remains a challenge to dissociate the social dimension of bi-regional relations from a classic North-South development agenda in which EURoCLIMA partner countries are expected to improve one-sidedly even as the EU is deeply implicated in Climate Change as a major producer of greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, cooperation in areas such as climate change should give more attention to areas such as the use of indigenous and traditional knowledge as well as the “use of nature-based solutions”. This would be a counterweight to the already much stronger role of various actors in the business sector whose participation is encouraged through Corporate Social Responsibility.

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## 7.3 DOCUMENTS OF THE EULAC-FOCUS CONSORTIUM

### **EULAC Focus 2019a: Institutional Analysis of EU-CELAC Relations.**

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The European Union – Latin America and Caribbean Foundation (EU-LAC Foundation) was created in 2010 by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union (EU) and Latin American and Caribbean (LAC). Its Members are the Member states of the EU and LAC regions as well as the EU itself. The Foundation is a tool of the EU-LAC partnership and its activities feed into the intergovernmental dialogue, in line with the bi-regional EU-CELAC Action Plan. The EU-LAC Foundation was entrusted with the mission of strengthening and promoting the strategic bi-regional relationship, enhancing its visibility and fostering active participation of the respective civil societies.

